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QUI  TAM  LITIGATION  AGAINST  GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS:  CONSTITUTIONAL  IMPLICATIONS
OF  A  NEGLECTED  HISTORY
Randy Beck*
The Supreme Court concluded twenty-five years ago, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
that uninjured private plaintiffs may not litigate “generalized grievances” about the legality of
executive branch conduct.  According to the Lujan Court, Congress lacked power to authorize
suit by a plaintiff who could not establish some “particularized” injury from the challenged
conduct.  The Court believed litigation to require executive branch legal compliance, brought by
an uninjured private party, is not a “case” or “controversy” within the Article III judicial power
and impermissibly reassigns the President’s Article II responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”  The decision effectively granted the President a semi-exclusive power to mon-
itor and ensure the legality of a broad range of executive branch activity.
The Lujan Court overlooked a now relatively unfamiliar aspect of Anglo-American legal
history.  From the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the English Parliament, American
colonial and state legislatures, and early Federal Congresses routinely enacted “qui tam” legisla-
tion that authorized uninjured private “informers” to collect penalties for unlawful conduct by
government officials.  These qui tam statutes authorized private litigation against executive offi-
cials in circumstances that would be classified as generalized grievances under modern standing
jurisprudence.  The Lujan Court acknowledged historical use of qui tam legislation, but appar-
ently believed such statutes were limited to regulation of private parties.  The widespread practice
of regulating government officials through qui tam legislation in the five centuries leading up to
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the framing of our Constitution suggests the need to reconsider the reasoning of Lujan, though
perhaps not the result, and to revise the Court’s understanding of legislative tools available to
monitor the legality of executive branch conduct.
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INTRODUCTION
The generation that framed our Constitution sought to establish “a gov-
ernment of laws, and not of men.”1  Government submission to law was cen-
tral to the Framers’ vision for a constitutionally limited republican
government.2  Over two centuries later, however, many commentators
believe executive officials of both major political parties have subordinated
the rule of law to the pursuit of other agendas.3  The past half century in
particular has generated numerous reports of federal officials violating seem-
1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1,
art. XXX (separating legislative, executive, and judicial powers “to the end it may be a
government of laws and not of men”).
2 See John Adams, Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present State of the American
Colonies, UNIVERSAL ASYLUM AND COLUMBIAN MAG., Dec. 1790, at 392 (“[T]he very defani-
tion of a Republic, is ‘an Empire of Laws, and not of Men.’”) (letter to the Hon. George
Wythe, of Virginia).
3 See Frederick Schauer, The Political Risks (If Any) of Breaking the Law, 4 J. LEGAL ANAL-
YSIS 83, 90–93 (2012) (offering illustrative examples of asserted legal violations by federal
officials and others, including military action in Libya, treatment of detainees, warrantless
surveillance of citizens, and the Iran-Contra affair); Peter M. Shane, The Presidential Statu-
tory Stretch and the Rule of Law, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1231, 1237–48 (2016) (detailing and
assessing “statutory stretches” employed to justify military operations in Kosovo, Iraq, Syria,
and Libya as well as methods of interrogation and surveillance); Jack Goldsmith & Matthew
Waxman, Obama, Not Bush, Is the Master of Unilateral War, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 14, 2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/119827/obamas-war-powers-legacy-he-must-seek-congres
sional-authorization (critiquing Obama administration construction of War Powers Resolu-
tion in connection with Libya military operations); John O. McGinnis, The Coming Lawless-
ness: The Choices This Election Are Bad News for the Rule of Law, CITY J. (Oct. 4, 2016), http://
www.city-journal.org/html/coming-lawlessness-14770.html (expressing concerns about
legal fidelity of both major-party presidential candidates in the 2016 election). See generally
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED ASSAULT ON
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2015) (detailing claims of unlawful Obama
administration actions); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1056–98 (2008) (surveying
conflicts over legislative regulation of military and national security activities from the Tru-
man administration through the George W. Bush administration); Ted Cruz, The Obama
Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63 (2015) (also detail-
ing claims of unlawful Obama administration actions).
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ingly clear legal requirements or offering implausible rationales for ignoring
applicable rules.4
The importance of government respect for law warrants careful consid-
eration of the mechanisms available for enforcing legal constraints on gov-
ernment officials, especially executive branch officials who apply the law to
others.5  This Article will focus particular attention on the Supreme Court’s
twenty-five-year-old decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,6 which articu-
lated strict limits on judicial monitoring of executive action, even when
authorized by Congress.  The Lujan Court assigned the President a virtually
exclusive authority to police the legality of a broad range of executive branch
conduct.  In litigation initiated by private parties, Lujan concluded, the judi-
ciary may only evaluate the legality of executive action as a step toward
redressing particularized harm to an identified plaintiff.7  The decision
rested on two constitutional theories: challenges to the lawfulness of execu-
tive conduct by those without a particularized injury (1) would exceed Article
III judicial power, which is limited to resolution of “Cases” and “Controver-
sies,” and (2) would reassign the President’s Article II responsibility to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” making courts “virtually continu-
ing monitors” of executive action.8  Under Lujan, Congress lacks power to
authorize private litigation of generalized grievances concerning the legality
of executive branch conduct.9
This Article challenges Lujan’s conclusion that only the President or his
subordinates may litigate generalized grievances about executive lawlessness.
The challenge rests on an often overlooked aspect of Anglo-American legal
history, the extensive practice of regulating public officials through “qui tam”
legislation.10  The qui tam label derives from a longer Latin phrase describ-
ing a litigant “who pursues [an] action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well
as his own.”11  From the fourteenth century through the eighteenth century,
Parliament often enacted qui tam statutes that allowed any person to sue for
a statutory offense and instructed the court to divide any recovery between
the crown and the private litigant, called a “common informer.”12  The
informer did not need to allege individualized injury “because every Offence,
for which such Action is brought, is supposed to be a general Grievance to
every Body.”13  The Supreme Court has acknowledged (post-Lujan) that qui
tam actions satisfy Article III case or controversy requirements, given their
4 See infra notes 43–63 and accompanying text.
5 See 2 JAMES WILSON, Of the Executive Department, in LECTURES ON LAW 183, 198 (1790)
(“[T]he law is higher than the magistrate, who administers it.”).
6 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
7 Id. at 560–61.
8 Id. at 577 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
9 Id. at 576–77.
10 See infra Part II.
11 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000).
12 See infra Section II.A.
13 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 267 (1721).
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long historical pedigree,14 but continues to recite standing principles that
cannot be reconciled with qui tam history.15  The Court has left open the
question of whether qui tam statutes might violate the Article II Take Care
Clause as interpreted in Lujan.16
The Lujan Court was aware of the historical use of qui tam legislation,
but apparently believed informer statutes regulated only “private part[ies].”17
The Court overlooked Parliament’s extensive use of qui tam legislation from
the fourteenth century onward to enforce specified duties of government
officials.18  This English practice of regulating public officials through qui
tam legislation crossed the Atlantic and was widely followed in the American
states at the time the Constitution was ratified.19  Federal legislators, begin-
ning with the First Congress under the new Constitution, authorized qui tam
litigation against numerous executive branch officials, including revenue
officers, census workers, treasury employees, postal workers, and officials
overseeing trade with Native American tribes.20  This centuries-old practice
of authorizing qui tam informers to litigate generalized grievances concern-
ing the lawfulness of government conduct undermines Lujan’s conclusion
that the Take Care Clause was intended to grant the President virtually exclu-
sive authority to police the legality of executive action in the absence of par-
ticularized harm.21  It was well established at the time of the framing that a
legislature could authorize judicial monitoring of executive conduct at the
behest of private informers who lacked any individual injury.
Part I of this Article considers constitutional principles potentially rele-
vant to judicial monitoring of executive branch legal compliance.  In addi-
tion to the Article III case or controversy requirement and the Article II Take
Care Clause argument from Lujan, we review the Supreme Court’s decision
in Morrison v. Olson,22 upholding appointment of “independent” prosecutors
to investigate executive branch officials.  The Morrison majority concluded
that the President exercised “sufficient control” over the independent coun-
sel to satisfy Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, which vests all “executive
power” in the President,23 while Justice Scalia’s Morrison dissent argued that
14 See Vt. Agency, 529 U.S. at 771–78.
15 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
16 See Vt. Agency, 529 U.S. at 778 n.8.
17 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1992) (“Nor . . . is [this] the unu-
sual case in which Congress has created a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit
against a private party for the Government’s benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the
victorious plaintiff.” (emphasis added)).
18 See infra Section II.A.
19 See infra Section II.B.
20 See infra Section II.C.
21 See infra Section III.B.
22 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
23 Id. at 696 (“Notwithstanding the fact that the counsel is to some degree ‘indepen-
dent’ and free from executive supervision to a greater extent than other federal prosecu-
tors, in our view these features of the Act give the Executive Branch sufficient control over
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any limitation on the President’s control made the statute unconstitutional.24
The “unitary executive” principle that underlay both the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Morrison provides another possible basis for objecting to
litigation against executive officials by uninjured private citizens who are not
subject to presidential control.
Part II of the Article focuses on the history of qui tam legislation
directed at government officials in England, the early American states, and
the initial Congresses following ratification of the Constitution.  Qui tam leg-
islation in England and the early American states helped accomplish several
goals related to regulation of government conduct.  Authorizing qui tam liti-
gation (1) enhanced monitoring of decentralized government activity,25 (2)
countered incentives for official resistance to legislative mandates,26 and (3)
bolstered public confidence in the lawful performance of important govern-
ment functions.27  These objectives help explain the decision by the First
Congress to adopt qui tam statutes regulating federal revenue officers,28 cen-
sus workers,29 and treasury officials,30 as well as the adoption of qui tam stat-
utes in the Second Congress regulating postal employees31 and officials
licensing trade with Native American tribes.32
Part III of the Article considers the constitutional issues raised above in
light of the history surveyed in Part II.  Section III.A addresses the “case or
controversy” requirement and the doctrine of standing.  Cass Sunstein argues
that the history of qui tam legislation shows that the Court reached the
wrong outcome in Lujan.33  On this view, Congress has power to create uni-
versal standing to litigate generalized grievances, whether or not the statute
includes a bounty.  While that could be an accurate understanding of Article
III, the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the history of qui tam
legislation.  The bounty provision of a qui tam statute gives the successful
informer an individual right to payment, a concrete individual interest that
distinguishes a qui tam statute from a bare universal authorization to sue.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) citizen suit provision considered in
Lujan is also distinguishable from a traditional qui tam statute in terms of the
duties enforced and the relief available.  Qui tam statutes tended to define
specific legal duties of executive officials that could be enforced through pri-
vate collection of financial penalties, while the ESA sought to authorize
the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitution-
ally assigned duties.”).
24 Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25 See infra subsections II.A.1, II.B.1.
26 See infra subsections II.A.2, II.B.2.
27 See infra subsections II.A.3, II.B.3.
28 See infra subsection II.C.1.
29 See infra subsection II.C.2.
30 See infra subsection II.C.3.
31 See infra subsection II.C.4.
32 See infra subsection II.C.5.
33 Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 164 (1992).
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injunctive relief to enforce any provision of a complex and partially indeter-
minate regulatory scheme.  The history of qui tam legislation should, how-
ever, change the way we think about standing and the role of the courts in
cases presenting generalized grievances.  The Lujan Court overreached when
it described “particularized” injury as part of the “irreducible constitutional
minimum” of Article III standing, and when it suggested that Congress may
never authorize private litigation of generalized grievances about executive
branch conduct.34
Section III.B considers implications of Part II’s history for Lujan’s read-
ing of the Take Care Clause.  The Anglo-American history of regulating gov-
ernment officials through qui tam litigation provides powerful evidence that
Article II was not understood to create a semi-exclusive presidential authority
to police the legality of executive branch conduct.  Based on more than four
and a half centuries of legislative practice, the First Congress believed it
could grant members of the public standing to litigate generalized grievances
about the legality of executive branch conduct, at least when it conferred a
financial interest in the litigation.  So far as we know, neither President Wash-
ington nor anyone else raised any constitutional concerns.
Lujan’s reading of the Take Care Clause not only overlooks settled pat-
terns of interbranch relations at the time of the framing, but also ignores the
practical obstacles that would have made any centralized presidential moni-
toring of federal officials largely superficial.35  The Constitution anticipated
activities that would take federal officers throughout the already vast territory
of the United States at a time when means of travel and communication were
much less advanced than today.  Viewed from the perspective of the late
eighteenth century, a semi-exclusive presidential power to monitor the law-
fulness of executive conduct would have meant virtually no monitoring at all
for a great deal of important executive branch activity.
Section III.C considers whether qui tam litigation against executive
branch officers can be reconciled with the “unitary executive” principle
embodied in Article II, Section 1, which vests all “executive power” in the
President.  The best answer to this constitutional concern flows from Black-
stone’s explanation that qui tam legislation authorizes a species of “popular
action,” because the statutory right to sue is “given to the people in gen-
eral.”36  The power to file a qui tam action is a nongovernmental power and
hence does not implicate the tripartite constitutional allocation of govern-
mental power among the three branches.
A number of eighteenth-century mechanisms called on citizens to par-
ticipate in the enforcement of laws and the projection of communal force.
Local sheriffs could call out a posse comitatus of armed citizens to help catch a
fleeing criminal or keep the peace.  Citizen jurors were called upon to
authorize prosecutions as members of a grand jury, or to render verdicts
about the legality of a defendant’s conduct as members of a petit jury.  The
34 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
35 See infra notes 508–12 and accompanying text.
36 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160.
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government could muster the citizen militia to fight external enemies or to
enforce the laws.  Seagoing vessels could be licensed as “privateers,” supple-
menting government naval forces.  All of these mechanisms empowered citi-
zens to participate in law enforcement and extend the government’s coercive
reach, while often serving as checks on governmental power.  Qui tam regula-
tion of government officials can be seen as another of these institutions
through which the public participated in law enforcement in order to both
supplement and restrain executive authority.
The purpose of this Article is to highlight an underappreciated aspect of
our legal history that has significant implications for ongoing constitutional
debates.  I do not advocate broad revival of the tradition of regulating execu-
tive officials through qui tam legislation.  Elsewhere, I consider whether
selective use might be appropriate to promote legal accountability in particu-
lar contexts, such as where a conflict of interest within the executive branch
could hinder enforcement of the laws.37  Whatever implications this aspect of
our history might have for future policy discussions, however, this Article
looks to the past principally to inform present debates about constitutional
power.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL MONITORING OF EXECUTIVE CONDUCT
James Wilson, one of our first Supreme Court Justices, lectured on law at
what became the University of Pennsylvania.38  In a lecture on the executive
department, Wilson expressed the view, widely embraced in the framing gen-
eration, that the “principle of democracy” means the law should be “higher
than the magistrate, who administers it.”39  Many of the core political values
of the framing generation could be realized only if government officials
respected legal constraints on their conduct.  Popular sovereignty would be
operationalized through law, as agents of the people functioned within con-
stitutional boundaries established by popular conventions and legislative
boundaries enacted by the people’s representatives.40  Liberty would be pre-
37 See Randy Beck, Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, 21
CHAP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).  For example, perhaps it would be useful to enact a qui
tam statute penalizing an official who expends federal funds without a supporting congres-
sional appropriation, an area where presidential support for the expenditure could pre-
clude internal executive branch remedies and standing doctrine would complicate efforts
to obtain a judicial remedy. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”).
38 See James Wilson (1742–1798), PENN BIOGRAPHIES, http://www.archives.upenn.edu/
people/1700s/wilson_jas.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2017).  Wilson also signed the Declara-
tion of Independence and participated in the Constitutional Convention. Id.
39 See 2 WILSON, supra note 5, at 198.
40 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA 2009) (“[T]he
power of the people is superior to” the legislature and judiciary, which are bound by “[the
will of] the people, declared in the Constitution.”); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON
CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. XI, § 141, at 79 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1690) (“[N]or can [the
people] be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen
and authorised to make laws for them.”); 2 WILSON, supra note 5, at 198 (“[T]he principle
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served through law that defined and limited the power of government.41
Law would even secure a measure of equality, helping ensure that those seen
as similarly situated would be treated in similar ways.42
Given the central role of government submission to law in realizing our
political values, we should pay careful attention to whether executive officials
observe legal constraints on their conduct and to available mechanisms for
enforcing compliance.  In this Part, I review claims that executive officials
sometimes ignore clear legal rules or offer dubious justifications for execu-
tive action.  We then consider principles drawn from Articles II and III of the
Constitution that may limit judicial examination of executive conduct.  The
constitutional analysis begins with a brief consideration of Morrison v. Olson,
an important Article II case, and then pays particular attention to Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, which embraced both Article II and Article III grounds
for limiting litigation against executive officials.  This Part of the Article con-
cludes with an introduction to qui tam legislation, a feature of Anglo-Ameri-
can legal history that casts considerable doubt on the historical analysis
driving the Lujan decision.
A. Recent Executive Conduct and the Rule of Law
While our political philosophy prioritizes executive respect for legal
boundaries, the past half century has generated numerous reports of illegal
conduct by the executive branch, or conduct of dubious legality.  The Nixon
administration declined to spend appropriated funds on policy grounds
unrelated to the authorizing statutes43 and covered up a burglary of Demo-
of democracy [means] . . . that the law is higher than the magistrate, who administers it;
that the constitution is higher than both; and that the supreme power, remaining with the
people, is higher than all the three.”).
41 See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 32 (1960) (noting that under early American political phi-
losophy, “[government’s] authority derived from law” and “[b]y the same token its author-
ity was limited by law”); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1608, at 472 (1833) (arguing that a republic with a limited constitution
cannot have “any practical restraint upon the acts of the government, or any practical
enforcement of the rights of the citizens” without an independent judiciary “to interpret
the constitution and laws, and to preserve the citizens against oppression and usurpation”);
1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Study of the Law in the United States, in LECTURES ON LAW, supra note
5, at 431, 435 (“Without liberty, law loses its nature and its name, and becomes oppression.
Without law, liberty also loses its nature and its name, and becomes licentiousness.”).
42 William Cranch, Preface to 1 Cranch iii (1804) (“[A judge] can not decide a similar
case differently, without strong reasons, which, for his own justification, he will wish to
make public.”); 1 JAMES WILSON, Of Man, as a Member of Society, in LECTURES ON LAW, supra
note 5, at 621, 638 (“With regard to all, there is an equality in rights and in obligations;
there is that ‘jus aequum,’ that equal law, in which the Romans placed true freedom.”);
Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801) (“[T]he minority possess their
equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be oppression.”).
43 See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975) (EPA lacked authority to refuse
allocation of funds authorized for municipal sewage and sewage treatment facilities); St.
Highway Comm’n of Mo. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1118 (8th Cir. 1973) (U.S. Secretary of
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cratic National Committee headquarters that eventually led to the President’s
resignation.44  The Ford administration sent troops into Cambodia to rescue
the crew of a captured merchant ship (the Mayaguez), going so far as to
bomb an airfield and storage depot after the rescue, notwithstanding con-
gressional funding restrictions forbidding “combat activities” and “hostilities”
in Southeast Asia.45  A State Department official acknowledged that the
Carter administration sometimes violated section 502B of the Foreign Assis-
tance Act,46 banning security assistance to countries engaged in a pattern of
human rights violations.47  National security officials in the Reagan adminis-
tration violated at least the spirit and probably the letter of the Boland
Amendment by funneling profits from Iranian arms sales to the Nicaraguan
Contras.48  George H.W. Bush and other presidents have been criticized for
ignoring statutory language based on signing statements asserting broad and
untested claims of executive power.49  The Clinton administration construed
an appropriations provision as authorizing participation in NATO’s Kosovo
operation beyond the sixty-day limit of the War Powers Resolution (WPR),
even though the WPR explicitly rejects authorization by that means.50
Transportation did not have express or implied authority to withhold highway funds on
nonstatutory grounds); cf. Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 263 (C.D. Cal. 1973)
(denying standing to challenge EPA’s withholding of funds for water treatment plants).
44 See Gerald Caplan, The Making of the Attorney General: John Mitchell and the Crimes of
Watergate Reconsidered, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 311, 326–32 (2010) (reviewing JAMES ROSEN,
THE STRONG MAN (2008)).
45 Barron & Lederman, supra note 3, at 1072.
46 See Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices,
76 AM. J. INT’L L. 246, 263–75 (1982) (discussing interpretation of various statutory terms
and application to various aid packages; noting situation involving Argentina when non-
statutory exceptions “were abused in a way that seriously undermined the purpose of sec-
tion 502B” and proposed military training package to Guatemala that “seemed to be clearly
contrary to section 502B”); see also Jeffrey B. Whalen, Does the Law of Human Rights Guide—
Or Rationalize—U.S. Foreign Policy?, 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 18, 19 (1985) (“The execu-
tive branch has found it very difficult to comply with the laws and usually has sought to
circumvent, ignore or even violate the laws.  Both the Reagan and Carter Administrations
have been unable or unwilling to carry out fully the requirements of the statutes.”).
47 See 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (2012).
48 See Schauer, supra note 3, at 95 (“Someone asking the question, ex ante, whether the
Iran-Contra scheme violated the Boland Amendment could not have been in any serious
doubt about the answer to that question.”). But see Cruz, supra note 3, at 92 (“It is disputed
whether the diversion of the Iran arms sales proceeds to the Contras violated the Boland
Amendment.”).
49 See Peter M. Shane, Presidential Signing Statements and the Rule of Law as an “Unstruc-
tured Institution,” 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 231, 242–43 (2007) (signing statements by
first President Bush included “some of the more expansive claims of presidentialist consti-
tutionalism”; second President Bush issued signing statements raising constitutional objec-
tions to over 1000 statutory provisions “frequently based on no legal authority whatever”);
see also Shane, supra note 3, at 1260–61 (noting second President Bush raised constitu-
tional objections to “1,070 provisions embodied in 127 statutes” including some that “were
wholly unprecedented and even silly”).
50 See Barron & Lederman, supra note 3, at 1090 & n.619.
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The proliferation of terrorist incidents and political polarization since
the turn of the century have, if anything, heightened pressures on the execu-
tive branch to overstep legal boundaries.  The Department of Justice under
President George W. Bush offered a narrow reading of the “severe physical or
mental pain or suffering” required for interrogation to constitute “torture,”
based on a strained analogy to use of the phrase “severe pain” in an unre-
lated medical benefits statute.51  Only the threat of resignation by several
high level Justice Department officials prevented continuation of an ongoing
surveillance program viewed as legally indefensible.52  The Obama adminis-
tration violated the WPR by ordering extensive Libya operations based on an
implausible argument that U.S. forces were not engaged in “hostilities.”53
Published reports indicate that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
issued a top secret ruling criticizing the National Security Agency for prohib-
ited data searches raising serious Fourth Amendment issues and for a lack of
candor in disclosing the extent of the practice.54  Critics also alleged a num-
ber of unlawful acts in implementing the Affordable Care Act (ACA), includ-
ing delay of the employer mandate beyond the statutory effective date55 and
51 See Shane, supra note 3, at 1238, 1269–72; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assis-
tant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President
5–6 (Aug. 1, 2002) (regarding standards of conduct for interrogation under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340–2340A, and defining “severe physical or mental pain or suffering” in torture stat-
ute by reference to potential sources of “severe pain” in statute concerning medical
benefits).
52 See Julian Sanchez, What the Ashcroft “Hospital Showdown” on NSA Spying Was All About,
ARS TECHNICA (July 29, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/what-the-
ashcroft-hospital-showdown-on-nsa-spying-was-all-about/.
53 Goldsmith & Waxman, supra note 3 (saying the Obama administration rendered
WPR’s sixty-day limit “meaningless in many important contexts” with “unconvincing” argu-
ment that the administration was “not engaged in ‘hostilities’ even though they were part
of seven months of air strikes that helped decimate Libyan army units and bring down the
government”); Shane, supra note 3, at 1246–48; Jennifer Steinhauer, Obama Adviser Defends
Libya Policy to Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/
us/politics/29powers.html  (quoting Democratic Senator Jim Webb on the administra-
tion’s position: “When you have an operation that goes on for months, costs billions of
dollars, where the United States is providing two-thirds of the troops . . . where they’re
dropping bombs that are killing people, where you’re paying your troops offshore combat
pay and there are areas of prospective escalation . . . I would say that’s hostilities.”).
54 See Tim Johnson, Secret Court Rebukes NSA for 5-Year Illegal Surveillance of U.S. Citizens,
MIAMI HERALD (May 26, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/
national/article152948259.html.
55 Under section 1513(d) of the ACA, the employer mandate provisions were to apply
“to months beginning after December 31, 2013.”  Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1513(d), 124
Stat. 119, 256 (2010).  The administration nevertheless decided that employers with fifty to
ninety-nine employees would not be expected to comply with the provision until 2016, a
delay of two years, and that employers with a hundred or more employees would not need
to comply until 2015. See Juliet Eilperin & Amy Goldstein, White House Delays Health Insur-
ance Mandate for Medium-Size Employers Until 2016, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/white-house-delays-health-insurance-
mandate-for-medium-sized-employers-until-2016/2014/02/10/ade6b344-9279-11e3-84e1-
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federal payments to health insurance companies in violation of statutory
directives56 or in the absence of congressional appropriations.57  The Trump
administration was accused of unconstitutional conduct, or at least stretching
prior legal precedents, in bombing Syria without first seeking congressional
authorization.58  High-level officials of both major parties have conducted
public business using private email systems, skirting laws designed to pro-
mote transparency, preserve records, and increase cybersecurity.59  Adminis-
trative agencies routinely fail to satisfy regulatory deadlines set by statute.60
27626c5ef5fb_story.html; Avik Roy, Opinion, Well, Never Mind Then: To ‘Ease the Transition
to a 30-Hour Week,’ Obamacare Employer Mandate Delayed Again, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2014), http:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2014/02/10/well-never-mind-then-to-ease-the-
transition-to-a-30-hour-week-obamacare-employer-mandate-delayed-again/#6ec7aadb57fe.
56 Section 1341 of the ACA provided for the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) to collect funds from insurers for a reinsurance program, administrative costs
of the reinsurance program, and additional amounts to deposit into the U.S. Treasury.
The statute provided that the funds collected for the third purpose “shall be deposited into
the general fund of the Treasury of the United States and may not be used for the [reinsur-
ance] program established under this section.”  Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1341(b)(4),
124 Stat. 119, 208–11 (2010).  Nevertheless, HHS allocated all of the funds collected to the
reinsurance program, rather than depositing funds into the Treasury as required by the
statute. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-B-328016, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES: TRANSITIONAL REINSURANCE PROGRAM (2016); see Seth Chandler, Opin-
ion, Busted: GAO Finds Payments to Insurers Under Affordable Care Act Are Illegal, FORBES (Sept.
29, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2016/09/29/busted-gao-finds-
payments-to-insurers-under-affordable-care-act-are-illegal/#6828d20147db.
57 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 168 (D.D.C.
2016) (determining that HHS payments to insurers pursuant to section 1402 of ACA vio-
late Constitution’s Appropriations Clause).
58 See Jack Goldsmith, Opinion, The Constitutionality of the Syria Strike Through the Eyes of
OLC (and the Obama Administration), LAWFARE (Apr. 7, 2017, 7:31 AM), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/constitutionality-syria-strike-through-eyes-olc-and-obama-administration;
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Opinion, Trump’s First Unconstitutional War, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 11,
2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/446633/donald-trump-syria-strike-unconsti
tutional-declaration-war. But see John Yoo, Opinion, Trump’s Syria Strike Was Constitutional,
NAT’L REV. (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/446692/trump-syria -
strike-constitutional-presidents-have-broad-war-powers.
59 See U.S. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ESP-16-03, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY: EVALU-
ATION OF EMAIL RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS (2016) (report-
ing on varying use of nondepartmental email accounts for State Department business by
officials in multiple administrations); see also Matt Apuzzo & Maggie Haberman, At Least 6
White House Advisers Used Private Email Accounts, N.Y. TIMES  (Sept. 25, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/politics/private-email-trump-kushner-bannon.html.
60 See generally Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1169–71 (9th Cir.
2002) (multiple Fish and Wildlife Service failures to satisfy twelve-month deadline for
addressing listing petitions under Endangered Species Act); In re Bluewater Network, 234
F.3d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Coast Guard failure to issue oil spill regulations eight years
after statutory deadline); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (Fish
and Wildlife Service failed to meet one-year deadline for identifying critical habitat for Rio
Grande silvery minnow); In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F. 2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (FDA failed to
act within 180-day deadline for decisions on new drug and antibiotic applications); Oxfam
Am., Inc. v. SEC, 126 F. Supp. 3d 168 (D. Mass. 2015) (failure to meet 270-day deadline for
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We could debate at length the legality of some of these executive
actions, the constitutionality of the duties imposed, and the wisdom of the
underlying legislative directives.61  But we could also cite other examples of
legally dubious executive behavior.62  Commentators from varying political
and jurisprudential perspectives have discerned threats to the rule of law in
such executive conduct.63  My own view is that human nature poses a perpet-
ual threat to the rule of law.  Humans chafe at impediments to the pursuit of
passionately desired ends, including government officials convinced of the
justice, necessity, or expediency of a favored course of action.  James Madison
observed that “power is of an encroaching nature” and must “be effectually
restrained from passing the limits assigned to it.”64  The “great difficulty” in
framing a government, he argued, lies in “enabl[ing] the government to con-
trol the governed” while “oblig[ing] it to control itself.”65  Preserving the rule
of law requires a mutually reinforcing combination of cultural habits and
accessible legal remedies.66  The need for an effective response to unlawful
conduct warrants close examination of constitutional principles that may
limit the power of courts to review the legality of executive action.
issuance of regulations under Dodd-Frank); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C12-
4529, 2013 WL 5718339 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (FDA failed to meet seven deadlines for food
safety regulations).
61 I have argued elsewhere that the President’s duty to obey the law and the presiden-
tial oath to uphold the Constitution justify ignoring statutes that he reasonably views as
unconstitutional. See J. Randy Beck, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving
the Royal Prerogative, 16 CONST. COMM. 419 (1999) (book review).
62 See sources discussing numerous additional examples of legally questionable con-
duct by various administrations, supra note 3.
63 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 4 (“The Obama administration’s actions . . . reflect
long-standing progressive unease with the concept of the rule of law.”); McGinnis, supra
note 3 (arguing that both major party presidential candidates in the 2016 election would
be unreliable defenders of the rule of law); Shane, supra note 49, at 231, 233 (“Critics of
the Bush 43 administration have not infrequently charged that the administration’s uni-
lateralism is antagonistic to the rule of law.”); Shane, supra note 3, at 1272 (explaining that
stretching a statute to reach a surprising interpretation “is more consistent with rule of law
values” than advancing a claim of uncontrollable and unreviewable presidential power, but
for several reasons “the statutory stretch strategy might be thought actually to undermine
the rule of law”).
64 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 279 (James Madison) (ABA 2009).
65 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 294 (James Madison) (ABA 2009).
66 Peter Shane points out that “many plausible conceptions” of the “rule of law” can be
offered. See Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and Presidential Influence in
the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 680 (2014).  However, one suspects that
most of the contending alternatives would include an expectation that “government actors
should obey the law” and that “meaningful recourse should be available” when law has
been violated. Id. at 681.  Shane focuses on recourse for those “injured” by violations of
law. Id.  But I contend that maintaining respect for the rule of law also requires effective
remedies for unlawful conduct even when one cannot identify an injured party with suffi-
cient motivation to pursue relief.
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B. Morrison v. Olson and the Unity of Executive Power
The Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson considered constitutional chal-
lenges to the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act, a post-Watergate statute designed to deal with potential conflicts of inter-
est that can arise when the Department of Justice investigates important pres-
idential appointees.67  The statute instructed the Attorney General to seek
judicial appointment of an independent counsel to investigate high-ranking
executive branch officials unless the Attorney General’s preliminary inquiry
found “no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is war-
ranted.”68  One argument against the statute was that it violated the separa-
tion of powers by limiting the President’s control of an official wielding
Article II executive power.69
The Morrison majority acknowledged that “the functions performed by
the independent counsel are ‘executive’ in the sense that they are law
enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by officials within
the Executive Branch.”70  The Court rejected the separation of powers argu-
ment, however, because the statute gave the President various means to con-
trol the independent counsel.  The Act permitted the Attorney General to
remove the independent counsel for “good cause,” a power that allowed the
President to carry out his constitutional duty to take care that “the laws are
‘faithfully executed.’”71  While the “no reasonable grounds” for further inves-
tigation standard might seem to require frequent appointment of an inde-
pendent counsel, the Court noted that the Attorney General’s decision
whether to seek appointment was subject to the Attorney General’s unreview-
able discretion.72  The appointing court defined the independent counsel’s
jurisdiction by reference to facts submitted by the Attorney General, and the
independent counsel was required to follow Justice Department policy if
“possible.”73  The Court concluded that these features of the statute afforded
the executive branch “sufficient control over the independent counsel to
ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned
duties.”74
The Court’s opinion in Morrison was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who had previously served as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC), a division of the Department of Justice that deals regu-
larly with separation of powers issues.75  The dissenting opinion was written
67 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988).
68 Id. at 661 (quoting Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1) (1982)).
69 See id. at 705–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 691 (majority opinion).
71 Id. at 692–93, 696.
72 Id. at 696.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, the Separation of Powers, and
the Riddle of the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1741 (2006) (“Rehnquist next encountered
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by Justice Scalia, another former head of OLC.76  Justice Scalia argued that
the statute violated the Constitution by depriving the President of plenary
authority over the independent counsel.  Focusing on Article II, Section 1’s
grant of “the executive Power” to the President, Justice Scalia argued that
“this does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive
power.”77  The Framers of the Constitution deliberately rejected models of
divided executive power.  Alexander Hamilton defended this aspect of the
constitutional design, arguing that unity in the Executive promoted energetic
law enforcement and helped maintain accountability.78  Based on the Fram-
ers’ decision to vest executive power in a single set of hands, Justice Scalia
believed the Constitution would not tolerate any statutory limitation that
deprived the President of exclusive control over the exercise of executive
power.79
While the majority and Justice Scalia disagreed over the degree of con-
trol the President must exercise, they agreed on the basic principle that exec-
utive power must be subject to presidential direction.  If Congress provided
for a person to exercise “executive power” within the meaning of Article II,
Section 1, without giving sufficient means of presidential supervision, the
statute would presumably be unconstitutional under either the majority or
dissenting opinions.  All of the Justices in Morrison viewed the independent
counsel’s authority to investigate and prosecute criminal charges against
executive branch officials as an exercise of executive power.  This constitu-
tional bar to the completely independent exercise of executive power could
affect who may litigate against executive officials and under what
circumstances.
C. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Generalized Grievances
A few years after Morrison, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,80 an important precedent on the law of stand-
ing.  The doctrine of standing seeks to identify the sorts of “Cases” and “Con-
troversies” that fall within the Article III judicial power.81 Lujan was brought
by environmental organizations against the Secretary of the Interior, chal-
lenging regulations that applied the Endangered Species Act (ESA) only to
federal government actions in this country or on the high seas.82  The central
question for the Court was whether the plaintiffs had standing to seek judi-
the separation of powers with his appointment as Assistant Attorney General for the Office
of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Justice Department.”).
76 Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437,
500 n.150 (1993).
77 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
79 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As I have said, however, it is ulti-
mately irrelevant how much the statute reduces Presidential control.”).
80 See 504 U.S. 555, 555 (1992).
81 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
82 Under section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act:
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cial review of the federal government’s failure to apply the ESA to federal
projects in foreign countries.  The Court described “the core component of
standing” as “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III.”83  It laid out an oft-cited version of a familiar
three-part test:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three elements.  First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which
is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjec-
tural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”  Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be
“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the
court.”  Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that
the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”84
In cases challenging the legality of government conduct, the majority indi-
cated, a person who is “an object” of the government’s action will ordinarily
have standing, but standing will be harder to demonstrate when the “plain-
tiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regula-
tion (or lack of regulation) of someone else.”85  The Lujan majority concluded
that the plaintiff environmental organizations could not show that the gov-
ernment’s restricted application of the ESA would cause an “imminent”
injury to their members, because the individual members had no definitive
plans to travel to countries where endangered animals were allegedly
threatened by federal action.86
The most relevant portion of the Lujan opinion for our purposes is the
section rejecting the “procedural injury” theory of standing embraced by the
Court of Appeals.  The appellate court had relied on the ESA’s “citizen suit”
provision, which authorized “any person” to “commence a civil suit on his
own behalf” to enjoin violation of “any provision” of the ESA, including the
provision requiring interagency consultation before federal actions that
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary [of the Interior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried
out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after
consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558 (alteration in original) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982)).
The initial regulation applied the ESA to federal actions abroad, but a revised regulation
reinterpreted the Act to apply only to actions taken within the United States and on the
high seas. Id. at 558–59.
83 Id. at 560.
84 Id. at 560–61 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
85 Id. at 561–62.
86 Id. at 563–64.
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might threaten the habitat of endangered animals.87  As explained by the
Lujan majority, the Court of Appeals reasoned:
[T]he citizen-suit provision creates a “procedural righ[t]” to consultation in
all “persons”—so that anyone can file suit in federal court to challenge the
Secretary’s (or presumably any other official’s) failure to follow the assert-
edly correct consultative procedure, notwithstanding his or her inability to
allege any discrete injury flowing from that failure.88
The Lujan majority rejected the appellate court’s procedural injury theory
based on caselaw holding that
a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—
claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application
of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an
Article III case or controversy.89
The majority surveyed a number of cases in which the Court had applied this
rule against private litigation of “generalized grievances.”90  For instance, in
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, the Court dismissed a suit by
citizens claiming that members of Congress violated the Constitution’s
Incompatibility Clause by holding commissions in the military reserves.91
The Court noted that the conduct challenged “would adversely affect only
the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance,” a kind of
interest that could not serve as a predicate for standing to sue.92  The Court
has similarly held that an injury a person suffers in her capacity as a taxpayer,
in common with all other taxpayers, is too generalized to support Article III
standing.93  Consistent with this long line of cases, the Lujan Court insisted
that federal court litigation must be premised on a “particularized” injury,
meaning “that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way.”94
Lujan broke new ground when it expressly ruled that the Constitution
prevents Congress from conferring standing on private persons to litigate
generalized grievances:
[T]here is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the
source of the asserted right.  Whether the courts were to act on their own, or
at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement
described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to
the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch—one of
87 Id. at 571–72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982)).
88 Id. at 572 (second alteration in original) (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911
F.2d 117, 121–22 (8th Cir. 1990)).
89 Id. at 573–74.
90 Id. at 574–75.
91 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
92 Id. at 217, 220.
93 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 574–75.
94 Id. at 560 n.1.
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the essential elements that identifies those “Cases” and “Controversies” that
are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches.95
The Court’s analysis rested on its understanding of the role of courts, as dis-
tinguished from the role of the political branches of government: “ ‘The
province of the court,’ as Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison,
‘is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.’  Vindicating the public inter-
est (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitu-
tion and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.”96  Since
vindicating the public interest is the job of the political branches, the Consti-
tution would not allow Congress to transfer that function to the courts by
conferring standing to litigate generalized grievances on private parties:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in execu-
tive officers’ compliance with the law into an “individual right” vindicable in
the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts
the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”  It would enable the courts, with the per-
mission of Congress, “to assume a position of authority over the governmen-
tal acts of another and co-equal department,” and to become “virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”97
In short, the Lujan Court thought congressional attempts to confer standing
absent a particularized injury would infringe the Constitution in two distinct
ways: (1) by exceeding Article III’s case-or-controversy limitation on judicial
power, and (2) by undermining the President’s responsibility to ensure faith-
ful execution of the laws under the Take Care Clause of Article II.98
The Lujan Court grounded its decision on what it took to be the tradi-
tional relationship between the judicial and executive branches.  The Court
has elsewhere said that the case-or-controversy limitation is designed to iden-
tify suits “traditionally amenable to”99 or “historically viewed as capable of
resolution through the judicial process.”100  The Lujan majority, noting that
95 Id. at 576.
96 Id. (citation omitted).
97 Id. at 577 (citations omitted) (first quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; then quoting
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923); and then quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
98 Lujan’s standing principles apply to any federal court litigation—not just suits
against the government—but it is likely that the “generalized grievance” limitation will
have heightened impact on lawsuits challenging unlawful government conduct, a context
in which individuals might be motivated to challenge illegal conduct that does not affect
them individually.  The Article II limitation would seem to apply principally to suits against
executive branch officials, but it is possible that a court could view some lawsuits against
private parties as implicating the President’s Take Care Clause responsibilities.
99 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).
100 GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 382 (1980)
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)); see also Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC
Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2008) (“We have often said that history and tradition offer a
meaningful guide to the types of cases that Article III empowers federal courts to
consider.”).
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the Constitution does not define “legislative Powers,” “executive Power,” or
“judicial Power,” argued that “the Constitution’s central mechanism of sepa-
ration of powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activ-
ities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.”101  In
seeking this “common understanding” of the appropriate activities of the
judiciary, the Court relied on eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
sources—the Federalist Papers and Marbury v. Madison.102  Justice Scalia was
more explicit about the historical nature of the inquiry in a law review article
that anticipated the Lujan ruling, referring to a separation of powers–based
requirement of particularized injury as the “original understanding” of stand-
ing doctrine.103
The central elements of Lujan’s standing analysis continue to guide the
Court a quarter century later.  For instance, two terms ago, in Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, the Court decided that the Ninth Circuit conducted an incomplete
Article III analysis when it focused on allegations that the defendant had
posted inaccurate information in violation of the plaintiff’s rights under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act.104  This was enough to satisfy Lujan’s requirement
of particularization, since it was the plaintiff’s rights (rather than public
rights) that were allegedly violated, but did not necessarily satisfy Lujan’s dis-
tinct requirement that the plaintiff’s injury be “concrete.”105  The Court
quoted Lujan’s description of injury in fact as part of the “‘irreducible consti-
tutional minimum’ of standing”106 and reiterated the principle that Article
III does not allow Congress to confer standing on an uninjured litigant.107
D. Vermont Agency and Qui Tam Litigation of Generalized Grievances
Lujan’s restrictions on private litigation of generalized grievances were
based on the Court’s understanding of the judiciary’s traditional role.  The
101 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1; then quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; and then quoting U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1).
102 See id. at 560 (discussing THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison)); id. at 576–77
(discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
103 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
ers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 897–98 (1983).
104 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545–46 (2016).
105 Id. at 1548 (“Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it is not
sufficient.  An injury in fact must also be ‘concrete.’  Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis,
however, that independent requirement was elided.”).
106 Id. at 1547 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
107 Id. at 1547–48 (“Injury in fact is a constitutional requirement, and ‘[i]t is settled
that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the
right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997))); id. at 1549 (“Congress’ role in
identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right
and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.  Article III standing
requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”).
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ruling embraced a familiar view of the legal universe.  Courts exist to provide
redress for private litigants injured by unlawful conduct.  They are also availa-
ble to redress legal claims on behalf of the public, but those claims are pur-
sued by public officials elected or appointed for that purpose.  Private
litigants seek judicial redress for particularized harms to private interests and
public officials seek judicial redress for generalized harms to public interests.
This view of the legal system is logical and orderly.  It leaves litigation on
behalf of the public in the hands of professionals, chosen by voters or
accountable to elected officials.  It allows government litigators to pursue the
optimal level of law enforcement through discretion in case selection, avoid-
ing cases that might result in overdeterrence of socially beneficial con-
duct.108  It reduces opportunities for private litigants to subvert the public
good in pursuit of private interests.109
But while the Lujan Court’s understanding of the judicial role was logi-
cal, orderly, and in certain respects appealing, it was also based on an inaccu-
rate view of eighteenth-century Anglo-American legal history.  English and
early American courts did entertain suits by “aggrieved” private parties seek-
ing redress for particularized injuries, and they did entertain suits by public
officials seeking redress for unlawful conduct that harmed the public.  But
eighteenth-century English and American courts also routinely entertained
suits by private litigants who suffered no particularized injury and who sought
judicial redress based on generalized grievances about unlawful activity.
From the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries, qui tam litigation by
uninjured common informers was one of three extremely common methods
of statutory enforcement, alongside suits by public officials and suits by
injured parties.110
Beginning in the fourteenth century, the English Parliament enacted
hundreds of qui tam statutes, most of which followed familiar patterns.
Blackstone explains qui tam legislation as follows:
[M]ore usually, these forfeitures created by statute are given at large, to any
common informer; or, in other words, to any such person or persons as will
sue for the same: and hence such actions are called popular actions, because
they are given to the people in general.  Sometimes one part is given to the
king, to the poor, or to some public use, and the other part to the informer
or prosecutor; and then the suit is called a qui tam action, because it is
brought by a person “qui tam pro domino rege, &c, quam pro seipso in hac parte
sequitur.”  If the king therefore himself commences this suit, he shall have
108 See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legisla-
tion, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 620 (2000) (“In deciding whether to bring suit, the public prose-
cutor can engage in a case-by-case consideration of the regulatory benefits and the social
costs of a particular enforcement action.”).
109 Id. at 615–37 (detailing situations in which qui tam informers might pursue per-
sonal interests in ways that undermine the public interest).
110 Id. at 565–608 (describing the English history of qui tam enforcement); see
JONATHAN ROSE, MAINTENANCE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 297 & n.152 (2017) (discussing qui
tam enforcement of livery statutes in which plaintiffs sued for half a statutory penalty and
did not allege personal harm or seek compensatory damages).
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the whole forfeiture.  But if any one hath begun a qui tam, or popular, action,
no other person can pursue it; and the verdict passed upon the defendant in
the first suit is a bar to all others, and conclusive even to the king himself.111
A typical example of qui tam legislation is found in a 1745 English statute
designed to prevent merchants from passing off foreign linens as British or
Irish linens to obtain export bounties.112  Parliament required the marking
of domestic linens and imposed forfeitures for inaccurate markings.113
Under one section of the statute, any person who engaged in specified forms
of mislabeling was subject to the following penalty:
[S]uch Person or Persons shall forfeit the Sum of five Pounds for every Piece
of Linen so stamped as aforesaid, to be sued for and recovered by Bill,
Plaint, or Information, in any of His Majesty’s Courts of Record at Westmin-
ster, the Court of Session, Court of Judiciary, or Court of Exchequer in Scot-
land, or in any of his Majesty’s Courts of Record in Dublin . . . ; and one
Moiety of the said Penalties shall be to the Use of the King’s Majesty, His
Heirs, and Successors, and the other Moiety to such Person or Persons as will
sue or prosecute for the same.114
In authorizing litigation by any person who would sue, the statute vastly
expanded law enforcement resources and greatly increased the likelihood
that a merchant fraudulently marking foreign linen would be caught, all at
no cost to the government apart from the contingent promise of half of any
penalties recovered.115  While the provision for the informer’s “moiety”
might occasionally siphon off money that could have been recovered by pub-
lic officials, the statute’s overall effect on the treasury was likely a net positive
due to disclosure of statutory violations that would otherwise remain secret.
Since export bounties were paid by the government, private plaintiffs author-
ized to enforce the 1745 statute would be seeking redress for generalized
grievances rather than particularized injuries.
William Hawkins’s eighteenth-century treatise on Pleas of the Crown dis-
cussed qui tam litigation in its chapter on proceedings by information.116
111 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *160; see also id. at *262 (explaining that statutory
forfeitures “which regard mere matters of police and public convenience” are “usually left
to be inforced by common informers, in the qui tam informations or actions, of which we
have formerly spoken”).
112 An Act for Effectually Preventing the Exportation of Foreign Linens, Under the
Denomination of British or Irish Linens 1745, 18 Geo. 2 c. 24, Preamble (Eng.).
113 See id. §§ 2–4.
114 Id. § 3.
115 See, e.g., Beck, supra note 108, at 560 (in debate over the qui tam provisions of the
False Claims Act, Senator Langer argued that informers would give the Justice Department
additional help in enforcing the statute).
116 2 HAWKINS, supra note 13, at 277–80.  Qui tam statutes might allow enforcement
through either criminal or civil process, or give the informer a choice. See 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *303 (“Informations . . . which are partly at the suit of the
king, and partly at that of a subject . . . are usually brought upon penal statutes, which
inflict a penalty upon conviction of the offender, one part to the use of the king, and
another to the use of the informer; and are a sort of qui tam actions, (the nature of which
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Hawkins noted that an information could be “merely at the Suit of the King”
or “partly the Suit of the King, and partly the Suit of the Party,” with the latter
“commonly called an Information qui tam.”117  Statutes were deemed subject
to qui tam enforcement if they gave part of a penalty to any private litigant:
I take it for granted, that [an information or action qui tam] lie on no Stat-
ute which prohibits a Thing as being an immediate Offence against the Pub-
lick good in general, under a certain Penalty, unless the Whole, or Part of
such Penalty be expressly given to him who will sue for it; because otherwise
it goes to the King, and nothing can be demanded by the Party.  But where
such Statute gives any Part of such Penalty to him who will sue for it by
Action or Information, &c. I take it to be settled at this Day, That any one
may bring such Action, or Information, and lay his Demand tam pro Domino
Rege quam pro seipso.118
Penal statutes sometimes regulated conduct harming both the public and
private individuals, and an injured party could file a qui tam action as a
means of obtaining redress.119
While injured parties could bring qui tam actions, Hawkins makes clear
that the judiciary did not impose on qui tam informers any particularized
injury requirement of the sort found in Lujan.  Hawkins noted judicial
authority holding “[t]hat a Popular Action may conclude ad grave damnum
[‘to the great damage’], without adding of the Plaintiff; because every
Offence, for which such Action is brought, is supposed to be a general Griev-
ance to every Body.”120  Thus, while Lujan concluded that plaintiffs could
not bring suit if they suffered only a generalized grievance, Hawkins viewed
the generalized nature of a grievance as a justification for conferring stand-
ing on a private litigant.  Hawkins later indicated that common informers
were not entitled to recover costs under a statute “which gives the Deman-
dant his Costs in all Cases wherein he shall recover his Damages; for this
seems to suppose some Damage to have been done to the Demandant in
particular, which cannot be said in any popular Action.”121  Again, the
notion of damage “to the Demandant in particular” is just another phrasing
of Lujan’s “particularized” injury requirement.  Hawkins’s analysis shows that
no particularized injury was expected when an informer pursued a “popular”
or qui tam action.  Parliament was well aware of the difference between
injured parties and common informers, and sometimes authorized common
informers to sue only if the aggrieved party did not.122
was explained in a former volume) only carried on by a criminal instead of a civil process.”
(footnote omitted)).
117 2 HAWKINS, supra note 13, at 259, 264.
118 Id. at 265.
119 Id. (noting that some penal statutes concerned conduct causing “an immediate
Damage to the Party” but also affecting the public good; under such statutes, the “general
Opinion” held that “the Party grieved may, and it is holden by some that he ought” to
bring his suit as a qui tam action (footnote omitted)).
120 Id. at 267.
121 Id. at 273.
122 See id. at 272.
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The Supreme Court in Lujan understood that our legal history included
qui tam legislation, but may not have appreciated the ubiquity of such legisla-
tion at the time the Constitution was adopted.  The majority made clear that
the ESA’s citizen suit provision did not constitute qui tam legislation: “Nor,
finally, is [this] the unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete
private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for the Gov-
ernment’s benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff.”123
The reference to qui tam legislation as “unusual” was accurate as of the date
of Lujan, but failed to acknowledge that such legislation was widely used in
the eighteenth century, shaping the Framers’ understanding of the role of
courts and the meaning of the Article III terms “case” and “controversy.”
Moreover, Lujan’s description of qui tam legislation as allowing suit “against
a private party”124 implies that the Court was unaware of the widespread use
of qui tam statutes to regulate government officials, a point demonstrated in
Part II below.
The Court was confronted with the extensive history of qui tam legisla-
tion eight years after Lujan in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex rel. Stevens.125  The Vermont Agency case was brought under the most
important remaining federal qui tam statute, the Civil War–era False Claims
Act, which permits private litigants to sue for frauds against the govern-
ment.126  The case presented the question of whether the False Claims Act
could be used against a state agency that received money from the federal
government.  On its own initiative, the Court requested briefing on the juris-
dictional issue of whether a qui tam statute satisfies the requirements of Arti-
cle III standing.127
On the standing issue, the Vermont Agency opinion highlighted the injury
in fact requirement from the Court’s prior jurisprudence and noted that the
qui tam relator was seeking to litigate based on an injury suffered by the
United States, rather than an injury to the “complaining party.”128  The
Court nevertheless approved qui tam standing on two grounds.  First, the
Court drew an analogy to litigation by the assignee of a claim:
We believe . . . that adequate basis for the relator’s suit for his bounty is to be
found in the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the
123 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1992).
124 Id. at 573.
125 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
126 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
127 See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 528 U.S. 1015, 1015
(1999) (mem.) (directing parties to file supplemental briefs on the question: “Does a pri-
vate person have standing under Article III to litigate claims of fraud upon the
government?”).
128 Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771 (“Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or
otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party.” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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injury in fact suffered by the assignor.  The FCA can reasonably be regarded
as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.129
Second, the Court pointed to the long history of qui tam legislation as sup-
port for its decision: “We are confirmed in this conclusion by the long tradi-
tion of qui tam actions in England and the American Colonies.  That history
is particularly relevant to the constitutional standing inquiry . . . .”130  The
Court observed that “[q]ui tam actions appear to have been as prevalent in
America as in England, at least in the period immediately before and after
the framing of the Constitution.”131  The Court also documented enactment
of a number of qui tam statutes by the First Congress following ratification of
the Constitution.132  The Vermont Agency Court thought this history “well nigh
conclusive with respect to the question before us here: whether qui tam
actions were ‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to,
and resolved by, the judicial process.’”133
The Vermont Agency Court tacitly recognized that its holding was inconsis-
tent with the recitation of standing doctrine in Lujan.  In Vermont Agency’s
description of the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing, Justice
Scalia omitted the requirement that the injury be “particularized” and spoke
about the injury as something the plaintiff must “demonstrate” rather than
something the plaintiff must “have suffered.”134  However, the Court
expressly reserved the question of “whether qui tam suits violate Article II, in
129 Id. at 773. Vermont Agency’s suggestion that qui tam legislation effects a partial
assignment of the government’s claim may work as a modern analogy, but it seems anach-
ronistic as a justification for qui tam standing.  Claim assignment was generally impermissi-
ble in England during the centuries when qui tam legislation developed. See Sprint
Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 275 (2008) (“Prior to the 17th cen-
tury . . . , with only limited exceptions, English courts refused to recognize assignments at
all.”).
130 Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 774.  On the historical nature of the Article III inquiry,
the Court highlighted an opinion by Justice Frankfurter arguing that, under the Constitu-
tion, “[j]udicial power could come into play only in matters that were the traditional con-
cern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert feel of
lawyers constituted ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cole-
man v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
131 Id. at 776.
132 Id. at 777 & nn.6–7.
133 Id. at 777 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)).
While the Vermont Agency Court found standing to litigate a qui tam suit, it concluded on
the merits that the False Claims Act provision allowing suit against a “person” did not
authorize suit against a state or state agency. Id. at 787.
134 Compare Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[I]rreducible constitu-
tional minimum” of standing requires that the “plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in
fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical”’” (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990))), with Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771 (“[I]rreducible
constitutional minimum” of standing requires that the plaintiff “must demonstrate ‘injury
in fact’—a harm that is both ‘concrete’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypo-
thetical’” (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-3\NDL307.txt unknown Seq: 25  1-MAR-18 12:41
2018] qui  tam  litigation  against  government  officials 1259
particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and the ‘take Care’ Clause of
§ 3.”135  Later decisions of the Court have reverted to Lujan’s formulation
that the plaintiff must “suffer” a “particularized” injury to satisfy the “irreduci-
ble constitutional minimum” of standing.136  Thus, while Vermont Agency
offered a partial and temporary corrective to the Court’s Article III standing
jurisprudence, the Court has thus far ignored any broader implications of
qui tam history for understanding interbranch relations under Articles II and
III.
II. QUI TAM MONITORING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA
The Lujan Court concluded that uninjured private litigants may not sue
to remedy generalized grievances about unlawful executive conduct, even if
authorized to do so by Congress.  The Court believed such litigation did not
present a “case” traditionally considered appropriate for judicial resolution
and that it would undermine the President’s Article II responsibility to super-
vise execution of the laws.  While the Court knew of the tradition of qui tam
legislation, it considered such statutes “unusual” and believed they were con-
fined to regulation of private parties.  The Court was unaware that at the time
the Constitution was ratified, Anglo-American legislatures routinely author-
ized qui tam suits by uninjured private informers to litigate generalized griev-
ances about unlawful government conduct, including conduct of executive
officials.  This practice was widely followed in England from the fourteenth
century onward, was common in all thirteen American colonies/states in the
eighteenth century, and was embraced in a number of statutes enacted by the
first two Congresses.137
135 Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 778 n.8; see also id. at 801–02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014); see also Sprint Commc’ns
Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273–74 (2008); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
517 (2007).
137 Earlier studies of qui tam legislation have noted the existence of qui tam provisions
directed at public officials. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam
Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 342 n.3 (1989) (listing early federal qui tam statutes, including a
statute directed at marshals participating in the census); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control
over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 303 (1989)
(“[B]y authorizing a qui tam action, Congress could permit private citizens to sue the gov-
ernment officials to collect penalties incurred because of misfeasance in office.”); Sunstein,
supra note 33, at 175 (“Notably, the informers’ action was available against both private
defendants and public officials.”); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem
of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1407 (1988) (“These statutes provided a common
mechanism to regulate, by judicial sanction, governmental officials where there was likely
to be no aggrieved party with a private cause of action.”).  This Article seeks to document
that qui tam regulation of government officials had been routinely employed for hundreds
of years in England and America by the time the Constitution was ratified, and was natu-
rally embraced by early Congresses as an extension of longstanding legislative practice.
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A. British Qui Tam Statutes Regulating Government Officials
In the twelfth year of King Edward II, Parliament adopted a number of
statutory provisions designed to address problems in the English legal sys-
tem.138  One provision related to enforcement of “assizes” that regulated the
price, measure, and quality of consumer goods.139  Records of manorial
courts show numerous fines assessed when appointed “ale-tasters” accused
local brewers of “breaking” the “assize of beer,” for example, by using too
small of a gallon measure or otherwise departing from regulatory stan-
dards.140  The 1318 statute applied to any “Officer in City or in Borough”
responsible for enforcing “Assises of Wines and Victuals.”141  If such officers
engaged in wholesale or retail marketing of goods regulated by the assizes,
the merchandise would be forfeited to the King.142  The statute was presuma-
bly designed to eliminate conflicts of interest affecting officials with enforce-
ment obligations.143  Allowing a market participant to regulate a competitive
marketplace could undermine evenhanded enforcement of the law and
cause other merchants to distrust the regulatory process.
The challenge for Parliament lay in ensuring that local officials observed
the restriction on their commercial conduct, notwithstanding the economic
incentive to violate the statute.  England included forty distinct counties cov-
ering more than 50,000 square miles.144  The statute would apply to officers
in dozens of cities and boroughs.145  Given the highly decentralized nature
138 Statute of York 1318, 12 Edw. 2 Preamble (Eng.).
139 See SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 1 THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 612 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing assizes of bread
and beer); Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133,
1142–43 (1931).
140 SELDEN SOCIETY, 1 SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL AND OTHER SEIGNORIAL COURTS 8
(F.W. Maitland ed., 1974) (listing fines for several “[b]reakers of the assize”); id. at 11
(several identified as “[b]reakers of the assize,” including two who “have gallons which are
too small”); id. at 18 (fines for breaking assize); id. at 23 & n.2 (several people fined,
probably for violating assize of beer); id. at 27 & n.2 (same); id. at 33 (several brewers fined
for breaking assize of beer based on information presented by ale-tasters); id. at 88–89
(same); id. at 113–14 (seller of beer failed to appear to answer charge of violating assize).
141 Statute of York 1318, 12 Edw. 2 c. 6 (Eng.) (applying to any “Officer in City or in
Borough, that by reason of his Office ought to keep Assises of Wines and Victuals”).
142 Id. (“[S]hall not merchandise for Wines nor Victuals, neither in Gross nor by
Retale.”).
143 Id. (reciting statutory goal of securing “the common profit of the People”).
144 Peter Kellner & William Harford Thomas, England, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/England (last visited Nov. 28, 2017) (listing “Total
Area” of 50,302 square miles); David Simpkin, Total War in the Middle Ages? The Contribution
of English Landed Society to the Wars of Edward I and Edward II, in THE SOLDIER EXPERIENCE IN
THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 61, 68 n.26 (Adrian R. Bell et al. eds., 2011) (describing Arrow-
smith map of 1815–1816 showing the division of England into forty historic counties).
145 The British National Archives indicates that the term “burrough” or “burh” referred
to fortified towns. See Life in Towns and Villages, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://
www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/domesday/world-of-domesday/towns.htm (last visited Nov.
28, 2017).  The 1086 Domesday Book reportedly recorded “112 towns or burroughs,” and
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of the regulated activity, how could the King monitor local officials to ensure
they respected the will of Parliament?  One option would be to send royal
judges throughout the country looking for evidence of statutory violations.146
The statute affirmed that “the King may assign his Justices to execute this
Thing in Cities and Boroughs, when and where it pleaseth him.”147  But that
option would not provide systematic or continuous oversight unless the King
kept his judges constantly on the road.
Parliament’s solution was to provide for qui tam enforcement of the con-
flict-of-interest provision, allowing common informers to sue the regulated
officials.  The statute granted standing to whoever would initiate the litiga-
tion, instructing the judiciary that “he that will sue [for a thing so forfeited]
shall be received.”148  The legislation offered the informer a variety of judi-
cial fora: “the Chancellor, Treasurer, Barons of the Exchequer, Justices of
either Bench, and Justices assigned to take Assises.”149  It also swept away
potential procedural obstacles, specifying that judges should “admit such
Plaints by Writs, and without Writs, and shall determine them.”150  If the evi-
dence established the basis for a forfeiture, the statute directed that “the
third part” of the forfeited merchandise “shall be delivered to the Party that
sued the Offender, as the King’s Gift.”151  This qui tam remedy used a contin-
gent-fee arrangement to supplement available law enforcement resources at
no additional cost to the government.152  If the litigation was successful, the
informer’s bounty would come out of the proceeds and the remainder would
be forwarded to the treasury.  If the litigation was unsuccessful, the govern-
ment owed the informer nothing.
The 1318 conflict-of-interest provision highlights three sometimes over-
lapping advantages that can flow from qui tam legislation directed at public
officials.  First, qui tam legislation can extend the reach of government law
enforcement resources and allow more effective monitoring of the legality of
highly decentralized government conduct.  With the qui tam provision in
place, any citizen learning of a violation could step forward and act as the
King’s agent to enforce the statute, in lieu of the more haphazard monitor-
ing provided through occasional visits by royal judges.  Second, litigation by
private qui tam informers can overcome government officials’ resistance to
legal mandates, arising from conflicting personal or professional interests or
the number of towns more than doubled over the following 150 years, but the National
Archives does not report how many of the towns would have been classified as burroughs.
Id. See generally JAMES TAIT, THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH BOROUGH: STUDIES ON ITS ORIGINS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1936) (reviewing evidence concerning the origins and charac-
teristics of towns classified as “boroughs”).
146 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 139, at 560 (noting royal justices were sometimes
sent into English counties with commissions to accomplish particular tasks).
147 Statute of York 1318, 12 Edw. 2 c. 6 (Eng.).




152 See Beck, supra note 108, at 541.
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divergent policy preferences.  The 1318 statute imposed a regulation con-
trary to the economic interests of local officials.  The qui tam provision cre-
ated a significant threat of forfeiture to counter any economic incentive to
violate the statute.  Third, a system of qui tam enforcement can enhance pub-
lic confidence in the integrity of law enforcement processes, reducing the
risk that illegal conduct will go unaddressed and countering the suspicion
that those in power can violate the law with impunity.  These three advan-
tages help explain many of the qui tam provisions Parliament directed at
public officials over the succeeding centuries.
1. Enhanced Monitoring of Decentralized Government Activity
The deadly plague that swept through England in 1348–1350 reportedly
took thirty to forty-five percent of the population, with even higher percent-
ages succumbing in some parts of the country.153  The widespread mortality
produced enormous economic consequences.154  In the 1349 Statute of
Labourers, Parliament diagnosed the resulting economic problems as the
product of a lazy and greedy working class:
Because a great Part of the People, and especially of Workmen and Servants,
late died of the Pestilence, many seeing the Necessity of Masters, and great
Scarcity of Servants, will not serve unless they may receive excessive Wages,
and some rather willing to beg in Idleness, than by Labour to get their
Living.155
From the perspective of the political elites, it was as if the real problem the
plague created was to make it so much harder to get good help.  Parliament’s
answer to the calamity was to adopt a wide-ranging system of compulsory
labor combined with extensive wage and price controls.  Those able to work
and not otherwise employed could be compelled to serve at wages prevailing
three years earlier, before the plague spread to England.156  Artisans were
limited to charging prices that prevailed three years before and food
merchants could only charge a “reasonable Price” designed to generate
“moderate Gains, and not excessive.”157  Giving alms to a beggar was illegal if
the person could work for a living.158
By any measure, the Statute of Labourers represented a highly ambitious
regulatory undertaking, particularly in the mid-fourteenth century.  Parlia-
ment sought to regulate most employment relationships throughout the
country and most market transactions for consumer goods in ways that defied
the laws of supply and demand.  The statute’s diverse provisions contained a
153 Mike Ibeji, Black Death, BBC (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british
/middle_ages/black_01.shtml.
154 See Statute of Labourers 1349, 23 Edw. 3 c. 1 (Eng.).
155 Id. Preamble.
156 Id. c. 1.  Those already in service were not permitted to leave without permission or
reasonable cause. Id. c. 2.
157 Id. c. 5–6.
158 Id. c. 7.
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variety of enforcement mechanisms, but we will focus on two distinct qui tam
provisions included in chapter 6 regulating food prices, one directed at pri-
vate conduct and the other at public officials.  A food merchant found to
have charged an excessive price would pay double the amount received “to
the Party damnified, or, in Default of him, to any other that will pursue in
this behalf.”159  The statute thus deployed qui tam enforcement as a backup
mechanism, allowing a common informer to sue only if the aggrieved indi-
vidual failed to do so.  The statute empowered mayors and bailiffs to hear
claims against merchants and to levy the statutory penalty.160  A second qui
tam provision, parallel to the first, targeted public officials.  If mayors or bai-
liffs proved “negligent” in enforcing the statute, justices assigned by the King
could require the official to pay three times the illegal price “to the Party
damnified, or to any other in Default of him that will pursue.”161
According to one scholar, the King commissioned 671 royal judges
between 1349 and 1359 to enforce the Statute of Labourers.162  Given the
extent of the regulatory endeavor, however, Parliament also wanted the coop-
eration of mayors and bailiffs in enforcing the statute.  The provision for suits
by aggrieved parties provided a means to monitor both food vendors and
local officials to ensure compliance with statutory obligations.  The provision
for qui tam enforcement further expanded the universe of people incen-
tivized to seek out statutory violations.  An aggrieved party who paid inflated
prices might not want to file suit.  Some “victims” of illegal price inflation
might actually be coconspirators, willing to pay higher prices in exchange for
access to scarce goods.163  The qui tam provisions of the Statute of Labourers
greatly augmented enforcement resources directed at food merchants and
also greatly increased monitoring of mayors and bailiffs for diligence in
enforcing the statutory scheme.
Many other English qui tam statutes served a similar purpose of increas-
ing the number of citizens monitoring the legality of decentralized govern-
ment conduct.  Late in the fourteenth century, for example, a practice arose
in certain areas of demanding nine bushels in a “quarter” of grain, rather
than the eight bushels specified by statute.164  Parliament provided that
159 Id. c. 6.
160 Id. (directing that the penalty be paid “to the Use of them at whose Suit such
Offenders shall be convict,” i.e., either the injured plaintiff or the common informer).
161 Id.  After providing the treble damage award against mayors and bailiffs, the statute
also warned that “nevertheless towards Us they shall be grievously punished.” Id.
162 BERTHA HAVEN PUTNAM, THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATUTES OF LABOURERS DURING
THE FIRST DECADE AFTER THE BLACK DEATH 1349–1359, at 20–21 (1908).
163 Conventional economic wisdom suggests that price controls tend to produce eco-
nomic shortages.  Vedat Milor, Note, The Promotion of Economic Development Through Conflict
and Dispute Resolution: Examples from Mexico and Malaysia, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 169, 199
(1999) (“It is well established that price controls create shortages and black marketeer-
ing.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 638 (“Government
price-fixing will be inefficient and will produce a range of unintended harmful conse-
quences, including misallocation of supply and demand, leading to scarcity.”).
164 15 Rich. 2 c. 4 (1391) (Eng.).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-3\NDL307.txt unknown Seq: 30  1-MAR-18 12:41
1264 notre dame law review [vol. 93:3
someone buying grain at higher than eight bushels to the quarter would for-
feit the grain to the King.165  To ensure that local officials enforced the rule,
the statute provided that “the Mayor and Sheriffs of London” and mayors
and bailiffs in other cities, boroughs, towns, and markets would incur “like
Pain” at the suit of the King, a party, or “any other Person that will sue for the
King” if the official did not give the statute “full and due Execution.”166
A number of qui tam provisions over the ensuing centuries were
directed at the “aulnager” and other officers involved in regulating cloth sold
by English manufacturers.  The Statute of Cloths in the mid-fourteenth cen-
tury mimicked the enforcement scheme adopted a year earlier in the Statute
of Labourers, deploying qui tam litigation as a backup to suit by an aggrieved
party.  Under the statute, “every Buyer of . . . Cloth, or other that will sue”
could receive half of the statutory forfeiture imposed upon proof that the
aulnager “hath done any Fraud or Deceit in his Office.”167  An early fif-
teenth-century statute allowed a qui tam informer to sue an aulnager who
sealed cloth that did not meet statutory length and breadth requirements.168
In the second half of the fifteenth century, Parliament subjected the
aulnager and another officer called the “keeper of the seal” to qui tam for-
feitures for a more extended list of offenses, including improperly sealing
cloth that violated statutory requirements, refusing to seal cloth that com-
plied, charging higher fees than those provided by law, or refusing to show a
commission upon request.169  Statutes in the sixteenth century established
responsibilities of local “searchers” and “sealers” regulating the cloth trade,
with qui tam forfeitures for a mayor who failed to appoint a town searcher
and for improper sealing of cloth.170
The need to monitor decentralized government conduct also explains
two statutes from the second half of the sixteenth century regulating fairs
and markets to prevent sales of stolen horses.  The first statute required the
person in charge of a fair or market to provide an open space for sales of
horses and appoint one or more individuals to oversee and maintain meticu-
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Statute of Cloths 1350, 25 Edw. 3 c. 1 (Eng.).  The statute also provided for private
suit against a mayor, bailiff, or keeper who failed to execute the statute, but it did not
specify that the resulting fine should be shared with the private litigant. Id.
168 11 Hen. 4 c. 6 (1409) (Eng.) (allowing “every Person which will sue for the King, or
for himself” to recover “the Fourth Part” of the £10 penalty for a first offense or the £20
penalty for a second offense).
169 4 Edw. 4 c. 5 (1464) (Eng.); see also 8 Edw. 4 c. 1 (1468) (Eng.) (providing for qui
tam forfeiture if an aulnager sealed cloths of improper size).
170 See An Act Touching the Making of Woollen Clothes 1557, 4 & 5 Phil. & M. c. 5,
§ 33 (Eng.) (providing for forfeiture by town for improper sealing by searcher or sealer);
id. § 34 (providing a qui tam remedy to enforce all forfeitures in this statute or the previ-
ous statute); An Act for the True Making of Woollen Cloth 1552, 5 & 6 Edw. 6 c. 6,
§§ 41–42 (Eng.) (providing for forfeitures for improperly sealed cloth); id. § 44 (providing
for forfeiture for failures of mayor, bailiff, or head officer to appoint searcher for town or
city).
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lous records concerning each transaction.171  The statute provided for qui
tam forfeitures if the person in charge of the fair or market did not appoint a
toll gatherer to oversee the space for sales of horses, if the toll gatherer did
not properly supervise and maintain records of transactions, and if the toll
gatherer or bookkeeper did not deliver the records to be signed by the owner
or officer in charge of the fair or market.172  A few decades later, Parliament
adopted another qui tam provision to strengthen the statutory scheme,
imposing a forfeiture if the responsible official did not know the seller of the
horse or a person vouching for the seller.173
2. Countering Official Resistance to Legislative Policies
Government officials sometimes resist compliance with legislative direc-
tives due to conflicting economic or professional interests or policy differ-
ences with the legislature.  The English Parliament repeatedly deployed qui
tam provisions in such situations to counter officials’ incentives for noncom-
pliance.  The 1318 statute discussed above—requiring local officials to
refrain from selling merchandise they were responsible to regulate—
addressed an economic conflict of interest.174  Compliance with the statute
would undermine economic interests of any official positioned to profit from
such sales.  The statute’s qui tam provision responded to the economic incen-
tive to violate the rule.  After 1318, an official contemplating illegal sales
would have to consider both the possible profits from a violation and the
possible losses if a citizen filed a qui tam action.  Similarly, a statute from the
early seventeenth century imposed a qui tam forfeiture on the steward of any
court-leet or court-baron who personally received more than a small sum by
virtue of a grant or lease of the court’s profits.175  The statute sought to pro-
tect defendants from excessive fines imposed due to the financial interest of
court officers.176  Parliament believed qui tam enforcement could counteract
the stewards’ financial incentive to violate the legislation.177
Legislative restrictions can also undermine an official’s noneconomic
interests.  In the sixteenth century, King Henry VIII sought to limit the juris-
diction of the ecclesiastical courts, making it illegal in most circumstances for
such a court to summon a person who resided in a different diocese.178  A
judicial officer in an ecclesiastical court might chafe at this restriction on the
tribunal’s jurisdiction, which reduced the court’s power and could interfere
with the pursuit of justice in particular cases.  Parliament’s provision for qui
171 An Acte Agaynst the Byeng of Stolen Horses 1555, 2 & 3 Phil. & M. c. 7 (Eng.).
172 Id. §§ 2–3 (forfeitures); id. § 4 (qui tam remedy).
173 An Acte to Avoyde Horse Stealinge 1588, 31 Eliz., c. 12, § 2 (Eng.).
174 See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text.
175 An Acte that No Psonne Shalbe Cited Oute of the Dioc Where He or She Dwelleth
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tam enforcement gave court officials a financial reason to stay within the
scope of their more limited statutory mandate.179
Qui tam legislation could also address the concern that policy differ-
ences might lead to underenforcement of a controversial statutory mandate.
In the 1670 Act to Prevent and Suppresse Seditious Conventicles, Parliament
sought to promote religious uniformity by penalizing individuals who partici-
pated in religious assemblies conducted “in other Manner then [sic] accord-
ing to the Liturgy and practice of the Church of England.”180  The statute
allowed qui tam litigation against participants in such illegal religious ser-
vices.181  Parliament also provided qui tam remedies against certain officials
with enforcement responsibilities, imposing mandatory reporting obligations
on several temporal and spiritual officials.  A “Constable[,] Headborough[,]
Tythingman[,] Church warden[,] or Overseer of the Poore” credibly
informed of an illegal meeting was required to seek a conviction under the
statute, and could be sued for a forfeiture of £5 for willfully failing to perform
his duty.182  A Justice of the Peace or Chief Magistrate who willfully failed to
execute the Act faced a much larger one hundred pound forfeiture, half to
the King and half to the use of the informer.183
The statute was highly controversial and provoked criticism from advo-
cates of religious tolerance and from those sympathetic to Catholics and Prot-
estant dissenters burdened by the legislation.184  Inclusion of qui tam
provisions to enforce the statute against private citizens and to spur enforce-
ment efforts by government officials reflected Parliament’s expectation of
resistance to the statutory policy.  Those of us in the United States likely sym-
pathize with the resisters because we disagree with Parliament’s objective of
securing religious uniformity by law, but any legislative tool can be put to
good uses or bad.  The key point here is that Parliament saw qui tam regula-
tion of government officials as a means to ensure that its legal directives pre-
vailed in a climate of policy disagreement.
3. Bolstering Public Confidence in Governmental Processes
Belief that government officials violate the law with impunity or that
legal processes are untrustworthy can produce a corrosive public cynicism
179 See id.
180 An Act to Prevent and Suppresse Seditious Conventicles 1670, 22 Car. 2 c. 1, § 1
(Eng.).
181 Id. §§ 1–2.
182 Id. § 10.
183 Id.  Two years later, Parliament sought to weed out “Popish Recusants” from govern-
ment service by allowing qui tam prosecution of government employees who neglected to
take an anti-Catholic oath and participate in an Anglican communion service.  An Act for
Preventing Dangers Which May Happen from Popish Recusants 1672, 25 Car. 2 c. 2, § 3–5
(Eng.).
184 Beck, supra note 108, at 593–95.
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that undermines voluntary legal compliance.185  Parliament often deployed
qui tam regulation as a means of ensuring a remedy for government lawless-
ness, particularly in situations where one might expect a heightened level of
public attention or concern.  For instance, a desire to maintain public confi-
dence in the integrity of governmental functions appears to underlie a set of
statutes regulating the activities of purveyors who acquired goods for the
royal household.  A 1362 statute noted complaints about purveyors for the
royal family (including the King’s eldest son) and other noble families.186
The statute changed the name of procurement agents from “purveyor” to
“buyer,” limited the office to the households of the King and Queen, and
required buyers to pay market prices.187  The statute authorized “takings” as
necessary to supply the royal households and specified a method for adjudi-
cating price, but buyers were instructed to pursue such takings “in conve-
nient and easy Manner, without Duress, Compulsion, Menace, or other
Villainy.”188  The legislation provided a treble damage cause of action to a
party “charge[d]” or “grieve[d]” by a malicious taking, purchase, or arrange-
ment for carriage.189  The statute included qui tam enforcement as a backup,
providing that “if the Party will not sue, he that will sue for the King shall
have the Third Peny of that which shall be recovered for his Labour.”190  A
later enactment provided a qui tam remedy against any purchaser, including
the King’s purveyor, who bought grain at a measure of greater than eight
bushels per quarter.191
One common area of public concern is the integrity of tax collection
efforts.  Parliament repeatedly employed qui tam enforcement to ensure that
collected funds made their way to the public treasury for the intended pur-
pose.  In 1677, Parliament adopted a wide-ranging tax bill to collect funds for
war with France.  Under the statute, a local collector who kept any part of the
money or paid it to an unauthorized recipient would forfeit £5 per offense,
and a Receiver General would forfeit £500 each time he or his deputy failed
185 See, e.g., Gonzalo Lira, The Coming Middle-Class Anarchy, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.businessinsider.com/coming-middle-class-anarchy-2010-10 (“If a big enough
proportion of the populace—not even a majority, just a largish chunk—decides that it’s
just not worth following the rules anymore, then that society’s days are numbered . . . .”).
186 36 Edw. 3 c. 2 (1362) (Eng.).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. c. 3.  The statute also forbade the buyer to take payment from a person for
“sparing to be made,” but it is not clear whether this provision was enforceable through
private litigation. Id.
190 Id.
191 11 Hen. 6 c. 8 (1433) (Eng.).  An earlier statute had applied the eight bushel per
quarter standard to purveyors, but the statute may have only allowed suit by an aggrieved
party.  1 Hen. 5 c. 10 (1413) (Eng.) (“[T]he Party which will sue, have an Action grounded
upon the Case.”).
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to pay collected funds to the Exchequer.192  These forfeitures were payable
“to him or them that shall sue for the same.”193  A 1694 statute for duties on
ships and liquor, again premised on a need for revenue to fight the French,
contained a similar provision.194  If the commissioners and governors
responsible for collecting the duties diverted funds (or failed to keep
accounts), they were required to pay the amount misapplied to any qui tam
informer who would sue.195
Qui tam legislation became a common means of enforcing disqualifica-
tion statutes that limited who could serve in Parliament.  In 1742, various
government officers were prohibited from becoming members of Parlia-
ment, with a forfeiture imposed for each day the person sat or voted in the
legislature.196  Use of qui tam enforcement in this context cannot be
explained by a need for information.  The facts forming the basis for the
forfeiture—the holding of a public office and service in Parliament—would
be matters of public record.  The most plausible explanation for qui tam
enforcement in this context is to make certain that enforcement of the stat-
ute could not be blocked by public officials allied with the violator.  A 1782
disqualification statute similarly used qui tam litigation to bar members of
Parliament who had an interest in a public contract.197
Qui tam enforcement was also employed to monitor the activities of pri-
vate individuals and corporations performing public functions.  A four-
teenth-century statute imposed a qui tam forfeiture on a juror who accepted
a gift in exchange for his vote.198  A number of eighteenth-century statutes
permitted qui tam actions against goldsmiths, silversmiths, and their guilds
for offenses connected to the assaying or marking of metal.199
192 An Act for Raising Money by a Poll and Otherwise to Enable His Majestie to Enter
into an Actuall Warr Against the French King and for Prohibiting Severall French Com-
modities 1677, 29 & 30 Car. 2 c. 1, § 59 (Eng.).
193 Id.
194 5 & 6 Wm. & M. c. 20, §§ 1, 13 (1694) (Eng.).
195 Id. § 13.  A later provision of the statute provided for qui tam forfeiture by bank
officers who lent money to the royal family. Id. § 29.
196 An Act to Exclude Certain Officers from Being Members of the House of Commons
1742, 15 Geo. 2 c. 22, § 2 (Eng.).
197 An Act for Restraining Any Person Concerned in Any Contract, Commission, or
Agreement, Made for the Publick Service, from Being Elected, or Sitting and Voting as a
Member of the House of Commons 1782, 22 Geo. 3 c. 45, §§ 2, 9 (Eng.).
198 34 Edw. 3 c. 8 (1360) (Eng.).
199 An Act for Appointing Wardens and Assaymasters for Assaying Wrought Plate in the
Towns of Sheffield and Birmingham 1773, 13 Geo. 3 c. 52, § 4 (Eng.) (providing qui tam
remedy); id. § 6 (bond and oath of assayers); id. § 19 (forfeiture of assayer for improper
marking or inappropriate disclosure of designs); id. § 29 (recovery on bond for neglect or
fraud by assayer); An Act for the Better Preventing Frauds and Abuses in Gold and Silver
Wares 1739, 12 Geo. 2 c. 26, §§ 9, 22 (Eng.) (forfeiture for failing to submit required
records); An Act for Appointing Wardens and Assay Masters for Assaying Wrought Plate in
the Cities of Bristol Chester and Norwich 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 4, § 6 (Eng.) (forfeiture
by company of goldsmiths or silversmiths for fraud in assaying or marking).
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B. Early State Qui Tam Statutes Regulating Public Officials
Our review of British qui tam statutes directed at public officials sug-
gested that such legislation could typically be explained in terms of one or
more of three broad objectives: (1) monitoring decentralized government
activity to ensure compliance with directives from a central government, (2)
countering government officials’ economic and other incentives to violate
applicable rules, and (3) bolstering public confidence in the lawful perform-
ance of important governmental functions.  Those same objectives prove sim-
ilarly helpful in explaining the extensive use of qui tam legislation to regulate
government activity in the eighteenth-century American colonies and states.
Our survey of state legislation will be illustrative rather than exhaustive, sam-
pling a wide array of statutes in which legislatures in all thirteen American
colonies and states used private qui tam informers to monitor the lawfulness
of government conduct.
1. Monitoring Decentralized Government Activity
Governmental functions in England were divided between hierarchically
superior central authorities like the King and Parliament and inferior local
authorities like mayors, bailiffs, and sheriffs.  This structural allocation of
authority was often replicated in the early American colonies and states.  A
centralized legislative assembly would generate laws with statewide applica-
tion, while local administration would be overseen by town or county offi-
cials.  Consequently, the American context generated a comparable problem
concerning how to monitor decentralized government activities to ensure
compliance with centralized directives.  Borrowing from English practice,
American governments often turned to qui tam legislation for that purpose.
a. Centralized Regulation of Local Administration
The newly independent state of North Carolina enacted legislation in
1777 to overhaul the state’s system of caring for the poor.200  Since impover-
ished citizens resided throughout the state, the task of caring for those in
need fell to local “overseers of the poor,” selected at the county level.  The
North Carolina legislation is remarkable for the large number of statutory
forfeitures directed at five distinct categories of local public officials.  The
county sheriff could be fined £10 for neglecting to advertise the date for
initially electing overseers of the poor,201 £10 for failing to select and adver-
tise a day for the overseers’ first meeting,202 £5 for each overseer he failed to
summon to that initial meeting,203 forty shillings for failing to summon an
200 An Act for Making Provision for the Poor, and for Other Purposes (1777), in JAMES
IREDELL, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, c. 7, § 1 (Hodge & Wills eds., 1791)
[hereinafter LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA].
201 Id. § 2.
202 Id. § 1.
203 Id.
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overseer to a subsequent meeting,204 and £20 for failing to advertise at least
ten days in advance the date for the triennial election of new overseers.205
Those elected as overseers could forfeit £5 if they failed to take the oath to
qualify for office,206 forty shillings if they missed a meeting without sufficient
cause,207 and £20 for refusing to serve as a county warden when selected by
the other overseers.208  The county warden and the clerk hired by the over-
seers could forfeit £10 for failure to maintain financial records and make
them available for annual public inspection.209  The warden could also for-
feit £20 for refusing to care for a poor person settled in the county or
returned from another county.210  The clerk of the county court would for-
feit £20 for neglecting to furnish the wardens with an inventory of the
county’s taxable property.211  All of these forfeitures could be enforced
through qui tam actions, with half of the money allocated to the use of the
informer and half to benefit the local poor.212  One advantage of this exten-
sive system of qui tam enforcement was the elimination of the need for cen-
tralized oversight.  Assuming local informers were willing to bring qui tam
suits and courts were willing to implement the statute, the system could oper-
ate as intended without supervision by state officials.
A much more selective use of qui tam enforcement can be seen in a
1789 Massachusetts law establishing a statewide system of public education.
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 stressed the importance of public
education and empowered the legislature to require creation of schools.213
Acknowledging the “dispersed situation of the [commonwealth’s] inhabi-
tants,” the 1789 legislation required the formation of local school districts
and the hiring of public schoolmasters.214  Towns or districts that failed to
204 Id. § 7.
205 Id. § 20.
206 Id. §§ 3–4.
207 Id. § 7.
208 Id. § 5.
209 Id. § 6.
210 Id. § 23.
211 Id. § 12.
212 Id. § 19 (allowing, since no different allocation was specified, all of the forfeitures to
be recovered “one Half to the Use of the Informer, the other half to the County Warden,
for the use of the Poor of the County”).  The statute also provided that the overseers would
be liable to an aggrieved party if they failed to raise sufficient taxes to meet their financial
obligations. Id. § 11.  The wardens could sue sheriffs or tax collectors who failed to collect
or account for tax revenues, id. § 13, or a private housekeeper who entertained a poor
person without giving notice. Id. § 23.
213 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. III.  The constitution highlighted instruction in
“piety, religion and morality” as an aid to “the good order and preservation of civil govern-
ment.” Id.  It empowered the legislature to require “the several towns, parishes, precincts,
and other bodies-politic, or religious societies, to make suitable provision, at their own
expense,” for “public protestant teachers.” Id.
214 An Act to Provide for the Instruction of Youth, and for the Promotion of Good
Education (1789), in ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch. 19, at
416 (Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1894) [hereinafter LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS].
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comply could be compelled to pay money to the county treasury, but this
penalty included no provision for qui tam enforcement.215  The statute did
include two regulations of schoolmasters enforceable through qui tam litiga-
tion.  A person who operated a (presumably private) school for children “in
the most early stages of life” without a certificate from the local selectmen
would forfeit twenty shillings, half to the informer.216  A more substantial
penalty of £20 per month could be collected from any schoolmaster, includ-
ing a public schoolmaster, who was not a citizen of one of the United
States.217
Some qui tam legislation enforced duties relating to appointment and
qualification for office.  A Massachusetts town could forfeit £50 in a qui tam
action if it failed to appoint a committee to implement a law to prevent
overharvesting of certain species of fish.218  An elected fish warden in New
Hampshire could face a qui tam forfeiture for refusing the office.219  Mary-
land and South Carolina surveyors could suffer qui tam forfeitures for con-
ducting surveys before taking the oath of office.220
215 Id. at 418–19 (“[P]enalties . . . shall be levied by warrant from the Supreme Judicial
Court, or Court of General Sessions of the Peace for the County.”).
216 Id. at 420.
217 See id. (“[H]alf . . . to the use of the person who shall sue for the same.”).
218 See An Act to Prevent the Destruction and to Regulate the Catching of the Fish
Called Salmon Shad & Alewives in the Rivers and Streams in the Counties of Cumberland
and Lincoln, and to Repeal all Laws Heretofore Made for that Purpose (1788), in LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 214, ch. 73, at 157, 162.
219 See An Act in Addition to, and in Amendment of an Act, Intitled “An Act to Prevent
the Destruction of Salmon, Shad & Alewives in Merrimac River, & for Repealing all the
Laws Heretofore Made for that Purpose” (1795), in 6 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE INCLUDING
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACTS, RESOLVES, VOTES, ETC. EDITED AND PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIREC-
TION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD 1792–1801, at 221–22
(1917) [hereinafter LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE] (“[I]f any person legally chosen by any of
said Towns shall neglect or refuse, after being lawfully notified of his appointment to take
the Oath prescribed by this Act or execute the Office he shall forfeit & pay Ten Dollars to
any Person who will sue for the same, with cost as aforesaid.”).
220 See An Act to Ascertain the Fees of the Surveyor General for the Time Being and His
Deputies; and to Prevent Any Irregularities Being Committed in the Office of the Said
Surveyor General, or by Any of His Deputies (1733) [hereinafter Fees of the Surveyor
General Act], in 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; EDITED, UNDER AUTHORITY
OF THE LEGISLATURE, § 7, at 343–47 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1838) [hereinafter STATUTES OF
SOUTH CAROLINA]; THOMAS HERTY, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF MARYLAND, BEING AN ABRIDG-
MENT, ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED, OF ALL THE PUBLIC ACTS OF ASSEMBLY NOW IN FORCE, AND
OF GENERAL USE, FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT OF THE STATE, TO THE END OF NOVEMBER
SESSION 1797, INCLUSIVE, WITH REFERENCES TO THE ACTS AT LARGE 496 (1799) [hereinafter
HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND]; see also An Act Requiring the Agents of the Lord Baltemore to
Certifie into the Secretary’s Office the Instructions and Conditions of Plantations, with the
Fees by Them Demanded; and Obliging His Lordship’s Deputy Surveyors to Qualifie
Themselves According to Law (1715) [hereinafter An Act Requiring the Agents], in ACTS
OF ASSEMBLY, PASSED IN THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND, FROM 1692, TO 1715, at 58 (1723)
[hereinafter ACTS OF MARYLAND] (subjecting surveyors to qui tam action for failure to take
the oath of office).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-3\NDL307.txt unknown Seq: 38  1-MAR-18 12:41
1272 notre dame law review [vol. 93:3
Other qui tam statutes enforced duties relating to administrative tasks
like conducting meetings and keeping records.  A Rhode Island town clerk
who failed to give notice of a town meeting and a town-sergeant or constable
who failed to serve the notice on individual freemen were subject to qui tam
forfeitures.221  A New Hampshire constable who failed to give notice of a
town meeting could forfeit £10 “to any inhabitant of the town who will sue
for the same,” one-half “to the use of the Town and the other half to the use
of the prosecutor.”222  A Massachusetts town clerk or county register of deeds
could face qui tam prosecution for neglecting record-keeping requirements
with respect to lost property or stray animals.223  A Maryland clerk or register
could suffer a qui tam forfeiture for allowing public records to be removed
from the office overnight.224  South Carolina surveyors were required to
record surveying instructions in a government office.225
It was also common to use qui tam enforcement to monitor financial
matters.  Colonial Maryland regulated fees charged by a variety of state and
local officials, with offenders obliged to pay treble damages to the party
aggrieved, plus an additional forfeiture to be split between the crown and
“the Party or Parties that shall sue for the same.”226  Officers and agents of
Lord Baltimore, the Lord Proprietor, faced a qui tam action if they did not
post information including fees charged.227  South Carolina surveyors could
be sued for charging higher fees than provided by law.228  Commissioners of
a Maryland county court who took a bond from a sheriff could suffer a qui
tam forfeiture if they failed to transcribe and transmit the bond to the appro-
priate office within two months.229  In Rhode Island, an officer who retained
money paid in fines and forfeitures for more than three months could be
sued by a qui tam informer for three times the amount withheld.230
221 See An Act Declaring Towns to be Bodies Corporate, Establishing Town-Councils,
Regulating Town-Meetings, and Prescribing the Manner of Recovering Debts Due from
Towns, in THE PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF RHODE-ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS,
AS REVISED BY A COMMITTEE, AND FINALLY ENACTED BY THE HONOURABLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
AT THEIR SESSION IN JANUARY, 1798, § 11, at 329–30 (Carter & Wilkinson eds., 1798) [here-
inafter LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND].
222 An Act for Regulating Towns and the Choice of Town Officers (1791), in 5 LAWS OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 41, at 592–93 [hereinafter An Act for Regulating
Towns].
223 See An Act Respecting Lost Goods & Stray Beasts (1788), in LAWS OF MASSACHU-
SETTS, supra note 214, ch. 55, at 86, 87–88.
224 See HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 444.
225 See Fees of the Surveyor General Act, supra note 220, §§ 6, 10.
226 An Act for the Limitation of Officer’s Fees, in ACTS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at
55.
227 See An Act Requiring the Agents, supra note 220, at 58.
228 See Fees of the Surveyor General Act, supra note 220, § 1.
229 See An Act for the Direction of the Sheriff’s Office, and Restraining Their Ill Prac-
tices Within This Province (1715), in ACTS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 177–79.
230 See An Act to Prevent the Detention of Fines from the Proper Offices (1794), in
LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND, supra note 221, § 1, at 421–22.  The statute obliged the officers
from whom the money was withheld to enforce the statute. Id. § 2.  However, this did not
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American qui tam legislation in the eighteenth century enforced a wide
variety of other duties.  A New Hampshire sheriff or constable who neglected
to serve a lawful precept (a writ or warrant) after tender of payment could be
sued for a forfeiture by a qui tam informer or, in the absence of a private suit,
indicted for the forfeiture to the use of the county.231  A New Hampshire
town officer appointed to measure wood sold by the cord would forfeit thirty
shillings for neglecting to measure wood brought to him.232  The selectmen
of a Connecticut town were subject to a qui tam penalty if they failed to
provide a pound to restrain stray animals,233 and for each month they failed
to provide the town constable a black staff with the state’s coat of arms on the
head.234  Colonial New Jersey constables could be sued by qui tam informers
for failure to perform duties connected with issuance of bills of credit to
increase the money supply.235  In Massachusetts, the keeper of a lighthouse
could forfeit £100 for failing to keep the lights burning and visible to ships
from sunset to sunrise, two-thirds payable to “the person or persons who shall
inform of such neglect.”236  A colonial sheriff in Maryland could forfeit a
quantity of tobacco in an action by a qui tam informer if he delayed delivery
supersede the provision for qui tam enforcement. Id. § 1 (“[O]ne moiety thereof to the
use of the person who shall sue for the same.”).
231 See An Act Prescribing the Duty and Regulating the Office of Sheriff (1791), in 5
LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 44, at 608 [hereinafter An Act Prescribing the
Duty and Regulating the Office of Sheriff] (providing for forfeiture of £10 within three
months to “any person who will sue for the same” or, in the absence of a private suit,
recovery by the county through indictment within a year).  A “precept” is “[a] writ or war-
rant issued by an authorized person demanding another’s action, such as a judge’s order
to an officer to bring a party before the court.” Precept, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).  A person falsely pretending to be a sheriff or peace officer could also be sued for a
qui tam forfeiture. See 5 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 44, at 609.
232 See An Act to Prevent the Fraud in Cord Wood Exposed to Sale (1791), in 5 LAWS OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 9, at 758 (stating that forfeiture “to be recovered and
appropriated in manner as beforementioned”; prior paragraph provided for forfeiture by
person who bought or sold unmeasured wood “one half of which sum shall be for the use
of the town or place in which the same is so bought & sold, the other half to the use of the
person suing for the same”).
233 See An Act for Providing and Maintaining Pounds, and for Regulating the
Impounding Creatures, and for Preventing Rescues and Pound Breach, in ACTS AND LAWS
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, IN AMERICA, § 3, at 344 (Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin
1802) [hereinafter LAWS OF CONNECTICUT].
234 See An Act Relating to Constables, in LAWS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 233, § 15, at
119–20.
235 See An Act for Making Forty Thousand Pounds in Bills of Credit (1735), in LAWS OF
THE ROYAL COLONY OF NEW JERSEY 1703–1745, at 476–77; An Act for Striking One Hundred
Thousand Pounds in Bills of Credit, and Directing the Mode for Sinking the Same (1774),
in LAWS OF THE ROYAL COLONY OF NEW JERSEY, 1770–1775 (1986), at 219 [hereinafter LAWS
OF THE COLONY OF NEW JERSEY].
236 An Act Provision for the Building and Maintaining Light Houses on the Sea Coast
of This Commonwealth, and for Repealing All Laws Heretofore Made for That Purpose
(1787), in ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 1786–1787, ch. 31,
at 597 (Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1893) [hereinafter ACTS OF MASSACHUSETTS].
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of a royal or official letter or refused to give a receipt when passing the letter
along,237 or if he failed to read in the county court an act concerning regula-
tion of slaves.238  While use of qui tam regulation to supervise local govern-
ment administration could be quite eclectic in the eighteenth-century
American states, we will observe below a number of recurring patterns.
b. Road Maintenance and Construction Obligations
Legislators in the eighteenth century often turned to qui tam supervi-
sion of road construction and maintenance activities.  Early American gov-
ernments did not create centralized highway departments of the sort
common today.  The task of road maintenance was instead delegated to local
governments.  Officials responsible to carry out road construction and main-
tenance functions were sometimes monitored and incentivized through qui
tam legislation.
Selective use of qui tam monitoring can be seen in a 1774 New Jersey
statute that overhauled the system of road construction and maintenance
throughout the colony.239  The statute imposed a number of legal duties on
public officials, some enforceable by government officials and others
enforced through qui tam litigation.  The law required every city, town, and
precinct to annually elect two surveyors of the highways and at least two over-
seers of the roads.240  If a surveyor or overseer did not take the oath of office,
he could forfeit £5 to the local tax collector to use for road and bridge repair,
but this provision did not authorize suit by a private party or provide for a
private litigant to share in the forfeiture.241  The same enforcement mecha-
nism applied to a forty shilling forfeiture if the town clerk failed to post
notices with the names of those elected, a £5 forfeiture by the clerk of the
peace if he neglected record-keeping requirements with respect to new roads
approved by the surveyors, and a forty shilling forfeiture if tax assessors or
collectors neglected revenue-raising functions.242  Other provisions allowed
overseers to recover highway-related funds from constables243 and enabled
237 See An Act for the More Speedy Conveying Publick Letters and Packets of This Prov-
ince, and Defraying the Charge Thereof; and to Prevent Abuses of Breaking Open and
Concealing Any Letters Whatsoever (1713), in ACTS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at
73–75.
238 See HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 381.
239 See An Act for Regulating Bridges and Roads (1774), in LAWS OF THE COLONY OF
NEW JERSEY, supra note 235, at 178.
240 Id. at 178, 182.
241 Id.  This provision did not explicitly allow enforcement by the tax collector, but did
provide for the money to be paid to that official. Id. at 178.  It did not make provision for
qui tam enforcement, neither authorizing suit by a private litigant nor providing for the
forfeiture to be split with that person. Id.
242 Id. at 179–80, 182, 192.
243 Id. at 187.
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tax collectors to recover excess bridge funds and related forfeitures from
their predecessors.244
In addition to the duties enforceable by public officials, the 1774 New
Jersey statute used qui tam informers to monitor certain responsibilities of
elected surveyors and overseers.  A surveyor who neglected duties connected
with a petition to open a new road or to alter an existing road could forfeit
£5 in a qui tam action.245  An overseer who failed to perform duties relating
to road inspection and maintenance could forfeit £3, recoverable by a qui
tam informer.246  An overseer also incurred a forfeiture if he “connive[d] at”
letting a private road worker request a reward from a traveler, excused some-
one from working “for drink,” or got drunk when he should work.247  The
overseer was likewise subject to suit if he neglected to enforce forfeitures
incurred by others.248  These forfeitures imposed on the overseer could be
recovered “by any Person whatsoever, One Half to the Use of the Prosecu-
tor.”249  The practice of using qui tam litigation to enforce the duties of over-
seers and surveyors was not an innovation in the 1774 statute, but instead
carried forward a practice that stretched back at least to a 1716 enactment on
the same subject.250
Qui tam enforcement of road maintenance obligations was common in
other states.  Selectmen in Connecticut towns could be sued by informers if
they failed to maintain sign posts and milestones.251  A North Carolina over-
244 Id. at 189–90.  Other provisions of the statute imposed penalties for private miscon-
duct, enforceable by public officials, with only one providing for qui tam litigation as a
backup enforcement method.  An overseer was empowered to enforce a forfeiture when a
citizen failed to provide required assistance in road maintenance activities, with the over-
seer keeping half of the funds recovered. Id.  Other forfeitures applied to those who filled
in drainage ditches, who failed to remove certain dead trees near the road, who defaced or
destroyed road markers, or who blocked or narrowed certain roadways. Id. at 184–86,
189–90.  A person who left open or destroyed a gate, or who drove through private lands
outside the roadway, was liable for a forfeiture in addition to damages for any injured
party. Id. at 186–87.  A small forfeiture applied when citizens assisting with road mainte-
nance requested money, drink, or rewards from travelers. Id. at 183–84.  This latter provi-
sion deployed qui tam enforcement as a backup to enforcement by a public official,
allowing recovery “by the Overseer, or any other Person who shall prosecute the same, One
Third for his own Use.” Id. at 184.
245 Id. at 181 (“[T]o be recovered by any Person who will sue for the same . . . paid One
Half to him who shall sue for the same to Effect.”).
246 Id. at 183.
247 Id. at 184.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See An Act for the Better Laying Out, Regulating and Preserving Public Roads and
High-ways Thro’-out This Province (1716), in THE ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
PROVINCE OF NEW-JERSEY, FROM THE TIME OF THE SURRENDER OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE
SECOND YEAR OF THE REIGN OF QUEEN ANNE, TO THIS PRESENT TIME, BEING THE TWENTY
FIFTH YEAR OF THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE THE SECOND 48–56 (1752) [hereinafter ACTS OF
THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY].
251 See An Act for Erecting and Continuing a Sign-post in Each Town in This State, in
LAWS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 233, § 1, at 395 (“[O]ne Half to the Complainer that
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seer of roads faced possible qui tam litigation if he refused appointment to
the position,252 neglected to maintain signs at forks in the road,253 or failed
to keep roads and bridges clear and repaired.254  New York likewise author-
ized qui tam prosecution of a person neglecting or refusing the office of
overseer of roads,255 while New Hampshire selectmen were subject to qui
tam forfeitures if they neglected to establish post-guides at intersections.256
c. Qui Tam Regulation of Judicial Administration
American governments in the eighteenth century often used qui tam
legislation to ensure the proper functioning of the legal system.  Such stat-
utes sometimes enforced the initial steps necessary to qualify for offices in
judicial institutions—taking oaths and, for some roles, posting bond.  In
North Carolina, a qui tam informer could keep half of the £100 forfeiture
imposed on someone who presumed to act as a justice of the peace or justice
of a county court without first taking the prescribed oath of office.257  Vir-
ginia adopted the same rule for justices of the peace and magistrates of
county or corporation courts, backed by a forfeiture of $1000.258  The clerk
shall prosecute the same within six Months after such Neglect, and the other Half to the
County Treasury; which Fine shall be recoverable of the Select-men.”); An Act to Oblige
the Several Towns on the Post-Roads, to Erect Monuments, Shewing the Distances from
the Several County Towns of Said Roads, in LAWS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 233, § 2, at
319 (“[O]ne Half to him or them who shall prosecute the same to Effect, the other Half to
the Treasury of the Towns where such Select-men belong.”).
252 See An Act to Empower the County Courts of Pleas and Quarter-Sessions of the
Several Counties in This State, to Order the Laying out Public Roads, and to Establish and
Settle Ferries, and to Appoint Where Bridges Shall Be Built, and to Clear Inland Rivers and
Creeks (1784), in LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 200, ch. XIV, § IX, at 534 (“[T]o
be recovered and applied as other Fines and Forfeitures by this Act directed.”).
253 Id. § XI, at 534 (“[T]o be recovered before any Justice of the Peace, and applied as
other Fines in this Act are directed.”).
254 Id. § XIV, at 535 (“[T]o be recovered by a Warrant from any Justice of the Peace by
any Person taking out the same, and to be applied to his own Use.”).
255 See An Act for Dividing the Counties of This State into Towns (1788), in 2 LAWS OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK: COMPRISING THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE ACTS OF THE LEGISLA-
TURE, SINCE THE REVOLUTION, FROM THE FIRST TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION, INCLUSIVE, ch.
LXIV, § XIII, at 170 (Thomas Greenleaf ed., 1792) [hereinafter LAWS OF NEW YORK] (moi-
ety of forfeiture “to the use of any person who shall prosecute the same to effect”).
256 See An Act to Establish Post-Guides and to Facilitate Traveling in and Through This
State (1792), in 6 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 19, at 66–67 (giving “one
half to the use of the prosecutor or Informer”).
257 See An Act for Establishing Offices for Receiving Entries of Claims for Lands in the
Several Counties Within This State, for Ascertaining the Method of Obtaining Titles to the
Same, and for Purposes Therein Mentioned (1777), in LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra
note 200, ch. I, § LVI, at 309.
258 See An Act to Reduce into One, the Several Acts Concerning the County and Other
Inferior Courts of This Commonwealth (1792) [hereinafter An Act Concerning Inferior
Courts], in A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA OF A
PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE, ch. LXVII, § II, at 90 (Augustine
Davis ed., 1794) [hereinafter ACTS OF VIRGINIA].  A forfeiture of $1500 applied if someone
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of a Virginia county court could forfeit $1500 for executing the office without
an oath and $600 for doing so without posting an adequate bond, both
enforceable by qui tam litigation and accompanied by terms of imprison-
ment.259  A Virginia county coroner faced a qui tam forfeiture if he executed
a writ prior to taking the oath of office and securing a bond.260
Some states used qui tam legislation to supervise issuance and execution
of writs.  A North Carolina clerk who issued a writ without taking adequate
security or keeping specified records would forfeit £100 to the defendant
plus an additional £50, “one Half to the Use of the Person suing for the same,
the other Half to the Use of the Poor of the County.”261  A Maryland county
clerk who delivered blank writs to an attorney, sheriff, or other person could
suffer a forfeiture of tobacco, half to the government and half to the
informer.262  A North Carolina sheriff who neglected to execute a writ or
other process without sufficient cause was required to pay £50 to the
aggrieved party; however, if the sheriff executed a “false [r]eturn,” he had to
pay £50, “one Moiety thereof to the Party grieved, and the other Moiety to
him or them that will sue for the same.”263  A New York sheriff would forfeit
£100 at the suit of a qui tam informer for executing a writ of replevin not-
withstanding an unadjudicated claim of ownership by the person in posses-
sion of the property.264  A New York sheriff executing a writ of fieri facias or
other writ of execution could face a qui tam prosecution if he sold property
without proper notice or outside of authorized hours.265  A New Jersey con-
acted as a judge of the General Court without first taking the oath, but this statute did not
include a provision for qui tam enforcement. See An Act Reducing into One, the Several
Acts and Parts of Acts Concerning the General Court, and Prescribing the Manner of Pro-
ceeding Therein in Certain Cases (1792), in ACTS OF VIRGINIA, supra, ch. LXVII, § I, at 76.
259 See An Act to Reduce into One, All Acts and Parts of Acts Respecting County and
Corporation Clerks (1792), in ACTS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 258, ch. LXX, §§ I, III & VI, at
101–02 [hereinafter An Act Respecting Clerks].
260 See An Act Concerning Coroners (1791), in ACTS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 258, ch.
LXXXI, § V, at 132.
261 An Act Directing the Clerks of the Several Courts of Record Within This State as to
Their Duty in Office with Respect to Issuing Writs (1787), in LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA,
supra note 200, ch. XIX, § III, at 619.
262 See HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 175 (“on penalty of 6000lb.
tobacco; one half to the support of government, the other to the informer”).
263 An Act for Appointing Sheriffs, and Directing Their Duty in Office, and for Oblig-
ing the Late Sheriffs and Collectors of Public Monies Who Are in Arrear, to Account for
and Pay the Same, and Other Purposes (1777), in LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note
200, ch. VIII, § V, at 331; see also THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF NEW JERSEY, 1703–1722, at
14 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978) [hereinafter LAWS OF NEW JERSEY] (referencing English law
from the tenth and eleventh year of King William the Third imposing qui tam forfeiture if
sheriff or other officer violated statutory restrictions on returns).
264 See An Act to Prevent Abuses and Delays in Actions of Replevin (1788), in 2 LAWS OF
NEW YORK, supra note 255, ch. V, § VI, at 7.
265 See An Act to Regulate Sales on Execution (1790), in 2 LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra
note 255, ch. LVII, §§ I–II, at 330.
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stable could pay a £5 qui tam forfeiture if he violated statutory duties relating
to summoning jurors and executing judgments.266
Qui tam legislation was sometimes deployed to promote good record
keeping by judicial officers.  A Rhode Island justice of the peace or his estate
was required to deliver official papers and records to the town clerk within
six months after he left office or died, subject to a qui tam forfeiture for each
month’s delay.267  On removal from office or death, a Massachusetts justice
of the peace or his estate had three months to lodge official papers and
records with the clerk of the court of common pleas, subject to a variable qui
tam forfeiture, with a larger forfeiture imposed for anyone who knowingly
destroyed, defaced, or concealed records of a deceased justice.268  The clerk
of a Maryland court of record could suffer a qui tam forfeiture of two thou-
sand pounds of tobacco if he did not deliver a legible bill of costs recovered
from the defendant.269  Virginia law imposed a qui tam forfeiture on a court
clerk who removed official records and papers from the county.270  A New
Hampshire clerk of court could be sued by a qui tam informer for failing to
deliver to the sheriff and the county treasurer an attested list of fines and
forfeitures imposed.271
Qui tam legislation also enforced a smorgasbord of other duties relating
to judicial administration and the integrity of the legal system.  In order to
prevent malicious prosecutions by information, a qui tam informer could col-
266 See An Act to Erect and Establish Courts in the Several Counties in This Colony for
the Trial of Small Causes, and to Repeal the Former Act for That Purpose, in LAWS OF THE
COLONY OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 235, at 308 (constable’s duties in summoning jury
venire); id. at 308–09 (constable’s duties in executing judgment); id. at 311 (qui tam forfei-
ture for violating statutory duties).
267 See An Act Regarding the Proceedings and Trials in Civil Actions, Brought Before
Justices of the Peace, in LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND, supra note 221, § 12, at 193–94 (awarding
forfeiture of two dollars a month, “one moiety thereof to and for the use of the State, and
the other moiety thereof to and for the use of the informer who shall prosecute for the
same”).
268 See An Act for Rendering Process in Law Less Expensive (1788), in LAWS OF MASSA-
CHUSETTS, supra note 214, ch. 67, at 126 (awarding forfeiture of £50–500 for neglect and
£500–1000 for destruction or concealment, “one half to the Commonwealth & the other
half to him or them, who shall sue for the same”).  An earlier statute on the same subject
imposed different deadlines and smaller forfeitures, but was also enforceable through qui
tam litigation.  An Act for Rendering Process in Law Less Expensive, in ACTS OF MASSACHU-
SETTS, supra note 236, ch. 43, at 110 (forfeiture of £50 for former justice of the peace who
delayed six months in lodging records, or for estate executor or administrator who delayed
three months, or £100 for destroying, defacing, or concealing records of deceased justice,
“one half thereof to the use of him or them, who shall sue for the same”).
269 See HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 91.
270 See An Act Respecting Clerks, supra note 259, § IV, at 101–02 (forfeiture for remov-
ing papers and records); id. § VI, at 102 (“All the penalties by this Act imposed, shall be
prosecuted for, and recovered by bill, plaint, or information, in any Court of Record, one
moiety to the use of the Informer, and the other moiety to the use of the
Commonwealth.”).
271 See An Act Prescribing the Duty and Regulating the Office of Sheriff, supra note
231, at 609–10.
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lect a forfeiture if the Attorney General of colonial New Jersey prosecuted
someone for a misdemeanor without presentment by a grand jury or an
information supported by an order signed by the governor.272  The judges of
a Virginia county or corporation court could incur a qui tam forfeiture if they
failed to maintain a sufficient prison, pillory, and stocks,273 failed to make
timely nominations to fill a vacancy in the office of coroner,274 or if the jus-
tices in certain counties failed to provide facilities and equipment needed for
hemp inspection.275  Maryland judges were obliged to maintain a set of stan-
dard English weights and measures, subject to enforcement by qui tam litiga-
tion.276  Judges in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey could face qui
tam actions for performing clandestine weddings.277  A justice of the peace
in South Carolina could incur a forfeiture for failing to administer certain
oaths.278  Virginia followed the English precedent of permitting a qui tam
action against a juror who accepted a bribe.279  Statutes in South Carolina,
New Jersey, Virginia, and Maryland used qui tam monitoring to restrict
272 See An Act for Preventing Malicious Prosecutions by Informations, in LAWS OF NEW
JERSEY, supra note 263, ch. XLIV, at 27.
273 See An Act Concerning Inferior Courts, supra note 258, § XIII, at 92.
274 See An Act Concerning Coroners, supra note 260, ch. LXXXI, § II, at 131–32.
275 See An Act to Regulate the Inspection of Hemp (1790), in ACTS OF VIRGINIA, supra
note 258, ch. LIV, § VI, at 59 (giving “one moiety to the prosecutor”).
276 See HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 491.
277 See An Act to Prevent Clandestine Marriages, in LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND, supra note
221, § 9, at 485 (imposing forfeiture for judge or minister performing wedding “without
due lawful publication”); An Act for Regulating and Orderly Celebrating of Marriages; and
for Preventing and Punishing Incestuous and Other Unlawful Marriages, in LAWS OF CON-
NECTICUT, supra note 233, § 3, at 286 (subjecting magistrate or minister to forfeiture for
performing marriage without prior publication and consent of parents and guardians for
those subject to care and control); An Act to Prevent Clandestine Marriages, in ACTS OF
THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 250, at 79–80 (imposing forfeiture by minister or
justice of the peace who marries people without a license or publication, half to the crown,
“the other half thereof to the Parents or Guardians of such Person who shall be so joyned
in marriage as aforesaid, or to such other Person or Persons who shall prosecute the same
to Effect”).  A similar forfeiture by Massachusetts judges could be enforced by the county
treasurer or by a parent or guardian with responsibility for one of the parties. See An Act
for the Orderly Solemnization of Marriages (1786), in LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note
214, ch. 3, at 9.
278 See An Act for Making Aliens Free of This Part of the Province, in 2 STATUTES OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 220, at 251–53.
279 See An Act Concerning Grand Juries, Petit Juries, and Venir (1792), in ACTS OF
VIRGINIA, supra note 258, ch. LXXIII, § XIX, at 108; see also An Act Against Such as Shall
Procure or Commit Wilful Perjury, and Against Embracery (1789), in ACTS OF VIRGINIA,
supra note 258, ch. XLVIII, § III, at 52; see also supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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judges, sheriffs, and clerks from pleading as attorneys.280  A New Jersey stat-
ute used qui tam monitoring to limit the fees attorneys charged.281
d. Qui Tam Monitoring of Inspection and Regulatory Regimes
Our review of English law showed use of qui tam statutes to police regu-
latory regimes, enforcing obligations of officials who regulated cloth or guild
officials who assayed precious metals.282  The practice carried over to the
new world, where American governments set up regulatory regimes enforcea-
ble by qui tam bounties directed at both government officials and regulated
parties.  A 1715 Maryland statute used qui tam informers to enforce regula-
tions for “hogsheads” (barrels) of tobacco.283  The legislation recited difficul-
ties experienced in regulating tobacco merchants, including a conclusion
that earlier laws had “in great measure proved ineffectual, either for want of
laying sufficient Penalties upon the Offenders, or of proper Methods to
inflict them.”284  Under the new legislation, any person who suspected that
tobacco had been packed in oversized hogsheads could “call to his Assistance
any Justice of the Peace, Sheriff, Vestryman, or Church-Warden” to enter a
building or ship for the purpose of seizing and marking the questionable
barrels.285  If examination showed that a hogshead exceeded statutory size
requirements, the officer could “condemn the same to the Use of such
Informer, who shall thereupon be immediately vested with the Property
280 See An Act for Regulating Attorney’s [sic] at Law Within This Province (1694), in
ACTS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 250, ch. VI, at 343 (forfeiture for justice
of the peace, sheriff, clerk, and others pleading as attorney in courts of province unless a
party); An Act for Establishing County and Precinct Courts, in 7 STATUTES OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, supra note 220, § VII, at 168; An Act Concerning Counsel and Attornies at Law
(1792), in ACTS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 258, ch. LXXI, § XI, at 104 (forfeiture for justice of
the peace, sheriff, or clerk pleading as attorney in court of the county, except as general
attorney for nonresident); HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 51 (forfeiture of
3000 pounds of tobacco if the magistrate, sheriff, or clerk pleads as an attorney in the court
where the person holds office).
281 See For the Better Enforcing the Observation of the Above Recited Ordinance (An
Act Enforcing the Observation of the Ordinance for Establishing Fees Within This Prov-
ince), in LAWS OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 263, ch. LXVI, at 55.
282 See supra notes 167–70, 199 and accompanying text.
283 An Act Ascertaining the Gauge and Tare of Tobacco Hogsheads; and to Prevent
Cropping and Defacing Tobacco Taken on Board Ships or Vessels upon Freight; and for
Laying Impositions on Tobacco by the Hogshead, for the Support of Government; and for
Encouraging Settlements in This Province, by Ascertaining the Manner of Paying the
Alienations, Fines, and Quit Rents, to the Lord Proprietory of This Province, on the Condi-
tions Therein Mentioned (1715), in ACTS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 87, 168.
284 Id.
285 Id.  The statute provided that the staves could not exceed forty-eight inches in
length, that the head could not exceed thirty-two inches in diameter, and that the bulge
could not exceed thirty-seven inches in diameter. Id.  A later section of the statute indi-
cated that duties were charged per hogshead of tobacco, which might suggest a motive for
using oversized barrels. Id. at 170–71.
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thereof.”286  An informer who actually saw a suspicious hogshead (rather
than just learning of one in a concealed location) could immediately seize
and mark it on his own initiative before “giv[ing] Information to some Jus-
tice, or other Officer,” who would then go to examine the barrel.287  A justice
of the peace or other officer who refused or delayed performance of statu-
tory duties would forfeit ten shillings per hogshead to the use of the
informer.288
New Hampshire used qui tam regulation to monitor the integrity of
weights and measures used by local merchants.  The selectmen of a town
would forfeit $100, half “for the use of the person who shall sue for the
same,” if they did not procure a set of standard weights, measures, and a scale
beam as required by law.289  The person selected as sealer of weights and
measures would forfeit $50 for failing to notify inhabitants to bring or send
their scale beams, steelyards, weights, and measures for inspection, and $20 if
he neglected some other duty under the act, “one half for the prosecutor.”290
If a person refused to have his weights and measures approved, there was a
potential forfeiture to be split between the sealer and the poor of the
town.291  However, a qui tam action could be brought against a merchant
who sold merchandise using unapproved weights and measures, or using
sealed weights and measures that proved unjust, one moiety for the poor of
the town “the other moiety to the informer who shall prosecute the same.”292
A late eighteenth-century Delaware statute used qui tam monitoring to
reinforce a system of health inspections in state ports.293  The master or com-
mander of a ship carrying more than forty persons, or carrying an infectious
passenger, or coming from an infected port would forfeit $1000 if he landed
without a permit from a doctor appointed to make inquiries.294  A smaller
$100 forfeiture applied if he concealed the existence of a sick passenger or
material information about sickness during the voyage.295  If the doctor
denied a landing permit, the ship could nevertheless try to convince other
286 Id. at 168–69.  The judgment of the officer was final, and the tobacco was to be
released and the mark struck out if the hogshead did not violate the statute. Id. at 169.
287 Id. at 169.
288 Id.  The informer also had a cause of action against anyone who altered or removed
a marked hogshead before it could be examined by an officer. Id. Another provision
permitted a qui tam forfeiture by any person who sold a hogshead of tobacco that did not
have the weight marked on it. Id. at 169–70.
289 An Act Regulating Scale Beams, Steelyards, Weights and Measures (1797), in 6 LAWS
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 21, at 446.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 445.
292 Id. at 445–46.
293 See An Act to Prevent Infectious Diseases Being Brought into This State, and for
Other Purposes (1797), in LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE: TO THE YEAR OF OUR LORD,
ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND TWENTY NINE INCLUSIVE 298 (R. Porter & Son 1829)
[hereinafter LAWS OF DELAWARE].
294 Id. § 1.
295 Id. § 2.
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local officials to allow landing of sick passengers under conditions that would
not endanger public health.296  The doctor was also instructed to inspect the
ship for compliance with statutory standards regarding the adequacy of sup-
plies and accommodations for passengers.297  A forfeiture of $50 applied if
the doctor failed to report violations to a local judge.298  All of the fines and
penalties under the statute were to be divided, with one moiety going to the
poor of the county “and the other moiety thereof to the use of him or her
who will sue for the same.”299
Many other early American statutes used qui tam litigation to reinforce
inspection regimes.  New Hampshire’s system for inspecting and branding
pot ash and pearl ash exported from the state included a number of poten-
tial forfeitures by regulated parties, enforceable by qui tam informers, as well
as one applicable to an inspector who delayed more than three hours in per-
forming a requested inspection.300  A New Hampshire naval officer, responsi-
ble for monitoring shipping at the state’s ports, could be sued by a qui tam
informer for neglecting functions imposed by state law.301  A North Carolina
naval officer could face qui tam forfeitures for allowing a ship to leave port
without a certificate of inspection or for refusing to provide a certificate that
the master or commander of the vessel had taken an oath required by law.302
296 Id. § 3.
297 Id. § 5, at 299.
298 Id.
299 Id. § 8, at 299–300.  A supplementary statute enacted later may have eliminated the
provision for qui tam enforcement.  The latter statute provided that all forfeitures in either
statute were to be sued for in the name of the state and instructed that suits were to be
brought, depending on the location, by the physicians appointed to perform inspections,
by specified municipal officials, or by a trustee of the poor. See A Supplement to the Act,
Entitled, “An Act to Prevent Infectious Diseases Being Brought into This State and for
Other Purposes” (1799), in LAWS OF DELAWARE, supra note 293, § 9, at 303.  A colonial
Georgia statute with similar purposes provided for qui tam actions against various private
individuals responsible for a ship who did not truthfully answer questions about the health
status of those on board. See An Act to Amend an Act Intituled an Act to Prevent the
Bringing into and Spreading of Malignant and Contagious Distempers in the Province; to
Oblige Masters or Commanders of Vessels Going out of Any Port Within the Same First to
Produce a Passport from the Governour or Commander in Chief; to ‘Prevent the Harbour-
ing of Sick Sailors and Others; and for the Regulating and Well Ordering of the Lazaretto
upon the Island of Tybee (1770), in 19 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA:
STATUTES, COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY 1768 TO 1773, at 156–60 (Allen D. Candler ed.,
1970) [hereinafter STATUTES OF GEORGIA].
300 See An Act for the Inspection of Pat and Pearl Ashes (1791), in 5 LAWS OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 40, at 825 (“[An inspector who shall] unreasonably refuse
neglect or delay to proceed to such examination and inspection for the space of three
hours . . . shall for such offence forfeit the sum of twenty shillings to any person who shall
sue for the same.”).
301 See An Act for the Regulation of Navigation and Commerce (1785), in 5 LAWS OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 8, at 78–80.
302 See An Act to Prevent the Exportation of Unmerchantable Commodities (1784), in
LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 200, ch. XXVI, §§ VI–VIII, at 496 [hereinafter An
Act to Prevent the Exportation of Unmerchantable Commodities].
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-3\NDL307.txt unknown Seq: 49  1-MAR-18 12:41
2018] qui  tam  litigation  against  government  officials 1283
A Georgia inspector could incur a qui tam forfeiture if he intentionally and
inaccurately certified that hemp or flax was “Clean made & Merchantable” or
that flour was “Merchantable.”303  A Maryland tobacco inspector faced a qui
tam forfeiture if he did not burn unmerchantable tobacco, but instead
allowed it to be carried away from the inspection site.304  Massachusetts pro-
vided for local inspection of nails, with forfeitures applicable to nail sellers as
well as forfeitures by nail inspectors for neglect or fraud in the performance
of their duties.305  New Hampshire cullers and surveyors, who inspected
wood products prior to shipment, could be sued qui tam for fraud or
deceit.306  A Connecticut statute for inspection of beef, pork, and other
products provided qui tam forfeitures for private exporters, as well as for an
inspector who gave a “false certificate” of inspection.307  In North Carolina,
an inspector was subject to qui tam prosecution for branding empty barrels
or lending his inspector’s brand to someone else.308  Merchants in Rhode
Island could be sued by qui tam prosecutors if they sold casks of lime that did
not display an inspector’s brand or if they employed counterfeit brands or
reused casks previously branded, and an inspector could likewise be sued for
branding lime in violation of statutory requirements.309  In South Carolina, a
303 An Act for Encouraging the Cultivation of Hemp Flax and Wheat and for Regulat-
ing the Inspection of Hemp Flax and Wheat Flour (1768), in 19 STATUTES OF GEORGIA,
supra note 299, at 92–93.
304 See HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 505.
305 See An Act for Regulating the Manufacture of Nails, Made for Sale or Exportation
Within This Commonwealth and Repealing All Laws Heretofore Made for That Purpose
(1790), in LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 214, ch. 36, at 445–46 (forfeiture of £4 for
“any neglect or fraud in inspecting Nails” or marking cask “which they have not actually
and thoroughly inspected” to be recovered “by any person who will sue and prosecute
therefore”).
306 See An Act for the Admeasurement of Boards and for Regulating the Sale of Shin-
gles Clapboards Hoops and Staves and for Other Purposes Therein Mentioned (1785), in 5
LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 4, at 73.
307 An Act for the Inspection of Provisions and Other Articles of Commerce, in LAWS OF
CONNECTICUT, supra note 233, § 12, at 244 (forfeiture for exporter who does not comply
with requirements for inspection, packing, and branding, “one Half to the Person who
shall prosecute or sue for the same”); id. § 13, at 244 (forfeiture for violating rules on
tobacco exports, “one Half to the Prosecutor”); id. §§ 18–19, at 245 (forfeiture for “false
Certificate” by inspector, “one Half to the Person who shall prosecute or sue for the
same”).
308 See An Act to Prevent the Exportation of Unmerchantable Commodities, supra note
302, § XXI, at 499.  There was also a forfeiture for a person who arranged for branding by
someone other than the inspector or his assistant. Id.; see also An Act the Better to Regu-
late the Inspection of Tobacco in This State, in LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 200,
ch. XVI, § V, at 671 (naval officer who neglects to certify mark and quality of each hogs-
head of tobacco forfeits £50 “to the Use of any Person suing for the same”).
309 See An Act Regulating the Assize of Lime-Casks, and the Inspection of Lime, in LAWS
OF RHODE ISLAND, supra note 221, §§ 3–5, at 517–18 (§ 3 “moiety to the complainant or
informer”; § 4 recoverable by indictment or other due process, “one moiety thereof to the
prosecutor”; § 5 “one moiety to and for the use of the prosecutor,” other moiety to the
inspector).
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receiver could face a qui tam forfeiture for licensing a public house or
retailer of liquor without the approval of specified individuals trusted by the
legislature.310
e. Qui Tam Monitoring of Quasi-Public Functions
In addition to use of qui tam legislation to monitor decentralized con-
duct by public officials, it may be relevant to highlight qui tam statutes
directed at persons performing what could be considered quasi-public func-
tions.  For instance, statutes sometimes imposed legal duties on church offi-
cials.  One colonial New Jersey statute required officials in each parish,
church, chapel, or meeting house to read the statute once a year after wor-
ship services.311  The vestrymen of a Maryland parish could suffer a qui tam
forfeiture if they failed to inspect the parish library twice a year.312
Qui tam legislation was sometimes used to enforce duties of persons lia-
ble for militia service.  An early New Jersey statute for organizing the militia
imposed certain forfeitures enforceable by militia officers.  For instance, mili-
tia leaders could collect penalties from those who did not appear for semi-
annual training, who appeared without the required weaponry, or who
refused an appointment to serve as a corporal or sergeant.313  However, the
statute included qui tam forfeitures for individuals neglecting to stand watch
in a time of public danger or leaving a post before being relieved by someone
else.314  A Georgia law from 1770 required male militia members to bring
guns or pistols when they attended worship services, subject to a penalty of
ten shillings, “half to him or them that shall give information thereof.”315
Church leaders were required to periodically inquire into compliance with
310 See An Additional Act to an Act Entitled for the Better Regulating Taverns and
Punch-Houses, in 3 STATUTES OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 220, § 7, at 581–85.
311 See An Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murdering of Bastard Children, in ACTS
OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 250, ch. LXXIII, § 3, at 274 (requiring public
reading of act annually “by the Clerk of [each] Parish Church, Chappel or Meeting, imme-
diately after Divine Service, under the Penalty of Twenty Shillings for every Omission and
Neglect therein; to be recovered with Costs, by the Informer”).
312 See An Act for Securing the Parochial Libraries of This Province (1723), in ACTS OF
MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 30 (imposing forfeiture if a vestry did not inspect libraries
twice a year, one moiety to crown, “the other Moiety to the Informer, or him or them that
shall sue for the same”).
313 See An Act for Settling the Militia of This Province, in LAWS OF NEW JERSEY, supra
note 263, ch. XL, at 17–19.
314 See id. at 18–19 (awarding “one half to the informer who shall prosecute the same to
effect” and the other half to the crown).  A very similar statute replicating many of the
same provisions was enacted a few years later. See An Act for the Settling the Militia of This
Province, in LAWS OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 263, at 139–42.
315 An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants by Obliging the Male White Per-
sons to Carry Fire Arms to Places of Public Worship (1770), in 19 STATUTES OF GEORGIA,
supra note 299, § 1, at 138.
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the statute, and could face a qui tam forfeiture if they did not give informa-
tion against a violator.316
Qui tam monitoring also facilitated regulation of quasi-public functions
performed by ferry operators.  A colonial New Jersey statute authorized the
governor to grant an exclusive license to operate a ferry over the Delaware
River between Burlington and New Bristol, and established fees that could be
charged for ferry service.317  The ferry operator could be sued by a qui tam
informer for failing to keep sufficient boats or failing to duly attend to ferry
service.318  A Rhode Island statute permitted a qui tam action against a ferry
operator who refused carriage to someone tendering payment, failed to keep
his boat in readiness, or allowed his boat to be absent from the ferry loca-
tion.319  A Connecticut statute allowed qui tam suits against ferry operators
who did not diligently attend to ferry operations during specified hours, or
who charged higher fares than authorized by statute.320  South Carolina ferry
operators could be sued for neglect or for carrying persons in violation of the
statute.321
2. Conflict of Interest Rules: Countering Incentives for Resistance
As in English law, early American governments sometimes used qui tam
legislation to counter conflicts of interest that might result in noncompliance
with statutory directives.  The Maryland legislature, for instance, required
Baltimore and Georgetown to appoint inspectors of potash and pearlash.322
The inspectors were not allowed to sell or trade in potash or pearlash, subject
to a £100 penalty, half allocated to the use of the person suing for it.323
North Carolina provided for qui tam enforcement of a rule preventing an
inspector from purchasing cullings or items that did not pass inspection.324
A Maryland county surveyor could suffer a qui tam forfeiture if he secretly
316 Id. § 2, at 138–39.  The congregant could also face a qui tam forfeiture for refusing
to cooperate with an inquiry by church leaders under the statute. Id. § 3, at 139.
317 See An Act for Establishing a Ferry from the Town of Burlington, to the Town of
New-Bristol, in LAWS OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 263, at 34.
318 See id.
319 See An Act Regulating Ferries, in LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND, supra note 221, § 7, at 573
(forfeiture for neglecting to keep boat in readiness or refusing to transport person apply-
ing for passage); id. § 9, at 573–74 (forfeiture for allowing boat to be absent from ferry).
320 See An Act for Regulating Ferries, in LAWS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 233, § 4, at
196 (“[O]ne Half to the Informer or Complainant, who shall prosecute the same.”); id.
§ 13, at 197 (“[O]ne Moiety to the Treasurer of the State and the other Moiety to be
divided between the Informer and the Person injured.”).
321 See An Act for Establishing Five Ferries; One over Winyaw River, Two over Santee
River, One over Sampit Creek, and One over Cooper River, in STATUTES OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, supra note 220, §§ 5, 8, at 71–72.
322 See HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 431–32.
323 See id.
324 See An Act to Prevent the Exportation of Unmerchantable Commodities, in LAWS OF
NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 200,  ch. XXVI, § XXII, at 499.
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purchased land within the county, personally or through an agent.325  Stat-
utes regulating fraudulent conduct by inspectors are also relevant here,326
since inspection fraud would often be motivated by financial considerations.
Use of qui tam regulation to counter conflicts of interest continued well
after the framing period.  An 1819 Delaware statute provided that a sheriff or
constable responsible for selling goods pursuant to law could not bid on the
sale items directly or through an agent.327  An 1829 statute regulated trustees
running the local “poor house.”  Their responsibility for expenditure of pub-
lic funds created opportunities for self-dealing.  To address the problem, the
statute provided that no trustee of the poor “shall directly or indirectly fur-
nish any article for the poor” and “all purchases shall be made from persons
not Trustees.”328  A violation made the trustee liable to pay “fifty dollars to
any person, who will sue for the same.”329
3. Bolstering Public Confidence in Government
A third reason for using qui tam legislation to regulate public officials is
to bolster public confidence in the lawful performance of important govern-
ment functions.  For instance, the secretary of the Maryland assembly was
required to record acts of the assembly in an official legislative book and affix
his seal.330  A secretary neglecting to do so could forfeit ten thousand pounds
of tobacco, half to the use of the informer.331  This was not decentralized
conduct that would be difficult for the central government to monitor.  Nor
did the secretary of the assembly operate under a continuing conflict of inter-
est that would impede performance of this duty.  The most plausible ratio-
nale for using qui tam legislation in this context was to create a high
likelihood that a particularly important government function would be regu-
larly and scrupulously performed, regardless of the circumstances.  Similar
considerations help explain extensive use of qui tam statutes to monitor
duties of officials in connection with elections and the collection and expen-
diture of tax funds.
a. Elections
One critical function of republican government is to conduct elections
that allow peaceful reallocation of political authority.  If the public comes to
doubt the integrity of the election process, the legitimacy of government
authority will be called into question.  Early American state governments
325 See HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, ¶¶ 7–8, at 497.
326 See, e.g., supra notes 303, 306–07 and accompanying text.
327 See A Supplement to the Act Entitled “An Act for the More Easy and Speedy Recov-
ery of Small Debts,” in LAWS OF DELAWARE, supra note 293, § 8, at 214.
328 An Act to Consolidate and Amend the Laws for the Relief of the Poor (1829), in
LAWS OF DELAWARE, supra note 293, § 18, at 445.
329 Id.
330 See HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 16.
331 See id.
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often used qui tam regulation to supervise persons conducting or participat-
ing in elections.  Such legislation provided a public check on the electoral
process, increasing the likelihood that election-related duties would be faith-
fully performed and reducing opportunities for public officials to corrupt the
integrity of the process.
England had used qui tam legislation to enforce statutory disqualifica-
tions for service in Parliament.332  Similar laws can be found in the early
American states.  Colonial New Jersey provided that those disabled from serv-
ing in the English House of Commons by reason of an office, pension, or
salary from the government were also disabled from serving in the state Gen-
eral Assembly.333  A person who served in the state House of Representatives
notwithstanding the statutory disability would forfeit £50 to be recovered “by
such Person as shall sue for the same.”334  A North Carolina candidate for
office could face a qui tam forfeiture of £500 if he had aided and abetted the
British during the Revolutionary War.335
Several states used qui tam monitoring to discourage election fraud or
misconduct. Connecticut allowed qui tam prosecutions for vote buying.336  A
Pennsylvania election judge, inspector, or clerk who committed willful fraud
in connection with an election could forfeit £100 to a qui tam litigant.337
Qui tam informers ensured the integrity of New Hampshire town meetings,
collecting a forfeiture from the moderator if he counted two votes from the
same person, added to or subtracted from the lawful vote total, or accepted a
332 See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text.
333 See An Act for Securing the Freedom of Assemblies (1730), in LAWS OF THE COLONY
OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 235, at 399.
334 Id. at 400.
335 See An Act to Amend an Act, Passed at Newbern, in November, One Thousand
Seven Hundred and Eighty-four, Entitled, An Act to Describe and Ascertain Such Persons
Who Owed Allegiance to This State, and to Impose Certain Disqualifications on Certain
Persons Therein Described (1785), in LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 200, ch. XI,
§§ I–II, at 555.
336 See An Act for Regulating the Election of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Assistants, in LAWS OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 233, § 13, at 153 (imposing forfeiture of
$17 for “giving, offering, accepting or receiving” a gift, fee, or reward for voting in General
Assembly election, “one half to him or them that shall sue for and prosecute the same to
Effect, and the other half to the Treasury of the Town”).  North Carolina imposed a forfei-
ture for vote buying.  However, unlike other sections of the statute, this provision did not
specify qui tam actions as a method of enforcement. See An Act Directing the Method of
Electing Members of the General Assembly, and Other Purposes (1777), in LAWS OF
NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 200, ch. IV, § XII, at 320–21 (imposing £500 forfeiture for
giving money, gift, gratuity, or reward for votes of electors in General Assembly election).
337 An Act to Regulate the General Elections of This Commonwealth and to Prevent
Frauds Therein (1785), in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 1801,
ch. MCLXXV, § XXV, at 48–49 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1906) [hereinaf-
ter STATUTES OF PENNSYLVANIA] (“[E]very specific fine and forfeiture by this act declared
and imposed on any person (not otherwise directed) who shall become liable to the same,
shall be recovered by actions of debt founded on this act, to any person who shall sue for
the same in the court of common pleas of the county or in the supreme court, or by
information or indictment to the use of the informer or prosecutor.”).
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proxy vote that was not personally delivered.338  In Rhode Island, the moder-
ator of a meeting could be sued if he failed to follow statutory procedures
concerning challenges to the eligibility of a voter339 or proxy voter.340
The fraud suppression statutes were often accompanied by more general
qui tam regulation of the electoral process.341  A Virginia sheriff or mayor
could face litigation for a number of election-related offenses, from refusing
to conduct a poll when required, to falsely certifying returns, to neglecting to
deliver poll books to the clerk of court.342  A North Carolina sheriff could be
sued by a qui tam informer for neglecting or refusing to prepare election
returns or otherwise violating election procedures.343  When Kentucky was
organized as a state separate from Virginia, officers conducting the elections
could be sued “by any person” for failing to perform election-related
duties.344  In New Hampshire, a constable who failed to provide notice to a
person elected to town office could be sued for thirty shillings by “any inhabi-
tant of this State who will sue for the same,” half to the use of the town “and
the other half to the use of the prosecutor.”345  Sheriffs and town clerks
could suffer qui tam forfeitures for neglecting to make timely election
returns.346  Selectmen who neglected to schedule a meeting for electoral
purposes would forfeit £10 to a qui tam informer.347  South Carolina justices
of the peace and other officials could also face qui tam forfeitures for
neglecting duties under the election laws.348
338 An Act to Prevent Undue Influence, and Fraud in Town Meetings, and in the
Choice of Town and State Officers (1799), in 6 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, at
568–69.
339 An Act Regulating the Manner of Admitting Freemen, and Directing the Method of
Electing Officers in This State (1798), in LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND, supra note 221, § 10, at
120–21; see id. § 12, at 122 (directing forfeitures be recovered “half to and for the use of
him who shall inform and sue for the same”).
340 See id. § 12, at 122 (“And that all the aforementioned forfeitures in this act may be
recovered by an action in any court of record in this State proper to try the same; one half
whereof shall be to and for the use of this State, and the other half to and for the use of
him who shall inform and sue for the same.”).
341 See, e.g., An Act Regulating the General Election (1826), in LAWS OF DELAWARE,
supra note 293, § 16, at 186 (imposing qui tam forfeiture on a variety of officers for willful
neglect or fraud in connection with election-related duties).
342 See An Act Concerning Election of Members of General Assembly (1785), in ACTS
OF VIRGINIA, supra note 258, ch. XVII, § XVII, at 22 (directing that one-half of the specified
forfeitures were payable to “any person who will sue for the same”).
343 An Act Directing the Method of Electing Members of the General Assembly, and
Other Purposes (1777), in LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 200, ch. IV, § XV, at 321.
344 An Act Concerning the Erection of the District of Kentucky into an Independent
State (1789), in ACTS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 258, ch. LIII, §§ II–III, at 55.
345 An Act for Regulating Towns, supra note 222, ch. 41, at 590.
346 See An Act for Laying a Fine on Delinquent Sheriffs and Town Clerks (1786), in 5
LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 9, at 112–13.
347 See An Act for Regulating Towns, supra note 222, ch. 41, at 593.
348 See An Act to Ascertain the Manner and Form of Electing Members to Represent the
Inhabitants of This Province in the Commons House of Assembly, and to Appoint Who
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b. Taxing and Spending
Just as the public tends to be very concerned with the integrity of the
election process, citizens also have a heightened interest in collection of
taxes and expenditure of public funds.  Many eighteenth-century American
governments found qui tam legislation useful for enforcing duties related to
taxing and spending.  In 1716, for example, the New Jersey General Assembly
responded to a report from the provincial treasurer indicating that several
counties had been in arrears on tax payments since 1708.349  The legislature
appointed persons in each county to inspect the tax assessment rolls to deter-
mine whether deficiencies were attributable to the death, removal, or insol-
vency of taxpayers.350  A tax collector or administrator of the collector’s
estate who neglected to make tax assessment records available to inspectors
could forfeit £50 to “any one that will Sue for the Same to Effect the one Half
To be to the Prosecutor and the other half for the support of the
Government.”351
North Carolina property tax legislation invoked the goal of promoting
transparency and accountability, declaring it “just and right that the Body of
the People on whom Taxes are laid, should know to what Purposes the Mon-
ies arising therefrom are applied and appropriated.”352  Under the statute, a
county clerk could face a qui tam action for neglecting to post public lists of
taxable property and of persons the tax collector deemed insolvent.353  The
requirement of publication was designed to provide a “Check against fraudu-
lent and deficient Returns of taxable Property, and to prevent improper
Allowances for Insolvents.”354  A parallel remedy could be invoked against
county commissioners who did not publish an “accurate List of the Taxes
levied and collected in such Town, together with a List of each Sum
expended by said Commissioners, and to whom paid, and for what
Purpose.”355
Legislatures often deployed qui tam informers to ensure maintenance
and oversight of tax records.  In Maryland, county commissioners were
Shall be Deemed and Adjudged Capable of Choosing or Being Chosen Members of the
Said House, in STATUTES OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 220, §§ 13, 16, 20, at 441–48.
349 An Act to Enable Some Persons in Every County of This Province to Inspect the
Rolls of All the Assessments in the Said County, which Lye in the Hands of the Collectors
Since the Year One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eight, and also Examine the
Acco[un]ts of the Collectors and See What Deficiencies of Persons Dead, Removed, or
Insolvent Remain Unpaid, and Report the Same to This House at the Next Meeting of This
Assembly, in LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 235, at 393.
350 Id. at 394.
351 Id.
352 An Act to Compel Certain Officers Therein Mentioned to Publish the Application
of the Public Monies, and Allowances for Insolvents (1786), in LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA,
supra note 200, at 587.
353 Id. § 2, at 588 (forfeiture by clerk neglecting or refusing to perform duties imposed
by act “to any Person who shall sue for the same”).
354 Id.
355 Id. § 5.
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empowered to make levies of tobacco to defray public charges.356  The
county clerk was required to annually transmit an account showing the
tobacco levied and its disposition, enforceable by a forfeiture of one thou-
sand pounds of tobacco, “[h]alf to the Informer, or him or them that will sue
for the same.”357  A North Carolina naval officer could be sued by a qui tam
informer for allowing a ship to leave port without proof of tax payment.358
New Jersey tax collectors could forfeit £50 for failing to pay over money col-
lected, along with a list of assessments.359  A New Hampshire statute author-
ized the selectmen of New London to collect a tax from nonresident owners
of land to use for road repairs, and provided for qui tam enforcement if the
selectmen neglected to account within four years for the appropriation and
expenditure of the funds.360  Similar statutes enforced a duty to account
imposed on selectmen of other New Hampshire towns.361  A 1740 New Jersey
statute noted that only certain residents of Essex county had been taxed for
repair of the Newark court house and jail, and imposed duties on a number
356 An Act Impowering the Commissioners of the County Courts to Levy and Raise
Tobacco, to Defray the Necessary Charges of Their Counties and Parishes (1704), in ACTS
OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 37.
357 Id.; see also HERTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND, supra note 220, at 337.
358 See An Act for Facilitating the Navigation, and Regulating the Pilotage of the Several
Ports of This State (1783), in LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 200, ch. XX, §§ XV, at
465 (forfeiture for naval officer who allowed ship to clear without master producing certifi-
cate of payment from tax receiver), XXII at 466 (“[E]ach and every Fine imposed by this
Act, shall be recovered by Action of Debt in any Court of Record having Cognizance
thereof, one Half to the Person suing for the same.”).
359 See An Act for the Support of the Government of His Majesty’s Province of New
Jersey for Five Years, to Commence from the Twenty Third Day of September, One Thou-
sand Seven Hundred and Twenty, and to End the Twenty Third Day of September, One
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty and Five, in LAWS OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 263, at
131–32.
360 See An Act to Enable the Select Men of New London in the County of Hillsborough
to Assess, Levy and Collect a Tax on All the Lands of Non Resident Proprietors in Said
Town of Three Pence Per Acre for the Purpose of Repairing the Public Roads in Said New
London (1791), in 5 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 8, at 546–47.
361 See, e.g., An Act to Impower the Inhabitants of Wendall in the County of Cheshire to
Levy a Tax on All of the Lands (Public Rights Excepted) in Said Town for Making, Bridg-
ing and Repairing the High-Ways (1791), in 5 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch.
16, at 556 (one-half to the prosecutor and the other half to the use of the County); An Act
to Empower the Inhabitants of Dorchester in the County of Grafton to Levy a Tax on All
Lands (Publick Lands Excepted) in Said Town for Making and Repairing the High Ways
(1791), in 5 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 21, at 803 (same); An Act to
Enable the Selectmen of Campton to Assess & Cause to Be Collected One Penny Per Acre
Annually for Two Years on All the Unimproved Lands in Said Campton (1792), in 5 LAWS
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 219, ch. 18, at 773 (“[O]ne half to the person or persons
who shall sue for the same & the other half to the use of said County.”); An Act to Enable
the Selectmen of the Town of New Hampton to Assess & Cause to Be Collected One Penny
Per Acre on Each Acre of Land in Said Town Annually, Publick Rights Excepted, for the
Term of Three Years from the Passing This Act (1792), in 5 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra
note 219, ch. 24, at 780 (same).
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of officers in order to complete the collection effort.362  A qui tam provision
allowed “any person that will sue” to collect forfeitures from officers neglect-
ing duties imposed by the statute, including assessors, collectors, constables,
justices, and specially appointed managers.363  South Carolina receivers
could be sued for misdirection of public funds.364
C. Early Federal Qui Tam Statutes Directed at Executive Branch Officials
When members of Congress assembled following ratification of the new
Constitution, they faced enforcement problems analogous to those con-
fronted in earlier years by the English Parliament and state legislative assem-
blies.  They had to figure out how to incentivize and monitor executive
compliance with congressional directives, even though federal officials would
be geographically dispersed throughout a vast territory.  Since the new gov-
ernment began its existence encumbered by Revolutionary War debts, Con-
gress needed to provide for that monitoring at a reasonable cost.365  To
accomplish these objectives, the First and Second Congresses borrowed from
the practices of the English Parliament and earlier American legislatures,
selectively employing qui tam regulation of executive branch officials along-
side provisions for litigation by injured parties and by government officials.
1. Revenue Officers
When the House of Representatives opened its doors to the public on
April 8, 1789,366 James Madison gave a speech highlighting the widely recog-
nized “deficiency in our treasury” and urging an impost on imports to estab-
362 See An Act for Raising of Money for Finishing and Compleating the Goal and Court-
House, Already Erected at Newark in the County of Essex (1740), in LAWS OF THE COLONY
OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 235, at 533–36.
363 Id.
364 See An Act to Continue an Act Entituled An Act for Laying an Imposition on Furrs,
&c., and for Appropriating the Same, in 3 STATUTES OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 220, at
248; An Additional Act to an Act Intituled an Act to Continue an Act Intituled an Act for
Laying an Imposition on Furrs, &c., and for Appropriating the Same, in 2 STATUTES OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 220, at 296.
365 See Letter from Arthur Lee to Tench Coxe (May 12, 1789), in 15 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 MARCH
1789–3 MARCH 1791, at 530, 530 (Johns Hopkins Press 2004) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY] (“The augmentation of Offices, will meet with much opposition unless they are
demonstrably necessary.  For there is much apprehension of alarming the People, with an
apparently expensive commencement of the new Government.”).  Evan Caminker notes
that federal resource constraints helped justify the 1986 congressional decision to reinvigo-
rate qui tam litigation under the False Claims Act. See Caminker, supra note 137, at
350–51.
366 See New-York Daily Gazette (Apr. 9, 1789), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
365, at 3, 3 (“Yesterday the doors of the House of Representatives of the United States,
were thrown open for the admission of the Citizens.”).
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lish a national revenue.367  Of the first five statutes passed by Congress, three
focused on this revenue-raising goal, including one laying duties on
imports,368 one laying duties on tonnage of ships,369 and one establishing a
system for collection of those duties.370  The Collection Act involved a mas-
sive undertaking in which Congress established fifty-nine collection districts
in the eleven states that had already ratified the Constitution (all but Rhode
Island and North Carolina), ranging from a high of twenty collection districts
in Massachusetts, to a low of one district each in New Hampshire, Penn-
sylvania, and Delaware.371  Each district included a port of entry and might
also include multiple ports of delivery.372  The Act provided for appointment
of hundreds of federal customs officers to be stationed throughout the east-
ern ports of the United States.  Busier ports of entry would be served by three
lead officials—a collector, a naval officer, and a surveyor—aided by minor
functionaries including a deputy collector, inspectors, weighers, measurers,
and gaugers.373  Less active ports might be assigned only one or two of the
higher ranked officials.374
The Collection Act imposed a significant number of penalties on mas-
ters and commanders of ships and other private individuals, and provided for
forfeitures of merchandise, vessels, and other property for violation of statu-
tory requirements.375  Congress had a decision to make about enforcement
of those penalties.  While qui tam legislation had been used in some Anglo-
367 The Congressional Register (Apr. 8, 1789), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
365, at 4–5.
368 See An Act for Laying a Duty on Goods, Wares, and Merchandises Imported into the
United States, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24 (1789).
369 See An Act Imposing Duties on Tonnage, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27 (1789).
370 See An Act to Regulate the Collection of the Duties Imposed by Law on the Tonnage
of Ships or Vessels, and on Goods, Wares and Merchandises Imported into the United
States, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (1789) [hereinafter Collection Act].
371 Id. § 1.
372 Id.  For instance, Portsmouth was the sole port of entry for the district of New
Hampshire, and all ships were required to enter and clear there, but from Portsmouth they
might move on to ports of delivery established at Newcastle, Dover, and Exeter. Id.
373 Id. (officers assigned to each port), § 5 (duties of collector, naval officer, and sur-
veyor; supervision of inspectors, weighers, measurers, and gaugers), § 6 (deputy collec-
tors), § 15 (appointment of inspectors).
374 Id. § 1.
375 Id. § 11 (forfeiture for commander of vessel who does not deliver manifests or take
oath), § 12 (forfeiture for unloading goods except during the day and with a permit;
seizure of goods by customs officer); id. § 15 (forfeiture of goods removed from wharf
without weighing and gauging or without permission of officer); id. § 16 (forfeiture by
master or commander if goods delivered do not agree with manifest); id. § 23 (forfeiture
of packaged goods if inspection shows that they differ from documented entries); id. § 24
(forfeiture of goods concealed to avoid duties); id. § 25 (forfeiture for concealing or buy-
ing goods subject to forfeiture under act); id. § 34 (forfeitures for relanding goods once
they have been entered for exportation in order to obtain a drawback of duties); id. § 35
(forfeiture for offering bribe to customs official and penalties for falsely swearing oath); id.
§ 40 (forfeitures for bringing goods into the United States other than by sea in vessels of at
least thirty tons burden).
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American revenue collection regimes, common informers were a controver-
sial method of law enforcement.  In a letter to Congressman Goodhue, a
Massachusetts merchant expressed hope for a collection system that would
operate “without having recourse to the encouragement of a contemptible
and infamous host of informers.”376  In a letter to Senator Strong, on the
other hand, another Massachusetts merchant passed along an idea from state
Comptroller General Leonard Jarvis “that the whole of any forfeiture ought
to be given to the informer” as an “inducement to vigilance.”377  James Sulli-
van, a former judge and future governor of Massachusetts, commented to
Congressman Gerry on the need to “eradicate an opinion Established with
the body of the people when we were a part of [the] British Empire” that “an
Informer against Smuglers was more odious than a theif [sic].”378  He recom-
mended letters to newspapers throughout the country “to change the public
opinion and to make the people veiw [sic] Informers as meritorious.”379
Congress opted against qui tam enforcement of Collection Act penalties
directed at private parties, but tried nevertheless to induce disclosure of
smuggling and other offenses.  Under section 36 of the Collection Act, all
penalties were to be sued for “in the name of the United States . . . by the
collector of the district where the same accrued, and not otherwise,” with the
only exception being for “cases of penalty relating to an officer of the cus-
toms.”380  Property subject to forfeiture under the Act was to be “seized,
libelled and prosecuted as aforesaid.”381  Though only public officials could
enforce the duties of regulated parties, the Act offered rewards for informa-
tion that resulted in a recovery.  Penalties and forfeitures, unless otherwise
allocated, were to be split between the government and federal customs
officers, with one-half going to the United States treasury and one-half
divided among the port’s collector, naval officer, and surveyor.382  However,
376 Letter from Epes Sargent to Benjamin Goodhue (May 26, 1789), in 15 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 365, at 631, 632.
377 See Letter from Samuel Phillips, Jr. to Caleb Strong (June 11, 1789), in 16 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 365, at 749, 750 (noting that the Comptroller General, Leonard
Jarvis, believed the increased monitoring provided by the heightened financial incentive
would “encrease the revenue more than a share of those forfeitures would add to it”); see
also Letter from Leonard Jarvis to Benjamin Goodhue (Aug. 13, 1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 365, at 1305, 1305–06 (commenting on the first Collection Act and
suggesting need for greater financial inducements for informers and officers; noting that
“the Act of informing or seizing may be attended with an Odium not attached to the Act of
prosecuting”).
378 See Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (June 23, 1789), in 16 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 365, at 843, 844; see also Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge
Gerry (July 25, 1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 365, at 1133, 1134 (refer-
ring to “the contempt & abhorrence to informers which has long Existed in the united
States”).
379 See Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (June 23, 1789), in 16 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 365, at 843, 844.
380 Collection Act, supra note 370, § 36.
381 Id.
382 Id. § 38.
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where a recovery occurred “in pursuance of information given to such collec-
tor, by any person” other than a naval officer or surveyor, half of the officers’
share was “given to the informer.”383  Thus, an informer could not bring suit
against private parties for revenue offenses, as would be the case under a qui
tam provision, but could furnish information to the local collector—who was
authorized to sue—and would receive one-quarter of any resulting recovery.
Though Congress decided against popular enforcement of the Collec-
tion Act penalties for private conduct, it did authorize qui tam enforcement
of two provisions imposing duties on customs officers.  Section 8 of the stat-
ute required each collector, naval officer, and surveyor to take an oath
“before he enters on the execution of his office.”384  To enforce the oath
requirement, Congress provided: “Any collector, naval officer or surveyor,
failing herein, shall forfeit and pay two hundred dollars, recoverable with
costs in any court having cognizance thereof, to the use of the informer.”385
Section 29 required each collector, naval officer, and surveyor to “cause to be
affixed, and constantly kept in some public and conspicuous place of his
office, a fair table of the rates of fees, and duties demandable by law.”386
Congress again provided that officers who failed to comply would suffer a qui
tam forfeiture of $100.387
Why did Congress authorize qui tam enforcement of two forfeitures
directed at customs officials under the Collection Act when it opted not to
use qui tam enforcement for other aspects of the legislation?  The decision
likely flowed from the difficult management challenge created by a large and
dispersed federal workforce.  Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton
reflected on this difficulty in a report to Congress eight months after enact-
ment of the legislation.  Hamilton suggested creation of an additional layer
of bureaucracy—appointment of “an officer in each state or other considera-
ble subdivision of the United States, having the general superintendance of
all the officers of the Revenue within such state or subdivision.”388  Not only
would this facilitate collection of revenue from remote ports, but it was “in
the opinion of the Secretary, essential to a due supervision of the conduct of
the particular officers engaged in the collection of the revenues.”389  Hamil-
ton believed it impossible that the need for supervision could be satisfied “by
any attention or vigilance of an Individual or Individuals at the Head of the
Treasury.  Distance, and the multiplicity of avocations, are conclusive
bars.”390  The oath requirement of section 8 and the requirement to post a
383 Id.
384 Id. § 8.
385 Id.
386 Id. § 29.
387 Id. (directing that officers “shall forfeit and pay one hundred dollars, to be recov-
ered with costs, in any court having cognizance thereof, to the use of the informer”).
388 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury (April 23, 1790), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY, supra note 365, at 437, 455.
389 Id. at 456.
390 Id.
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table of rates and fees under section 29 involved the actions of dozens of
customs officials scattered throughout the (then eleven) United States.  It
would be extremely difficult for President Washington or Secretary Hamilton
in New York to monitor all of those officials.  As in English and early Ameri-
can state law, qui tam provisions allowed Congress to provide for oversight of
the legality of executive conduct at minimal cost and without depletion of
federal enforcement resources.
Congress chose not to use qui tam enforcement for other duties of cus-
toms officers.  For instance, in addition to the provision for qui tam suit for
failure to post a schedule of rates and fees, section 29 of the Act included a
forfeiture of “two hundred dollars . . . for the use of the party grieved” if a
customs officer “shall demand, or receive any greater or other fee, compensa-
tion or reward, for executing any duty or service required of him by law.”391
The distinct enforcement mechanisms for these various penalties makes
sense because every overcharge by a customs officer would have an identifi-
able victim, whereas failing to take an oath and failing to post a table of fees
might not produce identifiable harm to anyone in particular.  Less clear is
why Congress failed to allow qui tam enforcement of section 35, which
imposed a forfeiture ranging between 200 and 2000 dollars and disqualifica-
tion for future office if a customs officer took a bribe or “connive[d] at a false
entry of any ship or vessel, or of any goods, wares or merchandise.”392
Congress replaced the initial Collection Act about a year later with a
more comprehensive statute including Rhode Island and North Carolina,
which had ratified the Constitution in the interim.393  The expanded legisla-
tion designated sixty-seven collection districts and authorized a correspond-
ingly larger number of federal customs officers.394  The qui tam provision
391 Collection Act, supra note 370, § 29.
392 Id. § 35.  It could be that Congress did not provide for qui tam enforcement of this
anticorruption provision to guard federal officials against the possibility of false accusa-
tions of soliciting bribes.  In the cases where Congress provided for qui tam enforcement,
evidence that the officer had complied with the law would be readily available.  If an officer
had in fact taken the oath of office, it should be possible to produce either the official who
administered the oath or the written certification of compliance required by the statute.
Id. § 8 (requiring sealed certificate of administration of oath transmitted to comptroller of
the treasury).  If an officer had posted a notice of fees and rates to be charged, it should be
possible to produce other officers or members of the public who could testify to seeing the
notice. Id. § 29.  On the other hand, if an informer claimed a federal surveyor in some
remote port had demanded a bribe, the litigation could turn into a contest of credibility
between two competing witnesses, and Congress may have wanted claims of that sort to be
subject to the control of federal prosecutors rather than private informers.  In any event,
the First Congress later selected qui tam enforcement for anticorruption provisions of a
subsequent bill taxing distilled spirits. See infra note 403 and accompanying text.
393 An Act to Provide More Effectually for the Collection of the Duties Imposed by Law
on Goods, Wares and Merchandise Imported into the United States, and on the Tonnage
of Ships or Vessels, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145 (1790).
394 Id. § 1.  The statute also authorized new categories of customs officers, allowing
construction of up to ten new “cutters” to help enforce the revenue laws, as well as smaller
boats, and providing for hiring of officers and sailors. Id. §§ 62–65.
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directed at officers failing to take the oath of office was eliminated, and the
two hundred dollar forfeiture was now allocated “to the use of the United
States.”395  However, the other qui tam provision directed at customs officers
in the original statute was expanded.  The qui tam forfeiture of $100 was still
enforceable against any collector, naval officer, or surveyor who failed to post
“a fair table of the rates of fees and duties demandable by law,” but now also
applied to an officer who failed to “give a receipt for the fees he shall receive,
specifying the particulars.”396
Near the end of its term, the First Congress adopted a major new piece
of tax legislation, the Distilled Spirits Act, that adjusted rates on imported
liquor and imposed new duties on spirits distilled within the United States.397
Consistent with Treasury Secretary Hamilton’s earlier recommendation, Con-
gress divided the country into statewide revenue districts and created a super-
visor of revenue for each district.398  The supervisors of revenue were
responsible for appointing inspectors to oversee imports of distilled spirits as
well as inspecting the products of domestic distilleries.399  The Act imposed
forfeitures on private persons designed to force importers and domestic dis-
tillers to submit to the inspection process,400 maintain proper documenta-
395 Id. § 5.  Congress may have concluded that sufficient oversight was offered through
the provision for certification that the oath had been administered, without the need for
additional monitoring by qui tam informers. See supra note 392.
396 An Act to Provide More Effectually for the Collection of the Duties Imposed by Law
on Goods, Wares and Merchandise Imported into the United States, and on the Tonnage
of Ships or Vessels, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, § 55 (1790).  The new provision retained the cause
of action for the “party grieved” by an officer charging higher fees than allowed. Id.  With
respect to the other penalties in the revised statute, the legislation still required that they
be “sued for . . . in the name of the United States”; such suits could be brought by the
collectors of the relevant port, but the law no longer specified that only the collector could
prosecute the action. Id. § 67.  The provision omitted the earlier statutory exception for
“cases of penalty relating to an officer of the customs,” see Collection Act, supra note 370,
§ 36, potentially creating some ambiguity, but section 55 seems relatively clear in allowing
suit by an informer against an officer. See An Act to Provide More Effectually for the Col-
lection of the Duties Imposed by Law on Goods, Wares and Merchandise Imported into
the United States, and on the Tonnage of Ships or Vessels, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, § 55 (1790).
397 An Act Repealing, After the Last Day of June Next, the Duties Heretofore Laid upon
Distilled Spirits Imported from Abroad, and Laying Others in Their Stead; and Also upon
Spirits Distilled Within the United States, and for Appropriating the Same, ch. 15, 1 Stat.
199 (1791).
398 Id. § 4.
399 Id. §§ 7, 11, 18.
400 Id. § 8 (forfeiture for importing distilled spirits without reporting for inspection),
§ 9 (forfeiture for landing distilled spirits without a permit), § 19 (forfeiture for removing
spirits from a domestic distillery before branding by an inspector), § 27 (forfeiture for
failing to make due entry of preexisting stock of imported spirits with the officer of inspec-
tion), § 48 (forfeiture for obstructing or hindering supervisor of revenue or officer of
inspection), § 7 (forfeiture for painting “office of inspection” on any building other than
official inspection house).
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tion,401 and pay duties without evasion or corruption.402  The statute also
included forfeitures for fraud or corruption by a federal revenue officer.403
This time, Congress abandoned its earlier reticence about having qui tam
informers enforcing federal tax laws.  Unless otherwise specified, all penalties
and forfeitures in the statute (those against private parties and those against
revenue officers) were subject to qui tam enforcement:
[O]ne half of all penalties and forfeitures incurred by virtue of this act,
except as above provided, shall be for the benefit of the person or persons
who shall make a seizure, or who shall first discover the matter or thing
whereby the same shall have been incurred; and the other half to the use of
the United States.  And such penalty and forfeiture shall be recoverable with
costs of suit, by action of debt, in the name of the person or persons intitled
thereto, or by information, in the name of the United States of America.404
The Act instructed federal attorneys to bring enforcement actions upon
application and contemplated that federal revenue officers would be entitled
to benefit from forfeitures under the statute, but nothing in the language
limited the enforcement provision to actions initiated by federal officials.405
Given that the earlier Collection Acts did not authorize qui tam enforce-
ment against private parties and made only minimal use of qui tam monitor-
401 Id. § 10 (forfeiture for moving distilled spirits from one port to another without a
certificate of inspection), § 13 (forfeiture for selling distilled spirits without delivering a
certificate of inspection to the purchaser), § 28 (forfeiture of containers of distilled spirits
unmarked and unaccompanied by certificate), § 35 (forfeiture by distiller neglecting to
maintain or permit inspection of books).
402 Id. § 20 (forfeiture for removing spirits from a distillery at night), § 30 (forfeiture
for rubbing out or defacing marks on container of distilled spirits), § 31 (forfeiture for
putting new spirits in container marked “Old Stock” or keeping old stock beyond deadline
for sale), § 32 (forfeiture of spirits fraudulently concealed to evade duties), § 33 (forfeiture
of spirits imported in undersized containers), § 45 (forfeiture for counterfeiting or forging
certificates), § 47 (forfeiture for bribing supervisor of revenue or officer of inspection),
§ 55 (forfeiture for relanding spirits designated for exportation).
403 The anticorruption provision read:
[I]f any such supervisor or other officer, shall enter into any collusion with any
person or persons for violating or evading any of the provisions of this act, or the
duties hereby imposed, or shall fraudulently concur in the delivery of any of the
said spirits, out of any house, building or place, wherein the same are deposited,
without payment or security for the payment of the duties thereupon, or shall
falsely or fraudulently mark any cask, case or vessel, contrary to any of the said
provisions, or shall embezzle the public money or otherwise be guilty of fraud in
his office, such supervisor or other officer shall for every such offence forfeit the
sum of one thousand dollars, and upon conviction of any of the said offences,
shall forfeit his office, and shall be disqualified for holding any other office under
the United States.
Id. § 49; see also id. § 39 (punishments for oppression or extortion by supervisor or
inspector).
404 Id. § 44.
405 Id.  There was a forfeiture in the statute that could only be enforced by the supervi-
sor of revenue for the benefit of the United States. Id. § 25 (forfeiture for failing to put up
sign or disclose existence of distillery).
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ing for federal officials, why did the First Congress greatly expand qui tam
enforcement of the tax laws in the new Distilled Spirits Act?  The change in
enforcement methods likely responded to Alexander Hamilton’s report
about the inadequacy of centralized monitoring of a dispersed network of
customs officials, combined with a new, more challenging tax collection envi-
ronment.  Under the new legislation, federal tax collection efforts would be
more widely distributed throughout the territory of the United States, since
duties were no longer concentrated just in ports and coastal areas.  Liquor
could be distilled anywhere in the country.  Moreover, under the new legisla-
tion, federal officials would enter into long-term, continuing relationships
with domestic distillers regulated by the statute, creating greater opportuni-
ties for corruption of federal revenue officers.  Consequently, Congress not
only adopted Secretary Hamilton’s recommendation to appoint regional
bureaucrats to monitor federal revenue officers, but also vastly expanded the
role of qui tam informers as a supplementary means of monitoring the law-
fulness of tax enforcement activities.
2. Census Officials
The First Congress adopted legislation to arrange for the initial United
States census, which the Constitution required to take place within three
years after Congress began meeting.406  The census was a matter of substan-
tial political consequence in light of the constitutional directive that “Repre-
sentatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States . . .
according to their respective Numbers.”407  Many expected the census to sig-
nificantly alter the allocation of congressional seats established in the initial
Constitution, shifting power in the House of Representatives away from
southern states and toward eastern states.408  As it turned out, the initial cen-
sus did little to change the regional balance of power.  What might be
406 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.  The version of the enumeration bill that first passed the
House would have provided for gathering additional information on matters like the occu-
pations of residents, something Madison believed would be useful to legislators and aid the
“science of Political Economy.”  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 14,
1790), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 365, at 517, 518.  He reported to Jefferson
that this language “was thrown out by the Senate as a waste of trouble and supplying mater-
ials for idle people to make a book.” Id.
407 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.  For these purposes, the Constitution notoriously directed
that the count should add to “the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons.” Id.
408 See Newspaper Correspondence, in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 365, at
2063, 2064 (newspaper article expressing view that eastern influence will increase after
census).  There are indications that some eastern members of Congress wanted the census
to take place as quickly as possible and that some southern members sought for more time.
See New-York Daily Gazette (Feb. 9, 1790), in 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 365, at
183 (remarks of Mr. Jackson from Georgia); Letter from Henry Wynkoop to Reading
Beatty (Feb. 4, 1790), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 365, at 416 (“[M]uch Con-
versation was had but nothing done respecting the enumeration[;] the Southern Gentle-
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thought of as eastern states (New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont) had a combined representation of
25/69 seats (36.2%) in the House of Representatives immediately before the
1790 census results were taken into account and a combined representation
of 39/105 seats (37.1%) after the census results were factored in; likewise,
what might be deemed the southern states (Virginia, Kentucky, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, and Georgia) had a combined representation of 25/69
seats (36.2%) before reallocation and 39/105 (37.1%) afterwards.409  Some
states did gain or lose ground within each region.  In the South, the biggest
winner was Virginia, which grew from 10/69 seats (14.5%) to 19/105 seats
(18.1%), while the biggest loser was Georgia, which diminished from 3/69
(4.3%) to 2/105 (1.9%).410  The biggest winner in the East was Massachu-
setts, which grew from 8/69 (11.6%) to 14/105 (13.3%), while the biggest
loser was Vermont, which lost ground in terms of percentage of the total
legislative body, going from 2/69 (2.9%) to 2/105 (1.9%).411
The Enumeration Act made federal marshals responsible for overseeing
the census in each judicial district, aided by assistants hired to visit each
household and conduct the actual enumeration.412  The census was to begin
the first Monday in August 1790, and the assistants were required to make
their returns to the marshal within nine months.413  The marshals had until
September 1, 1791, to submit total figures to the President.414  Two provi-
sions of the legislation established forfeitures applicable to census officials.
Under section 2 of the statute, “every assistant failing to make return, or mak-
ing a false return of the enumeration to the marshal, within the time by this
men are disposed to cast every Obstacle in its way, while those from the eastward generally
are disposed to forward it.”).
409 See Representatives Apportioned to Each State (1st to 23rd Census, 1790–2010),
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://foxx.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/state_apportionment.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2017).  The figure of sixty-
nine representatives before reapportionment counts the original sixty-five specified in Arti-
cle I, Section 2 of the Constitution, plus two each for Vermont and Kentucky, which were
added to the union and given representation in Congress before the effects of the 1790
census were factored in. See An Act for Apportioning Representatives Among the Several
States, According to the First Enumeration, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 253 (1792); An Act Regulating
the Number of Representatives to Be Chosen by the States of Kentucky and Vermont, ch.
9, 1 Stat. 191 (1791).  For each state, the number of representatives before/after the 1792
reapportionment legislation was: Connecticut, 5/7; Delaware, 1/1; Georgia, 3/2; Ken-
tucky, 2/2; Maryland, 6/8; Massachusetts, 8/14; New Hampshire, 3/4; New Jersey, 4/5;
New York, 6/10; Pennsylvania, 8/13; North Carolina, 5/10; Rhode Island, 1/2; South Caro-
lina, 5/6; Vermont, 2/2; and Virginia, 10/19.
410 See supra note 409.
411 Id.
412 An Act Providing for the Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States, ch.
II, § 1, 1 Stat. 101 (1790).
413 Id.
414 Id. § 3.
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act limited, shall forfeit the sum of two hundred dollars.”415  Section 3 estab-
lished forfeitures applicable to the marshal:
[E]very marshal failing to file the returns of his assistants, or any of them,
with the clerks of their respective district courts, or failing to return the
aggregate amount of each description of persons in their respective districts,
as the same shall appear from said returns, to the President of the United
States, within the time limited by this act, shall, for every such offence, forfeit
the sum of eight hundred dollars; all which forfeitures shall be recoverable
in the courts of the districts where the offences shall be committed, or in the
circuit courts to be held within the same, by action of debt, information or
indictment; the one half thereof to the use of the United States, and the
other half to the informer; but where the prosecution shall be first instituted
on behalf of the United States, the whole shall accrue to their use.416
Section 3 clearly provided for qui tam litigation as one enforcement method,
alongside enforcement by public officials.  While somewhat ambiguous, the
language “all which forfeitures” in section 3 likely extends to forfeitures of
assistants under section 2 as well as those for marshals, since section 2 did not
provide another method of enforcement.  Qui tam enforcement against cen-
sus assistants would make sense because of the decentralized nature of their
work, which took them throughout the populated territory of the United
States, including areas distant from other federal officials.  Centralized moni-
toring to prevent false returns by the assistants would be nearly impossible.417
Qui tam enforcement would significantly increase the chances that a census
assistant’s misreported numbers would be discovered and prosecuted.  In any
event, the statute unambiguously provided for qui tam enforcement against
federal marshals, a decision explicable by the importance of ensuring as
accurate a count as possible.
3. Treasury Officials
The Act creating the Department of the Treasury contained multiple
forfeitures that were likely subject to qui tam enforcement and, at the very
least, established rewards for private citizens providing information to sup-
port enforcement actions.  The statute authorized appointment of “a Secre-
tary of the Treasury, to be deemed head of the department; a Comptroller,
415 Id. § 2.
416 Id. § 3.
417 The nature of the enforcement problem is illustrated by correspondence between
James Madison and Edward Carrington, a federal marshal in Virginia.  The bill included a
provision for census assistants to collect a $20 forfeiture from persons who failed to give a
true account of those residing in a home. Id. § 6.  Carrington worried that under the
Judiciary Act, suits to enforce these penalties would have to be filed in federal district
courts “to which it will be impossible for the assistants from the distant parts of the Country
to resort for such small Sums . . . nor indeed will they in cases of false returns be able to
establish their Suits without witnesses.”  Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison
(May 3, 1790), in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 365, at 1419.  Carrington thought
state courts should be given concurrent jurisdiction over these penalties “or none will ever
be prosecuted for.” Id.
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an Auditor, a Treasurer, a Register, and an Assistant to the Secretary of the
Treasury.”418  Section 8 sought to prevent conflicts of interest and abuses of
office:
[N]o person appointed to any office instituted by this act, shall directly or
indirectly be concerned or interested in carrying on the business of trade or
commerce, or be owner in whole or in part of any sea-vessel, or purchase by
himself, or another in trust for him, any public lands or other public prop-
erty, or be concerned in the purchase or disposal of any public securities of
any State, or of the United States, or take or apply to his own use, any emolu-
ment or gain for negotiating or transacting any business in the said depart-
ment, other than what shall be allowed by law.419
Violation of these restrictions was deemed a “high misdemeanor” and the
officer would “forfeit to the United States the penalty of three thousand dol-
lars, and shall upon conviction be removed from office, and forever thereaf-
ter incapable of holding any office under the United States.”420  The statute
provided for an informer to share the money recovered in an enforcement
action: “[I]f any other person than a public prosecutor shall give information
of any such offence, upon which a prosecution and conviction shall be had,
one half the aforesaid penalty of three thousand dollars, when recovered,
shall be for the use of the person giving such information.”421  Assuming
“give information” here authorized the filing of an action, this provision
allowed qui tam enforcement.422  The Supreme Court has said that
“[s]tatutes providing for a reward to informers which do not specifically
either authorize or forbid the informer to institute the action are construed
to authorize him to sue.”423  This forfeiture provision did not contain lan-
guage like the initial Collection Act, passed a little over a month earlier,
which specified that penalty actions against private parties were to be
brought “by the collector of the district where the same accrued, and not
otherwise.”424
Qui tam litigation was clearly authorized in later legislation establishing
the First Bank of the United States.425  Section 8 of the statute created a
treble-value qui tam forfeiture against individuals involved in prohibited
commercial transactions by the bank, “one half thereof to the use of the
informer, and the other half thereof to the use of the United States, to be
418 An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 65 (1789).
419 Id. § 8.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 An “information” was one of the legal mechanisms traditionally available to qui tam
informers. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
423 United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943).  The Vermont
Agency Court described this discussion from Marcus as “dictum.” See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res.
v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777 n.7 (2000).
424 Collection Act, supra note 370, § 36.
425 See An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 10, 1
Stat. 191 (1791).
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recovered with costs of suit.”426  Section 9 enforced a ban on lending or
advancing more than $100,000 to the United States government (or more
than $50,000 to a state or foreign government) without previous authoriza-
tion by a law of the United States.427  The forfeiture for violating this rule was
allocated as follows:
[A]ll and every person and persons, by and with whose order, agreement,
consent, approbation, or connivance, such unlawful advance or loan shall
have been made, upon conviction thereof, shall forfeit and pay, for every
such offence, treble the value or amount of the sum or sums which shall
have been so unlawfully advanced or lent; one fifth thereof to the use of the
informer, and the residue thereof to the use of the United States.428
Treasury officials would presumably be among the individuals most likely to
violate the restriction on agreeing to a prohibited loan or advance to the
United States government.
In the case of revenue officers and census workers, qui tam enforcement
made sense as a means of monitoring decentralized government conduct.
Activities subject to qui tam regulation would take place wherever liquor was
distilled or wherever residents of the United States lived.  That rationale for
qui tam monitoring seems less relevant for officers of the Treasury Depart-
ment stationed in the nation’s capital.  A stronger reason for employing qui
tam enforcement in this context would be to preserve congressional control
of the public fisc and thereby foster public confidence in the lawful conduct
of the nation’s financial affairs.
4. Postal Workers
Before ratification of the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation
conferred on Congress the power of “establishing and regulating post-offices
from one state to another, throughout all the united states, and exacting
such postage on the papers passing thro’ the same as may be requisite to
defray the expences of the said office.”429  When the new Constitution came
into effect, the Post Office was operating under an ordinance enacted by the
Confederation Congress in October 1782.430  The ordinance imposed a vari-
ety of restrictions on postal workers, including prohibitions on opening,
embezzling, or destroying the mail, and required an oath that each employee
would abide by the legislation.431  These obligations were enforced through
forfeitures recoverable by government officials in state courts.  A Postmaster
General who violated his oath could forfeit $1000 for the benefit of the Post
426 Id. § 8.
427 Id. § 9.
428 Id.
429 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4.
430 An Ordinance for Regulating the Post Office of the United States of America
(1782), in JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, at 670.
431 Id. at 671 (requiring postal employees to take oath to “well and faithfully do, exe-
cute, perform and fulfil every duty required of me, and abstain from every act and thing
forbidden” by the legislation).
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Office in an action pursued by the Treasurer of the United States.432  A post-
master, post-rider, or other Post Office employee who violated his oath could
forfeit $300 in a state court lawsuit pursued by the Postmaster General.433
The Postmaster General and his deputies could also pursue penalties against
private parties who carried mail for hire in competition with the federal pos-
tal service.434
The First Congress provided for appointment of a Postmaster General
and for temporary operation of the Post Office under the rules adopted by
the Confederation Congress.435  The new Congress began work on more per-
manent Post Office legislation, but did not complete the task before it rose
for biennial elections.436  During the course of legislative deliberations in the
First Congress, President Washington’s new Postmaster General recom-
mended “[a] more accurate description of offences and frauds that may be
committed by any person employed” in the department, accompanied by
“such penalties as will be most likely to deter from and prevent the actual
commission of them.”437  The previous Postmaster General commented on
draft legislation that would have continued reliance on centralized supervi-
sion and litigation, suggesting that “[c]onsidering the Distance of some of
the Offices, & other Circumstances,” the Postmaster General should be
allowed at least six months to commence suits against subordinates.438
New Hampshire postmaster Jeremiah Libbey, in a letter to Senator John
Langdon, commented on a proposal to give the Postmaster General one
month after the end of a quarter to bring suit against a postmaster failing to
account for monetary receipts:
Suppose . . . that a Post Master at Portsmouth [New Hampshire], or Savannah
in Georgia—on the first day of [January] (the day the Quarter expires,)
should be sick, or some accident happen to him or family that he could not
possibly send on his Account & the money, at the time; on the first day of
February, the Post Master General is to commence an Action against him,
shall I ask where is the Action to be commenced?  where the General Office
is kept, 700 or 1000 miles from the place where the Post Master lives?  or is it
to be commenc’d where the Man lives?  If so the Post Master General must
give Orders for the Action perhaps, before it can be known whether the
Accounts & moneys were not sent on, [though] not arrived at the General
Office . . . .439
432 Id. at 671–72.
433 Id. at 672.
434 See id. at 672–74.
435 An Act for the Temporary Establishment of the Post-Office, ch. 16, 1 Stat. 70 (1789).
436 See An Act to Continue in Force for a Limited Time, An Act Intituled “An Act for
the Temporary Establishment of the Post-Office,” ch. 23, 1 Stat. 218 (1791).
437 Report of the Postmaster General (Jan. 22, 1790), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 365, at 1657, 1661–62.
438 Ebenezer Hazard’s Remarks (June 24, 1790), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 365, at 1704, 1706.
439 Letter from Jeremiah Libbey to John Langdon (June 30, 1790), in 19 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 365, at 1973, 1973 (second alteration in original).
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While Libbey was concerned about an unreasonably short statute of limita-
tions, his comments illuminate the difficulty of centralized supervision of sub-
ordinates stationed hundreds of miles from the seat of government.  The
Postmaster General might plausibly monitor financial accounting by postmas-
ters who sent relevant documents to the central office.  It would be much
more difficult for the Postmaster General to adequately enforce nationwide
regulations concerning carriage of mail and charges for services.
Perhaps for such reasons, when the Second Congress enacted legislation
to put the Post Office on a more permanent footing, it decided to shift to a
system of qui tam enforcement.440  The statute provided that “all pecuniary
penalties and forfeitures, incurred under this act, shall be, one half for the
use of the person or persons informing and prosecuting for the same, the
other half to the use of the United States.”441  The statute contained a num-
ber of regulations of private conduct enforceable through qui tam litigation,
including forfeitures for obstructing or delaying the mail,442 for a ferry oper-
ator negligently delaying or refusing to transport mail,443 for injuring Post
Office revenue by operating a competing mail service,444 and for counterfeit-
ing someone’s handwriting to avoid paying postage.445  More significantly for
our purposes, the Act also included several qui tam forfeitures applicable to
postal service employees, including penalties for demanding or accepting a
higher postage rate than provided by law or an additional gratuity or
reward;446 failing to account for “bye or way-letters” picked up along the
route;447 opening, delaying, secreting, embezzling, destroying, or deserting
the mail, or otherwise carrying mail contrary to the Act;448 and delaying or
embezzling newspapers sent through the mail.449
5. Federal Indian Agents
In addition to qui tam regulation of postal employees, the Second Con-
gress enacted qui tam legislation to monitor federal employees managing
trade with Native American tribes.  The statute prohibited trade with the
tribes except pursuant to a federal license.450  Obtaining a license required
the applicant to post a bond that would be forfeited if the person did not
440 See An Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post Roads Within the United States, ch.
7, 1 Stat. 232 (1792).
441 Id. § 25.
442 Id. § 5.
443 Id.
444 Id. § 14.
445 Id. § 20.
446 Id. § 11.
447 Id. § 15.
448 Id. § 16.
449 Id. § 22.
450 An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 19, § 1, 1 Stat.
329 (1793).
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comply with trade regulations adopted by the President.451  A person found
in Indian territory without a license and with merchandise typically sold to
Native Americans would forfeit the merchandise and pay a fine.452  A larger
forfeiture applied to someone who attempted to settle in Indian territory,453
or purported to purchase land from Native Americans.454  A person who
bought horses in Indian territory without a license was also liable to a
forfeiture.455
One forfeiture under the statute applied to federal officials with licens-
ing authority.  Under the statute, no agent, superintendent, or other person
authorized to grant a license for trade or for purchase of horses could “have
any interest or concern in any trade with the Indians, or in the purchase or
sale of any horses, to or from any Indian.”456  An officer violating the restric-
tion could forfeit $1000 and face a possible term of imprisonment.457  The
statute authorized qui tam enforcement, providing that “all fines and forfeit-
ures” under the Act would be split “one half to the use of the informant, and
the other half, to the use of the United States, except where the prosecution
shall be first instituted on behalf of the United States, in which case, the
whole shall be to their use.”458
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF QUI TAM REGULATION OF
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
When Morrison considered the constitutionality of “independent” prose-
cutions of executive branch officers and when Lujan addressed civil litigation
against federal officials, the Supreme Court paid minimal attention to mech-
anisms used to regulate government officials when the Constitution was rati-
fied in 1789.  This Article has highlighted the common eighteenth-century
practice of policing government conduct through qui tam legislation, a prac-
tice followed in numerous statutes enacted by our earliest Congresses.  This
Part will consider what the history of qui tam regulation of government offi-
cials might tell us about the constitutional issues raised in Lujan and Morri-
son, beginning with the Article III standing question and then moving on to
issues arising under Article II.
A. Qui Tam Litigation and Article III Standing
Nearly fifty years ago, Raoul Berger authored a Yale Law Journal article
challenging the Supreme Court’s developing standing jurisprudence on his-
451 Id.
452 Id. § 3.
453 Id. § 5.
454 Id. § 8.
455 Id. § 6.
456 Id. § 7.
457 Id.
458 Id. § 12.
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torical grounds.459  Professor Berger drew on Louis Jaffe’s earlier work con-
cerning the ability of “strangers” to seek prerogative writs in English courts
challenging actions taken without jurisdiction.460  In addition, Berger noted
the long tradition of “informer” or qui tam statutes: “The early English prac-
tice in prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto is not the sole indication of
easy access to ‘public actions’; there were in addition the centuries-old
‘informers’ actions” pursued under statutes that “offered financial induce-
ments to strangers to prosecute such actions.”461  Steven Winter expanded on
the evidence offered by earlier scholars, providing additional detail on the
use of qui tam legislation in early state and federal law and noting the exis-
tence of qui tam statutes directed at public officials.462  After the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lujan, Cass Sunstein wrote an ambitious and influential
article that drew on the earlier historical research to criticize the Court’s
standing jurisprudence.463  Sunstein argued that the law of standing was a
twentieth-century invention and that the only relevant question for determin-
ing the presence of an Article III case or controversy is whether the law
affords the plaintiff a cause of action, something Congress had done in Lujan
through the citizen suit provision of the ESA.464
Evidence concerning American reception of the English prerogative
writs lies outside the scope of this Article.465  Our review of the long tradition
459 See Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?,
78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
460 Id. at 819 (“When we turn to pre-Constitution English law for light on the meaning
of ‘case or controversy,’ we find that attacks by strangers on action in excess of jurisdiction
were a traditional concern of the courts in Westminster.  The writ of prohibition supplies
perhaps the clearest example.”).
461 Id. at 825–26.
462 See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1406–09 (1988).
463 See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 170–79.
464 See id. at 222–23; see also Caminker, supra note 137, at 381 (“Article III standing
requirements ought to be considered satisfied whenever the plaintiff seeking to invoke the
Federal judicial power asserts a cause of action pursuant to a congressional statute.”).
465 Ann Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson have responded to standing skeptics, seeking
to demonstrate a long tradition in various areas of law of limiting the extent to which
private parties may litigate interests of the public. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson,
Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004) (“[E]ighteenth-
and nineteenth-century courts were well aware of the need for proper parties, and they
linked that issue to the distinction between public and private rights.  Courts regularly
designated some areas of litigation as being under public control and others as being
under private control.  Within the area of private control, moreover, courts paid close
attention to whether the correct private parties were before them.”).  In considering histor-
ical evidence concerning English prerogative writs, it might be significant that many of the
cases relied on by standing skeptics involved challenges to actions taken without jurisdic-
tion. See Berger, supra note 459, at 819–24.  It is not clear that principles concerning who
may challenge an act taken without jurisdiction should necessarily carry over to other sorts
of legal claims.  For instance, since federal courts must notice defects in jurisdiction sua
sponte, they could not rely on standing principles to ignore a suggestion of lack of jurisdic-
tion filed by a stranger to the litigation.  See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475
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of qui tam regulation of public officials, on the other hand, puts us in a good
position to consider the relevance of qui tam legislation to the debate over
Article III standing doctrine.466  To the extent the Supreme Court grounds
its standing doctrine on historical practice when the Constitution was
adopted,467 it seems fair to conclude that Lujan made two related mistakes in
its explication of standing doctrine.  The Court erred when it identified “par-
ticularized” injury as part of the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of
standing.468  It compounded the error when it concluded that Article III bars
Congress from authorizing private litigation of generalized grievances about
unlawful executive branch activity.469  In the five centuries leading up to the
framing of our Constitution, it was routine for Anglo-American legislatures to
authorize litigation of generalized grievances by uninjured informers, includ-
ing generalized grievances about unlawful government conduct.470  A qui
tam informer did not need to allege individual injury “because every
Offence, for which such Action is brought, is supposed to be a general Griev-
ance to every Body.”471  There was no expectation in a popular action of
“Damage . . . to the Demandant in particular.”472
If the Lujan Court erred in its articulation of standing doctrine, does
that mean the Court reached the wrong outcome in light of the citizen suit
provision of the ESA?  If Professor Sunstein is correct that Congress may cre-
ate universal standing by simply affording a cause of action to anyone who
will sue, the ESA citizen suit provision could arguably be understood to
include such a grant.  One still might doubt whether Congress intended the
ESA’s citizen suit provision to confer standing on uninjured plaintiffs.  The
provision authorized “any person” to file a civil action for injunctive relief
“on his own behalf,”473 a formulation that might imply a statutory require-
ment to show some individual interest in the relief sought.  But, for the pur-
pose of exploring Article III issues in light of the history of qui tam litigation,
we will assume that Congress indeed intended to authorize suit by “any per-
son”—whether or not injured in some individual way—to seek injunctive
relief based on a federal agency’s misapplication of the ESA.
While Professor Sunstein may be correct about congressional power and
the proper outcome in Lujan, I am not convinced that the history of qui tam
legislation necessarily drives us to the conclusions he reached.  One can dis-
U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (discussing how every federal appellate court must satisfy itself of its
own jurisdiction and that of the lower courts, even if parties are prepared to concede
jurisdiction).
466 Woolhandler and Nelson acknowledge that standing skeptics “properly emphasize
[qui tam] statutes as telling evidence for their position.”  Woolhandler & Nelson, supra
note 465, at 726.
467 See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
468 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
469 Id. at 573–76.
470 See supra Part II.
471 2 HAWKINS, supra note 13, at 267.
472 Id. at 273–74.
473 See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012).
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tinguish qui tam statutes from the ESA citizen suit provision on grounds that
might justify differential treatment for purposes of Article III standing.
Lujan’s reading of Article III was guided by the Court’s understanding that
the case-or-controversy limitation was designed to confine the courts to a his-
torically judicial role, so that federal judges would not be drawn into tasks
more applicable to the political branches.  Our review of qui tam history
allows us a clearer picture of the role judges actually played in the centuries
leading up to the adoption of the Constitution, but that role still might be
distinguishable from the one Professor Sunstein envisions judges playing
under the ESA.
The typical qui tam statute did not authorize pure private representation
of the public.  Instead, the bounty provision of a qui tam statute was under-
stood to create a private financial interest that the informer pursued along-
side the public interest in enforcing the law.474  The Latin phrase giving rise
to the qui tam label—rendered by Blackstone as “qui tam pro ‘domino rege, &c,
quam pro seipso in hac parte sequitur’”475—speaks of a litigant who sues “for
himself” as well as suing “for the king.”476  The informer’s bounty, like the
injury suffered by an aggrieved party, gives the qui tam informer a personal
and private interest in the litigation that motivates and justifies the individ-
ual’s invocation of judicial aid.  The individual right conveyed by the
informer’s bounty explains a letter from attorney Richard Harison to Trea-
sury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, opining that a presidential pardon “can-
not extend to affect the rights of Individuals” and therefore could not remit
the portion of a statutory fine or penalty “expressly given to any Individual”
unless the informer consented or the statute qualified the individual’s right
to payment.477
Professor Sunstein suggests that no Article III value would be served by
recognizing standing when Congress offers a pecuniary inducement to sue
but denying congressional power to grant universal standing in the absence
of a bounty provision.478  Justice Holmes offered a possible response when
he commented that “[u]pon this point a page of history is worth a volume of
logic.”479  Holmes was justifying resort to the “traditional use” of the constitu-
tional term “direct tax” where a litigant sought to attach the label to a sort of
estate tax that “always has been regarded as the antithesis of a direct tax.”480
Similarly, where we seek to determine how the Framers understood the terms
474 Sunstein, supra note 33, at 176.
475 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *160.
476 Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“who as well for the king
as for himself sues in this matter”).
477 See Letter from Richard Harison to Alexander Hamilton (May 24, 1791), in THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON DIGITAL EDITION (Harold C. Syrett ed., 2011), http://
rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ARHN-01-08-02-0326; see also Beth A. Colgan, Reviv-
ing the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 335 n.292 (2014).
478 Sunstein, supra note 33, at 176–77.
479 N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
480 Id.
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“case” and “controversy” in Article III, perhaps historical usage should count
more than policy coherence.
In any event, apart from the informer’s bounty, the citizen suit provision
at issue in Lujan differs from the qui tam statutes reviewed in Part II in other
important respects that may implicate Article III concerns.  The qui tam stat-
utes we examined imposed a financial penalty on an individual government
official for a particular unlawful act identified with some precision in the
legislation.  In defending the Article III standing of qui tam litigants, Evan
Caminker noted that “qui tam statutes impose penalties for specific miscon-
duct” and therefore present legal issues in a “concrete factual setting.”481
The ESA’s citizen suit provision, on the other hand, was not limited to spe-
cific misconduct committed by particular officials.  It allowed “any person” to
sue for an injunction against any person or federal agency “alleged to be in
violation of any provision of this chapter.”482  Congress took a complex regu-
latory regime imposing numerous duties, some relatively indeterminate, and
authorized wholesale private enforcement.
The broad sweep of the ESA citizen suit provision arguably created a risk
that courts would be drawn into a policy-making role that extended beyond
eighteenth-century forms of judicial conduct.  We seek to guard against judi-
cial policymaking today through principles of statutory interpretation
embodied in the Chevron doctrine, but similar concerns could be thought to
underlie Article III’s case or controversy limitation.483  Universal standing to
litigate any statutory interpretation issue under the ESA—as opposed to
enforcing specific duties of particular government officials or specific rights
of particular plaintiffs—might serve as an invitation to judicial policymaking.
Of course, judicial policymaking could also occur under a citizen suit provi-
sion applied per Lujan.  However, one might reasonably believe that the judi-
cial temptation to embrace a free-wheeling policy role will be heightened in
cases where the only interests in view are those of the public at large.  Limit-
ing citizen suits to plaintiffs with particularized interests at stake arguably
tends to point judges in the direction of protecting private rights, a common
form of eighteenth-century adjudication.
To put it another way, if understood as a grant of universal standing, the
ESA citizen suit provision sought to make courts perpetual monitors of exec-
utive branch enforcement of a wide-ranging regulatory regime without being
481 See Caminker, supra note 137, at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).
482 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(1982)).
483 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Thomas
J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (2006) (“For its defenders, Chevron signaled a healthy
awareness that the resolution of ambiguities calls for judgments of policy—and an accom-
panying belief that such judgments should be made by political actors, not by the federal
judiciary.”).  Imagine a hypothetical statute, for instance, in which Congress purported to
empower federal courts to adopt regulations implementing the ESA in the course of “liti-
gation” pursued by private litigants.  A court might well find such a delegation of regula-
tory authority a violation of the Article III case or controversy limitation.
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entirely clear what Congress expected the Executive to do in implementing
the statute.  A citizen suit provision applied indiscriminately at least arguably
assigns the courts a role distinguishable from the role courts historically per-
formed in enforcing qui tam statutes that imposed specific legal duties on
individual public officials.  A much-discussed passage from Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Lujan may help illuminate the point:
In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains
of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before, and I do not read the Court’s opinion to suggest a contrary view.  In
exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the
injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons enti-
tled to bring suit.  The citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act
does not meet these minimal requirements, because while the statute pur-
ports to confer a right on “any person . . . to enjoin . . . the United States and
any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of any provision of this chapter,” it does not of its own force estab-
lish that there is an injury in “any person” by virtue of any “violation.”484
In speaking of Congress’s failure to identify an “injury” suffered by author-
ized litigants, Justice Kennedy appears to be concerned about the lack of
legislative specificity in identifying statutory duties subject to private enforce-
ment and the interests that would justify allowing private litigants to enforce
those duties.485  The history reviewed in Part II shows that particularized
“injury” was not historically required for judicial resolution of a qui tam
action, but perhaps Article III could still be understood to require that pri-
vate plaintiffs show a particularized “interest” (either a legal injury or a finan-
cial interest arising from a bounty provision) or that litigation against public
officials seeks enforcement of particularized “duties” imposed by statute.
None of this establishes that Professor Sunstein was wrong in his view of con-
gressional power, but only that his position is not compelled by the history of
qui tam legislation.  Someone who recognizes the inconsistency of Lujan’s
articulation of standing doctrine with qui tam history could nevertheless con-
clude that Lujan reached the right result in the case before the Court.
B. Qui Tam Litigation and the Take Care Clause
Lujan’s second ground for rejecting suits by uninjured citizens against
executive branch officials rested on the President’s responsibilities under
Article II of the Constitution.  According to the Lujan Court:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in execu-
tive officers’ compliance with the law into an “individual right” vindicable in
the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts
the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”  It would enable the courts, with the per-
484 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1982)) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
500 (1975)).
485 Id. at 580–81.
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mission of Congress, “to assume a position of authority over the governmen-
tal acts of another and co-equal department,” and to become “virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”486
Professor Sunstein sees the Lujan opinion as “motivated by many of the con-
cerns expressed in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson.”487
Justice Scalia argued unsuccessfully in Morrison that the independent counsel
statute usurped a portion of the executive power allocated to the Presi-
dent.488  However, Lujan reads the Take Care Clause as embodying a version
of the unitary executive principle that excludes certain forms of private litiga-
tion against executive officials.
Lujan understands the Take Care Clause to grant the President a semi-
exclusive constitutional authority to monitor and ensure legal compliance by
the President’s executive branch subordinates.  I use the term “semi-exclu-
sive” because the Lujan Court would allow persons or institutions other than
the President to address executive lawlessness in some situations.  The Court
had no problem with judicial monitoring of the legality of executive conduct
as a step toward offering redress to an aggrieved private plaintiff.489  The
Court would presumably also allow judicial correction of unlawful executive
conduct if the litigation was initiated by the President’s subordinates, as in a
criminal prosecution of an executive official.490  Article II gives Congress
express power to impeach and remove civil officers for “Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,”491 and nothing in Lujan calls into
question the congressional power to conduct oversight hearings concerning
the legality of executive branch activities.  But for the broad range of execu-
tive branch conduct that occurs below the congressional radar and that does
not injure any particular party with a motive to sue, Lujan leaves the task of
ensuring legal compliance exclusively in the hands of the President.
Jack Goldsmith and John Manning note that the Supreme Court invokes
the Take Care Clause in a variety of contexts, but “the Court almost never
construes the clause, at least not in any conventional way.”492  In other words,
the Court “does not look at any of the evidence one would expect an inter-
preter to consider in determining the clause’s relevance to the many uses to
which the Court has put it.”493  Their observation applies with particular
force to the Court’s reading of the Take Care Clause in Lujan.  Certainly the
486 Id. at 577 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) (first quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3; then quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923); and then quoting
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
487 Sunstein, supra note 33, at 193.
488 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
489 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575 (person with direct injury has standing to seek review of
executive action).
490 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695–96 (discussing President’s control over prosecution of
criminal activity).
491 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
492 Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1835, 1853 (2016).
493 Id.
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text of Article II does not compel the Court’s view of the clause as a semi-
exclusive grant of power to the President.  A provision that instructs the Presi-
dent to make sure something happens does not negate the possibility of a
redundant responsibility in other actors.  If a state law instructed parents to
“take care” that their children are clothed and fed, it would not disable
school officials from acting when parental responsibilities have been
neglected.494  The more natural understanding of the Take Care Clause is
that the President’s responsibility to ensure faithful execution of the laws
exists alongside any oversight provided by Congress or the courts in the exer-
cise of their constitutional functions.495
The bigger problem with the Lujan Court’s reading of the Take Care
Clause, however, is historical rather than textual.  As demonstrated in Part II,
Article II of the Constitution was drafted against the background of nearly
half a millennium of Anglo-American legislation authorizing uninjured com-
mon informers to initiate litigation to enforce legal duties of government
officials, including officials wielding executive power.  From the early four-
teenth century to the late eighteenth century, legislatures had routinely
enacted qui tam statutes that “convert[ed] the undifferentiated public inter-
est in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’
vindicable in the courts” and made the courts “virtually continuing monitors”
of the legality of executive action.496  In this historical context, the earliest
Congresses believed the Constitution allowed use of these long-recognized
legislative tools to monitor and ensure executive branch compliance with the
laws.  Congress provided for qui tam enforcement of numerous legal duties
of executive revenue officers, census workers, treasury officials, postal work-
ers, and officials regulating trade with Native American tribes.497  President
Washington did not raise any concern that the litigation authorized might
somehow intrude on his Article II authority.
The Take Care Clause was modeled on the New York Constitution of
1777, which instructed the governor to “take care that the laws are faithfully
executed to the best of his ability.”498  This constitutional duty coexisted with
the state’s tradition of qui tam legislation, including legislation directed at
494 Moreover, if a suit against an executive branch official by an uninjured litigant
undermines the President’s constitutional role under the Take Care Clause, why wouldn’t
a lawsuit by an injured litigant equally intrude on the President’s authority, especially given
Lujan’s minimalist understanding of what counts as a particularized injury?  Both types of
litigation have the same consequence of placing the task of responding to allegedly illegal
executive branch conduct in judicial hands.
495 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 492, at 1860 (“The drafters [of the Take Care
Clause] may have insisted that the President ensure the legality or good faith of executive
officers while not precluding Congress from specifying other means of policing executive
legality.”).
496 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 760 (1984)) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
497 See supra notes 366–458 and accompanying text.
498 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX; see Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 492, at 1861 &
n.169.
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public officials.499  The principal duty of the English King, reflected in his
coronation oaths, was “to govern his people according to law.”500  For centu-
ries preceding our Declaration of Independence and the ratification of our
Constitution, the King’s duty to enforce the laws was deemed compatible
with the tradition of qui tam legislation.501  A common informer sued on
behalf of the King as well as for himself, suggesting that qui tam litigation was
seen as supporting the King’s law enforcement mission.502  Courts that tried
qui tam actions in England and the early American states were not viewed as
competitors of the Executive, usurping powers of the King or governor, but
were engaged in a common mission of making sure that subordinate officials
stayed within legal constraints on their conduct.
Qui tam legislation does tend to undermine the ability of the executive
branch to pursue optimal enforcement of a statute through establishment of
enforcement priorities and exercise of prosecutorial discretion.503  Professor
Caminker argues persuasively, however, that executive judgments about
whether statutory claims should be pursued “are not constitutionally pro-
tected by Article II against congressional override.”504  Congress, for
instance, can dilute executive discretion through civil suit provisions, which
have consequences comparable to those of qui tam statutes.505  Zachary Price
surveys authority suggesting a broad congressional power to regulate the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.506  He notes that the Take Care Clause
was drafted against the background of the English Bill of Rights, which
denied the King authority to suspend or dispense with execution of parlia-
mentary enactments.507  While the effect of qui tam legislation on the
enforcement discretion of the executive branch should no doubt be taken
into account as a policy matter, it does not support the Lujan Court’s reading
of the Take Care Clause.
Lujan’s understanding of the Take Care Clause also seems anachronis-
tic.  It is unlikely that late eighteenth-century Americans would have under-
stood the provision to afford the President a semi-exclusive authority to
monitor executive branch officials, since any presidential monitoring of a far-
499 See supra Section II.B.
500 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *226.
501 See supra Section II.A.
502 Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“who as well for the king
as for himself sues in this matter”).
503 Beck, supra note 108, at 583 (“The common informer has little reason to consider
broader issues of public policy raised by a particular prosecution, and in fact has a strong
financial incentive not to take such considerations into account.  The result is that inform-
ers pursue litigation that disinterested prosecutors would consider contrary to the public
good.”); id. at 584–85 (examples of English informers pursuing inappropriate defend-
ants); id. at 620–33 (examples under the Federal False Claims Act).
504 Caminker, supra note 137, at 359–60.
505 Id. at 360.
506 See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671,
711–16 (2014).
507 See id. at 689–96.
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flung federal workforce would necessarily be superficial.  When the Constitu-
tion was ratified, the United States covered hundreds of thousands of square
miles, stretching from Maine (then part of Massachusetts) to Georgia and
from the Atlantic to the Northwest Territory (including present day Illinois
and Wisconsin).508  Those who created the Constitution anticipated that fed-
eral officials would engage in activities taking them throughout this vast terri-
tory, counting inhabitants, collecting taxes, regulating commerce among
states and with Indian tribes, carrying mail, and conducting military opera-
tions.509  The ultimate size of the federal workforce was uncertain, but it was
clear that the country, still burdened by Revolutionary War debts, could not
afford a large bureaucracy.510  Travel and communication were slow and
cumbersome.511  Exclusive reliance on centralized presidential monitoring
of federal agents would mean little or no monitoring at all for some very
significant government functions.  This explains why Congress turned to qui
tam legislation in several instances where the decentralized nature of federal
activity would make presidential supervision difficult.512  In sum, the history
recounted in Part II and the circumstances prevailing in the eighteenth-cen-
tury United States make Lujan’s reading of the Take Care Clause implausible
as a matter of original understanding.
C. Qui Tam Litigation and the Unitary “Executive Power”
Apart from the Take Care Clause, we should also consider the implica-
tions of qui tam history for the more general Article II executive power ques-
tions raised by cases like Morrison.  The Morrison Court upheld the
independent counsel statute, rejecting the argument that the legislation
diverted executive power constitutionally vested in the President.  The Court
agreed that the independent counsel’s investigation and prosecution of fed-
eral crimes constituted an exercise of “executive power,” but concluded that
the President maintained “sufficient control” by virtue of various provisions
of the statute, including the power to remove the independent counsel for
good cause.513  Does the history of qui tam regulation of executive officials
support the Court’s result in Morrison?  Does that history call into question
the unitary executive theory, either in the form embodied in the majority
opinion or the stronger version advocated in Justice Scalia’s dissent?
The best answer to these questions, in my view, derives from Blackstone’s
comment placing qui tam suits in the category of “popular actions, because
508 See United States, 1789, MAPS ETC, http://etc.usf.edu/maps/pages/700/795/
795.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2017).
509 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 8; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 408 (1819) (“Throughout this vast republic . . . revenue is to be collected and
expended, armies are to be marched and supported.”).
510 See supra notes 367–70 and accompanying text.
511 See supra notes 388–90, 439 and accompanying text.
512 See supra subsections II.C.2 and II.C.4.
513 See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
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they are given to the people in general.”514  The power to bring a qui tam
action was not a governmental power, but rather a power exercised by the
public with legislative authorization.  Under Anglo-American legal tradition,
legislatures could place the power to seek forfeitures from public officials for
unlawful acts in the hands of other government officers, aggrieved parties, or
members of the general public.  Since the power to initiate a qui tam action
was “given to the people,” it was not a governmental power subject to the
Constitution’s tripartite division among legislative, executive, and judicial
powers.515  The tradition of qui tam legislation can coexist comfortably with
Article II’s allocation of all “executive power” to the President because “exec-
utive power” is a subcategory of governmental power.
Qui tam legislation developed during centuries in which English and
American governments wielded considerably less power than they do today.
As a consequence, citizens were often called upon to participate in law
enforcement activities or to help extend the government’s coercive reach.  A
sheriff could call on a “posse comitatus” of armed citizens to assist in pursuing
a criminal or keeping the peace.516  The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred a
version of this authority on the federal marshal, providing that “he shall have
power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty.”517
Citizen jurors authorized prosecutions as members of grand juries or applied
the law as members of petit juries.518  The citizen militia could be called out
to protect the community and “execute the Laws of the Union.”519  Through
the power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”520 Congress could
license “privateers,” turning privately owned vessels into a naval force to tar-
get enemy shipping.521  These traditional methods of involving citizens in law
514 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *160; see also id. at *262 (statutory forfeitures “which
regard mere matters of police and public convenience” are “usually left to be inforced by
common informers, in the qui tam informations or actions, of which we have formerly
spoken”).  The term “popular action” can be traced to Roman law. See James E. Pfander,
Standing to Sue: Lessons from Scotland’s Actio Popularis, 66 DUKE L.J. 1493, 1500–03 & n.41
(2017).
515 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *160.
516 David B. Kopel, The Posse Comitatus and the Office of Sheriff: Armed Citizens Summoned
to the Aid of Law Enforcement, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 763–64 (2015) (“The
sheriff in carrying out his peacekeeping duty may summon to his aid the able-bodied adults
of the county.”).
517 An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73,
87 (1789).
518 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amends. V–VII.
519 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Jason Mazzone, The Commandeerer in Chief, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 265, 306 (2007).
520 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
521 See Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 579, 587 (2014) (“The Ameri-
can Revolution itself was steeped in a story of the jury as a moment of direct citizen check
on the oppressive power of the government.”); Nicholas Parrillo, The De-Privatization of
American Warfare: How the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateer-
ing in the Nineteenth Century, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 8–11 (2007) (summarizing U.S. his-
tory of using privateers in military conflicts and eventual abandonment of the practice).
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enforcement and the projection of communal force often served as impor-
tant safeguards against abuse of governmental powers.522  In this light, we
can recognize qui tam legislation as another means of involving the public in
law enforcement processes in a manner that served as a check on govern-
ment officials.
CONCLUSION
This Article has highlighted an important aspect of our legal history and
drawn out implications for constitutional interpretation.  While qui tam
informers can prevent abuse of governmental power, my goal has not been to
advocate widespread revival of qui tam legislation targeting public offi-
cials.523  Whether or not popular actions against government officials should
be a part of our legal future, their routine use in the legal past illuminates
several questions about our constitutional design.
522 See John F. Romano, State Militias and the United States: Changed Responsibilities for a
New Era, 56 A.F. L. REV. 233, 236 (2005) (noting the Federalist Papers’ argument that
“standing armies pose a threat to liberty, and that militias will serve as a bulwark to this
threat”).
523 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  I have written elsewhere about the con-
flicts of interest that arise when we offer private financial inducements to qui tam inform-
ers for enforcing laws on behalf of the public. See Beck, supra note 108, at 608–37.
